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Abstract
Research concerning administrator effects and the wider field of experimenter expectancyeffects (Rosenthal, 1976) has established the theory that the hypotheses and knowledgeheld by an experimenter can unconsciously influence their results. Therefore, in a novel useof a photographic line-up from an actual police investigation, this research aims to explorethe impact of administrator effects without the memory component of a recalled event.Previous research in this area has used a traditional memory paradigm to test administratoreffects, however this has clouded the issue of whether the witness is being influenced bythe administrator or is actually remembering the event. This research removes the memorycomponent and therefore concentrates on the expectancy effect of the administrator.
In order to further the understanding of administrator effects, this research examineswhether there is an aspect of interpersonal behaviour which predisposes some individualsto be more susceptible to inferences from others, or predisposes some to be more likely toinfluence individuals than others. In order to do this the Fundamental InterpersonalRelations Orientation: Behaviour (FIRO-B) instrument is utilised to examine theinterpersonal relationship behaviour of the administrator and the participant. This researchalso identifies the cues emitted by the administrator by audio-recording the interactionbetween the administrator and the participant.
Using an experimental design, which manipulated the knowledge of the location of thetarget, five hundred and twenty six participants were asked to identify the personresponsible for the Lockerbie bombing. Line-up administrators, who were either informed ofthe location of the suspect, informed of the location of an alternative suspect, oruninformed of the location of the suspect, presented the participants with the photographicline-up of twelve men, one of which is believed to be the person responsible for theLockerbie bombing. Participants were asked to pick the person they thought was thesuspect from the line-up, they then completed the FIRO-B questionnaire.
Analysis of the frequency of identifications suggests the presence of an experimenterexpectancy effect. A chi-square goodness of fit test indicates that significantly moreparticipants identified the target suspect when the administrator was informed of thelocation of the target, than when the administrator was uninformed. Analysis of the FIRO-Bdata found that target identifiers in the informed condition reported significantly higherreceived control scores than non-identifiers from an informed condition matchedcomparison group. Target identifiers also reported significantly higher social interactivityand received inclusion scores than non-identifiers.
Analysis of the FIRO-B data from the line-up administrators found subtle differences in theFIRO-B scores of the administrators achieving a high number of target identificationscompared to administrators achieving a low number of target identifications. In particular,administrators achieving a high number of target identifications reported higher levels of
expressed control and lower levels of received control than administrators achieving a lownumber of target identifications. Analysis of the transcripts of the line-ups indicate thatadministrators in the informed condition interacted with their participants for longer, andexhibited more verbal cues. Administrators who obtained a target identification also spoketo their participants for longer. Those administrators who spoke to their participants forlonger reported higher levels of expressed control and lower levels of received control.
The results of this study point to an experimenter expectancy effect. Beyond that thoughthere appears to be an aspect of interpersonal behaviour that may be responsible for apredisposition to influence or to be influenced. This thesis, in line with previous researchadvocates the use of ‘double-blind’ line-up procedures in order to eradicate the possibilityof an administrator effect. However, it also highlights the importance of considering thesocial interaction between the experimenter and the participant that is at the heart of socialpsychology research with human participants. In particular, the damning effect on theresults of research conducted by an experimenter who assumes the dominant role in asocial interaction, with a participant who assumes the submissive role.
Contents
Acknowledgements 4
Abstract 5
List of Figures 14
List of Tables 16
List of Appendices 23
Chapter 1
The Interpersonal Nature of the Social Psychology Experiment –
The Role of the Experimenter 24
1.1. A brief history of the experimenter expectancy effect 24
1.2. The nature of experimenter effects 25
1.2.1. Non-interactional bias 26
1.2.2. Interactional bias 28
1.3. Evidence for the experimenter expectancy effect 29
1.4. The communication of an experimenter’s expectancy 35
1.5. Moderating experimenter expectancy effects 38
1.6. Chapter summary 39
Chapter 2
The Interpersonal Nature of the Social Psychology Experiment –The Role of the Subject 40
2.1. The unique nature of the experimental situation 40
2.2. The demand characteristics of the experimental procedure and why
they are attended to 41
2.3. Chapter summary 47
Chapter 3
Experimenter Expectancy Effects in Eyewitness Identification Procedures 49
3.1. The empirical evidence of bias in eyewitness identification procedures 49
3.1.1. Instruction bias 52
3.1.2. Suggestibility 54
3.1.3. Foil bias 56
3.1.4. Presentation bias 58
3.1.5. Investigator bias 62
3.2. Line-up good practice and the need for double blind procedures 65
3.3. Chapter summary 68
Chapter 4
Human Memory and Eyewitness Identification 70
4.1. The memory process and its fallibilities 70
4.2. Eyewitness identification 73
4.2.1. The fallibility of eyewitness identification 74
4.3. Estimator variables - Witness characteristics 75
4.4. Estimator variables - Event characteristics 78
4.5. System variables – How line-ups are conducted 80
4.6. The determinants of the accuracy of a line-up identification 82
4.7. Chapter summary 84
Chapter 5
The Background to the Present Research: A real-life example of aquestionable identification from a line-up procedure? 85
5.1. The case of Al Megrahi 85
5.2. The eyewitness identification evidence against Al Megrahi 86
5.2.1. Timeline of identification evidence 88
5.3. Expert witness reports on the identification evidence of Anthony Gauci 89
5.3.1. The fallibility of Mr Gauci’s memory 90
5.3.2. Procedural impropriety 91
5.4. Chapter summary 93
Chapter 6
Isolating the Experimenter Expectancy Effect: Removing the memory
component 95
6.1. The antecedents of the research 95
6.2. The rationale for removing the memory component 96
6.3. The aims of the present research 97
6.3.1. The interpersonal relations factor 99
6.3.2. Research hypotheses 100
Chapter 7
Methodology 101
7.1. A methodology for studying administrator effects 101
7.1.1. Ethics and confidentiality 102
7.2. The recruitment of Facilitators and Administrators 103
7.3. The sample 104
7.3.1. General and social characteristics 105
7.4. The procedure 107
7.4.1. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition A 107
7.4.2. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition B 108
7.4.3. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition C 108
7.4.4. Instructions for the line-up administrators 109
7.4.5. Guidelines for conducting the experiment 111
7.5. The materials 114
7.5.1. The FIRO-B Questionnaire 115
7.6. The design 122
Analysis Section 1 – Examining the Sample 125
Chapter 8
8.1. The age and gender of the participants in each of the experimentalconditions 125
8.2. The occupational categories and educational attainment of the
participants in each of the experimental conditions 126
8.3. The confidence ratings of the participants 128
8.4. The homogeneity of the groups of participants 130
Analysis Section 2 – Examining the Extent of the Administrator Effects 134
Chapter 9
9.1. Line-up member selection frequency for the five conditions 134
9.2. Line-up member selection frequency by type of line-up 141
9.3. Analysis of the participants who made target identifications in theinformed group 141
9.4. Analysis of the participants who made target identifications in theuninformed group 145
9.5. Target absent line-up analysis 149
9.6. Summary of the main findings of this chapter 151
Analysis Section 3 – Analysis of the FIRO-B Questionnaire 153
Chapter 10
10.1. Analysis of the structure of the FIRO-B questionnaire for this sample 153
10.2. The FIRO-B results for the whole sample 160
10.2.1. Gender and age differences in the FIRO-B scores for thewhole sample 163
10.3. Analysis of the differences between the informed groups (A1 and B1),the uninformed groups (A2 and B2), and the control group (C1) 167
10.3.1. Mann-Whitney U tests to compare the informed, uninformed,
and control groups 168
10.4. Analysis of the participants in the informed condition who identifiedthe target and a matched comparison group 170
10.4.1. T-tests to compare the informed group who identified thetarget and the matched comparison group 171
10.4.2. Logistic regression analysis 172
10.4.3. Partial Order Scalogram Analysis 174
10.5. Analysis of those participants, who identified the target in the informed,uninformed, and control conditions 180
10.5.1. Comparison of the mean scores of the total FIRO-B scale,the original scales and the new scales for the informed,uninformed, and control groups 181
10.5.2. Further analysis comparing the informed, uninformed and controlgroups who identified the target 182
10.6. Further analysis of the participants in the informed condition 184
10.6.1. Comparison of the FIRO-B mean scores for the participantsin the informed condition who made target and non-targetidentifications 184
10.6.2. Mann-Whitney U tests to compare the participants in the informedcondition who identified the target to those in the informed conditionwho did not identify the target 185
10.7. Analysis of the FIRO-B scores of the administrators 186
10.8. Summary of the main findings of this chapter 189
Analysis Section 4 – Analysis of the Transcripts from the Line-ups:
Examining Verbal Cues 191
Chapter 11
11.1. Coding of the transcripts 191
11.2. The length of the transcripts 194
11.3. Comparison of the transcripts obtaining target identifications withthose obtaining non-target identifications 195
11.4. The relationship between the transcripts and the AdministratorsFIRO-B scores 196
11.5. Summary of the main findings of this chapter 197
Chapter 12
Discussion 198
12.1. Discussion 198
12.1.1. Evidence for the experimenter expectancy effect 198
12.1.2. The impact of interpersonal relations 201
12.1.3. The impact of verbal cues 202
12.2. Implications of the research 203
12.3. Limitations of the research 205
12.4. Future directions for research 208
References 210
Appendices 232
Word count - 69604
Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 7.4.5.a: A pictorial representation of conditions 1 and 2 112
Figure 7.5.1.a:Mapping sentence for Schutz's (1992) theory of interpersonal
relations 116
Figure 7.5.1.b: Revised mapping sentence for Schutz’s (1992) theory
of interpersonal relations, perceived experiences only 117
Figure 7.6.a: The ten experimental groups and the number of participants
in each group 123
Figure 9.3.a: Percentage of target identifications by Facilitator in
the informed condition 143
Figure 9.3.b: Percentage of target identifications by Administrator in
the informed condition 144
Figure 9.3.c: Percentage of target identifications by male and female
Administrators in the informed condition 144
Figure 9.3.d: Number of target identifications made by male and female participants
in the informed condition by the gender of the Administrator 145
Figure 9.4.a: Percentage of target identifications by Facilitator in the
uninformed condition 147
Figure 9.4.b: Percentage of target identifications by Administrator
in the uninformed condition 148
Figure 9.4.c: Percentage of target identifications by male and female
Administrators in the uninformed condition 148
Figure 9.4.d: Number of target identifications made by male and female participants
in the uninformed condition by the gender of the Administrator 149
Figure 10.1.a: Visual representation of the SSA for the FIRO-B data 158
Figure 10.1.b: Visual representation of the SSA for the FIRO-B data with
regional interpretation 159
Figure 10.4.3.a: A partial order scalogram analysis of 21 profiles derived from
the 72 individuals in the target and matched comparison groups 176
Figure 10.4.3.b: Item diagram for the received control scale 177
Figure 10.4.3.c: Partitioned item diagram for the expressed control scale 178
Figure 10.4.3.d: Partitioned item diagram for the personal and social inclusion
scale 179
Figure 10.4.3.e: A partial order scalogram analysis of 25 profiles showing the location
of the informed individuals who identified the target (T) and the matched
comparison individuals (C) with superposition of the two partition lines 180
Tables
Table 7.3.1: The number of participants recruited by each administrator 105
Table 7.3.1.1: The educational attainment of the participants 106
Table 7.3.1.2: The occupational categories of the participants 107
Table 7.5.1.1: The item numbers of the FIRO-B for each scale 118
Table 7.5.1.2: The item numbers of the revised FIRO-B structure 121
Table 8.1.1: Percentage and frequencies of male and female participants in
each condition 125
Table 8.1.2: Age range and mean ages of participants in each condition 126
Table 8.2.1: Percentage of participants from each occupational category in
each condition 127
Table 8.2.2: Levels of educational attainment for participants in each
condition 127
Table 8.3.1: Confidence ratings for all participants 128
Table 8.3.2: Confidence ratings for each condition as a percentage
(frequencies in parentheses) 129
Table 8.3.3:Mean confidence ratings for each condition 129
Table 8.4.1: The percentage of male and female participants in the informed
and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 130
Table 8.4.2: The percentage of participants in each age group for the informed
and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 131
Table 8.4.3: The percentage of participants in each of the age groupings for
the informed and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 131
Table 8.4.4: Percentage of participants in each occupational category for the
informed and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 132
Table 8.4.5: Percentage of participants in each educational category for the
informed and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 133
Table 9.1.1: Percentage of line-up member selections for the five conditions
(frequencies in parentheses) 135
Table 9.1.2: The percentage of identification responses (frequencies in parentheses)
for the two targets and the line-up fillers for all conditions 136
Table 9.1.3: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member
identification in condition C1 137
Table 9.1.4: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member
identification in condition A1 138
Table 9.1.5: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member
identification in condition A2 138
Table 9.1.6: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member
identification in condition B1 139
Table 9.1.7: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member
identification in condition B2 139
Table 9.1.8: Comparison of observed frequencies of target and non-target
line-up member identification for conditions A1, A2, B1, and B2, with
observed frequencies from the control condition 140
Table 9.2.1: Percentage of line-up member selections by type of line-up
(frequencies in parentheses) 141
Table 9.3.1: Percentage of male and female participants making target identifications
in the informed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 142
Table 9.3.2: Percentage of participants making target identifications for each
age group in the informed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 142
Table 9.3.3: Percentage of target identifications by type of line-up in the
informed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 143
Table 9.4.1: Percentage of male and female participants making target identifications
in the uninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 146
Table 9.4.2: Percentage of participants making target identifications for each
age group in the uninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 146
Table 9.4.3: Percentage of target identifications by type of line-up in the
uninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses) 147
Table 9.5.1: Percentage of line-up member selections in Condition 2 for
each condition (frequencies in parentheses) 150
Table 9.5.2: Percentage of target identifications in the informed and uninformed
conditions in Condition 2 (frequencies in parentheses) 150
Table 10.1.1: The variance explained by each component 153
Table 10.1.2: Comparison of eigenvalues from PCA and criterion values
from parallel analysis 153
Table 10.1.3: Component correlation matrix for the six factor solution 155
Table 10.1.4: Component correlation matrix for the three factor solution 156
Table 10.1.5: Items of the FIRO-B in each facet 158
Table 10.1.6: Cronbach alpha coefficients for the original and new scales 160
Table 10.2.1: Range and mean scores for each of the original scales for the
complete sample 162
Table 10.2.2: Range and mean scores for each of the new scales for the
complete sample 162
Table 10.2.1.1: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the original
scales and the total score for the male and female participants 164
Table 10.2.1.2: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the new
scales and the total score for male and female participants 164
Table 10.2.1.3: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probability
values for the original scales for male and female participants 165
Table 10.2.1.4: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probability
values for the new scales for male and female participants 165
Table 10.2.1.5: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation between participant age
and the original FIRO-B scales 166
Table 10.2.1.6: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation between participant age
and the new FIRO-B scales 166
Table 10.3.1: Range, median, and mean scores for the total FIRO-B for the
informed, the uninformed, and the control groups 167
Table 10.3.2: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the original scales
for the informed, uninformed, and control groups 169
Table 10.3.3: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the new scales
for the informed, uninformed, and control groups 168
Table 10.3.1.1: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probability
values for the original scales for the informed, uninformed, and control
conditions 169
Table 10.3.1.2: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probability
values for the new scales for the informed, uninformed, and control conditions 169
Table 10.4.1:Mean scores for the original scales for the informed group who
identified the target and the matched comparison group 171
Table 10.4.2:Mean scores for the new scales for the informed group who
identified the target and the matched comparison group 171
Table 10.4.1.1: Results of the Independent-Samples t-tests comparing the original
scale mean scores for the target group and the matched comparison group 172
Table 10.4.1.2: Results of the Independent-Samples t-tests comparing the new
scale mean scores for the target group and the matched comparison group 172
Table 10.4.2.1: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of correctly identifying
the target for the original scales 173
Table 10.4.2.2: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of correctly identifying
the target for the new scales 174
Table 10.4.3.1: Range of scale scores to constitute each structuple group 174
Table 10.5.1.1:Mean scores of the original scales for the informed, uninformed
and control groups who identified the target 182
Table 10.5.1.2:Mean scores of the new scales for the informed, uninformed
and control groups who identified the target 182
Table 10.6.1.1:Mean scores of the original FIRO-B scales for the target and
non-target identifications in the informed condition 184
Table 10.6.1.2:Mean scores of the new FIRO-B scales for the target and
non-target identifications in the informed condition 185
Table 10.6.2.1: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the original scale
scores for participants making target and non-target identifications in the
informed condition 185
Table 10.6.2.2: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the new scale
scores for participants making target and non-target identifications in the
informed condition 186
Table 10.7.1: Comparison of the mean scores of the Administrators and the
participants for the total scores, the original scales, and the new scales 187
Table 10.7.2: Percentage of target identifications for the Administrators in the
informed condition who returned a FIRO-B questionnaire 188
Table 10.7.3: Comparison of the scores for the four Administrators in the informed
condition for the total scores, the original scales, and the new scales 188
Table 11.1.1: Verbal behaviours of the Administrators with examples from the
transcripts 191
Table 11.1.2: Kappa Measure of Agreement values for the eleven behaviours
identified 192
Table 11.1.3: Percentage of each of the Administrator’s behaviours in their line-ups
in the informed, uninformed, and control conditions (frequencies in parentheses) 192
Table 11.1.4: Number and percentage of Administrator behaviours identified in
and average number of line-ups per behaviour in each condition 193
Table 11.2.1:Mean number of words spoken by Administrators and participants
in the three conditions 194
Table 11.3.1: Comparison of the mean number of words spoken by the Administrator
and the participant, for target and non-target transcripts 196
Table of Appendices
Appendix 1
Photo line-up containing Mr Megrahi’s picture shown to Mr Gauci on the 15th February 1991
Appendix 2
SREP approval certificate
Appendix 3
Consent form
Appendix 4
Photo-array X1 and X2
Appendix 5
Photo-array Y1 and Y2
Appendix 6
Respondent answer sheet
Appendix 7
The FIRO questionnaire
Appendix 8
The Screeplot of the Principal Components Analysis for the FIRO-B data
Appendix 9
Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of six factor solution of FIRO-Bitems
Appendix 10
Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of three factor solution of FIRO-Bitems
Chapter 1: The Interpersonal Nature of the Social Psychology Experiment –
The Role of the Experimenter
1.1. A brief history of the experimenter expectancy effect
Research concerning experimenter expectancy effects has a long history in Psychology,
indeed the effect has been established in a number of social psychology studies. The term
was coined by Robert Rosenthal following the research conducted by Rosenthal and
colleagues during the 1950’s and 1960’s. It describes how the hypotheses of the researcher,
through their unintentional behaviour towards their participants, may cause their
hypotheses to be confirmed. However, the observation that the experimenter can have an
effect on their data far precedes the establishment of the discipline of Psychology. Indeed,
Sir Francis Bacon writing in the year 1620 highlighted the impartiality of the observer. He
also predicted phenomena that are now recognised by cognitive psychologists as biased
assimilation, selective attention, and confirmation bias (Risinger, Saks, Thompson, &
Rosenthal, 2002). Whilst, nearly two hundred years ago astronomers observing stellar
transit times, found that different times were being recorded by different individuals. As
individuals used the same methods to measure these times, the difference it was realised
must reside with the individuals making the observations (Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal,
Thompson, 2003).
During the early years of the 20th Century the idea that the experimenter can affect their
results was slowly seeping into researcher’s consciousness. However, whilst researchers
were reaching these conclusions separately, there had yet to be a concerted effort to
combine the efforts of the separate researchers into one theory. One of these researchers
Pfungst (1911) drew attention to observer effects by debunking the mystery of Clever Hans,
the horse said to be able to solve arithmetic problems. Pfungst observed that rather than
being a mathematical genius, Clever Hans was instead responding to the inadvertent cues
exhibited by the questioners. Research in the 1920’s (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939)
attempting to study the productivity of workers under different conditions, was also an
early example of the experimental procedure having a direct effect on the participants. In
what became known as the Hawthorne effect it was found that receiving special treatment
as part of the experimental procedure was the cause of the increased productivity, rather
than the improvements made to the working conditions. Although the methodology of the
original experiment was subsequently criticised, the Hawthorne effect, as the knowledge
that the experimental procedure can have unforeseen effects on the participants, has
survived.
By the 1930’s a young researcher (Rosenzweig, 1933) published what is now considered a
seminal paper on the possible sources of error in the psychological experiment (Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991). Firstly, he argued that the experimenter’s attitude towards the participant
and the participant’s attitude towards the experiment can be a source of error. Secondly,
twenty years before Orne would describe the ‘good subject’ effect, Rosenzweig cautioned
that the motivations of the subject may lead to bias in the experiment. Finally, Rosenzweig
argued that the characteristics of the experimenter and their verbal and non-verbal
behaviours may affect the responses of the participants.
However, it was not until the 1960’s that researchers began to take serious notice of
experimenter effects. In the intervening years a vast body of research has accumulated in
the fields of physical, biological, and behavioural science where experimenter effects have
been noted. From the physical sciences there are numerous examples of scientists failing to
see phenomena that do exist, for example Newton and the absorption lines in the prismatic
solar spectrum. And further examples of scientists observing phenomena that do not exist,
for example Rene Blondlot’s N-rays. It is now widely accepted that the human being is not
an objective observer, but rather that, their views, wishes and knowledge have an impact on
the data they report. As Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) succinctly note, the experimenter
expectancy effect can be described as:
“the tendency for experimenters to obtain results they expect, not simply becausethey have correctly anticipated nature’s response but rather because they havehelped to shape that response through their expectations” (p. 377).
1.2. The nature of experimenter effects
Experimenter effects can be divided into two groups, firstly where the experimenter does
not influence the subject’s behaviour, and secondly, where the experimenter does influence
the subject’s behaviour. Rosnow and Rosenthal (1997) term these two groups as non-
interactional bias and interactional bias respectively.
1.2.1. Non-interactional bias
In the first group, non-interactional bias, there are three types of experimenter effect to
consider; observer effects, interpreter effects, and intentional effects. In the first group the
experimenter is an observer and the effect in this group manifests itself as an error of
observation, perhaps an overestimation or underestimation of some phenomenon. An
example of observation error was found in research conducted in 1940. Berkson, Magath,
and Hurn found that laboratory technicians counting blood cells only reported sample
counts that were accurate 15-34% of the time.
The second type of non-interactional experimenter effect; the interpreter effect, involves an
error when interpreting data. As the interpretation of data can be subjective it is harder to
define an interpretative error than it is an observer error. It is also suggested that
interpreter errors are less significant than observer effects (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
Other researchers have the opportunity to re-interpret the data once it is in the public
realm, however, it is impossible to return to the actual experiment and observe the subject
again. The third experimenter effect; the intentional effect involves falsifying data in order
to support hypotheses. Whilst research has suggested that undergraduate students may be
susceptible to falsifying data in order to obtain the desired results (Weinstein, 1979), there
are also examples of eminent scientists who have falsified their research (Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991).
Non-interactional observer effects have also been found where the expectation of the
observer has been manipulated. Two groups of identical planaria (freshwater flatworms)
were observed for how many head turns and body contractions they made. In the first
condition the observers were told that they should expect a high number of head turns and
contractions. In the second condition the same observers were told to expect a low number
of head turns and contractions. The observers identified twice as many head turns and three
times as many body contractions in the first condition, when they were expecting a high
number (Cordaro & Ison, 1963).
Recently attention has turned to the possibility of observer and interpreter effects within
the forensic sciences. Indeed it is suggested that a number of factors can pervade the
consciousness of the forensic scientist and lead to bias. Firstly, it is suggested that if an
examiner assumes the role of working for the prosecution, their perceptions of the evidence
before them will be affected by their need to aid the prosecution’s case. Indeed, it is
suggested that individuals who fail to retain their impartiality may be motivated to bias their
results in favour of the prosecution’s case.
In what has been termed an “adversarial allegiance” (Murrie, Boccaccini, Turner, Meeks,
Woods, & Tussey, 2009, p. 19), Murrie, Boccaccini, Guarnera, and Rufino (2013) suggest that
it is not only forensic scientists who are susceptible to the biasing effects of working for the
prosecution. Indeed, they argue that forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, when
employed as expert witnesses, are susceptible to the same bias. Field studies of actual civil-
commitment trials have found that experts scored their clients on a measure differently
according to whether they were employed by the prosecution or the defence. Furthermore,
the direction of the scores favoured the case of the employer, either the prosecution or
defence. This has been found even with the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare,
2003), which consistently demonstrates very strong inter-rater agreement (Murrie,
Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 2008; Murrie et al., 2009).
In addition to assuming a role for the prosecution, forensic examiners can also be
susceptible to contextual effects. As Risinger et al., (2002) point out, often, samples sent to
the examiner are accompanied by extraneous information about the case. This may include
the investigators hypothesis that they have caught the culprit and just need the examiner to
confirm their hypothesis. Or the investigator may provide the examiner with details of other
evidence they have collected (Giannelli, Weatherhead, & Weatherhead, 2010). In such
circumstances the presence of this extraneous information may inadvertently effect the
judgements made by the examiner.
Notwithstanding the comprehension of the general population that DNA analysis is free
from bias and interpretation, it is necessary in some cases for analysts to provide some
interpretation of the data. For example when the DNA sample is degraded, when there is a
small quantity, or when there is a mixture of DNA from two or more individuals, it is
necessary for the analyst to interpret the data and provide some judgement. In these cases
it is suggested that the interpretation of the evidentiary DNA sample may be influenced by
the analysts knowledge of the suspects DNA profile. Furthermore, it is argued that
information about the suspect, or details about the investigation can become known to the
scientist, including whether eyewitness identifications of the suspect have been made, or
whether the suspect has confessed to the crime, and the possible motives of the suspect for
committing the crime (Krane et al., 2008). The authors stress that knowledge of the suspects
DNA profile and knowledge of the case can result in confirmatory bias, thereby calling into
question the reliability of the analysis.
Fingerprint comparison is also a subjective judgement on the part of the analyst. Although
automated fingerprint identification systems search databases and find comparable
samples, the actual matching of a latent fingerprint from a crime scene, to a suspect’s
fingerprints is conducted by an expert. Real-life examples of mistakes by multiple forensic
experts suggest that subsequent experts may be susceptible to confirmation and context
bias if they know that the previous analyst has matched the latent print to the suspect (Dror
& Cole, 2010). Therefore, if an examiner assumes the role of working for the prosecution,
and knows that the police have who they believe to be the suspect in custody they may be
susceptible to confirmation bias. Whereby evidence confirming the hypothesis is accepted
and disconfirming evidence is rejected.
1.2.2. Interactional bias
In this instance it is the second group, the interactional bias group, where the experimenter
directly influences the response or behaviour of the participant, in which we are particularly
interested. In moving to study this group we also move from the physical and biological
sciences to the behavioural sciences to consider the expectations of the experimenter. The
effect of a person’s expectations on another person’s behaviour, the “self-fulfilling
prophecy” was aptly labelled by the sociologist Merton (1948). His theory proposes that a
person’s expectations and predictions about another person’s behaviour will cause the
person to act in the predicted or expected way. Although the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ term
was coined by Merton in the 1940’s the concept had already been utilised in a clinical
setting by the 1890’s (Rosenthal, 1976). Since this time research concerning self-fulfilling
prophecy has been conducted in a wide variety of experiments, including, reaction time,
psychophysics, animal learning, verbal conditioning, personality assessment, person
perception, learning, and ability (Valentine, 1992). Whilst much of this research purported
to show experimenter expectancy effects, as Rosenthal (1976) points out, the methodology
of some of these studies may have shown the effect of confounding variables not the
experimenter’s expectancy. In response to this, studies by Rosenthal and colleagues have
adopted a methodology more suited to measure the experimenter expectancy effect,
whereby the variables of the experiment are kept constant and only the experimenter’s
expectancy is manipulated.
1.3. Evidence for the experimenter expectancy effect
The self-fulfilling prophecy theory can be seen in action in the Pygmalion experiments
(Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1992), where teachers expected certain students to bloom
academically those students did indeed bloom academically. In these now famous
experiments, children of an American elementary school were given an IQ test. The teachers
at the school were led to believe that the test would predict academic growth. Twenty
percent of the students were randomly selected into the academic growth condition, the
teachers were then informed which of their students had scored highly on the test and
therefore were expected to bloom academically. When the children were tested with the
same IQ test eight months later; those who had been indicated as academic bloomers had
scored higher on the IQ test than those in the control group. This effect however, was first
documented with animal subjects. Studies with rats (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963a; Rosenthal &
Lawson, 1964), have found that those experimenters who are led to expect bright rats on a
maze or in Skinner boxes did indeed report bright rats, and those led to expect dull rats
reported dull rats.
In order to study experimenter expectancy effects under methodologically sound conditions
Rosenthal conducted a series of experiments (Rosenthal, 1966). One such experiment was
conducted by Rosenthal and Fode (1961), and then replicated by them in 1963(b). For the
first experiment ten undergraduate experimental psychology students were recruited as
experimenters. Each experimenter recruited between 18 to 24 participants, resulting in a
subject pool of 206 student participants. The experimenters were required to conduct a
person perception task by showing the participants ten photos and asking them to rate each
photo on a scale from extreme failure to extreme success. Each photo had previously been
rated as a zero, neither a success nor a failure. However, five experimenters were told that
their participants would average a -5 rating (moderate failure), whilst the other five
experimenters were told that their participants would average a +5 rating (moderate
success). Additionally, experimenters were told they would be paid $1.00 per hour, or $2.00
per hour if their results were as expected.
In order to control the variables of the experiment, experimenters were asked not to discuss
the experiment with anyone, and not to say anything to the participants other than the
instructions supplied to them. The results of the first experiment showed that the
experimenters expecting successful ratings (+5) obtained higher ratings than those
experimenters expecting failure ratings (-5). Due to the exceptional nature of these results,
and the scepticism which greeted these results from journal publishers (Rosnow &
Rosenthal, 1997), the researchers conducted a replication. In the replication, twelve
undergraduate industrial psychology students served as experimenters, who between them
recruited 86 participants. The replication followed the same procedure as the first
experiment with one important exception. In the first experiment the experimenter handed
each photo to the participant when asking them to make their ratings. However, in the
replication the photos were mounted onto cardboard and were not handled by the
experimenter. Again the results were exceptional; as in the first experiment all of those
experimenters expecting positive ratings did indeed obtain positive ratings, and those
expecting negative ratings obtained negative ratings. Therefore, even in the replication
experiment, where the researchers had strived to reduce the interaction between the
experimenter and subject, the same effects of experimenter expectancy had been found.
Reviewing these studies, Rosenthal (1976) indeed argues for the presence of an
experimenter expectancy effect: “Since the experimenters had all read from the identical
instructions, some more subtle aspects of their behaviour toward their subjects must have
served to communicate their expectations to their subjects” (p.149). Nevertheless, there are
a number of questions that were raised by this research. Firstly, Rosenthal (1976)
questioned whether the results obtained were due to the monetary incentive provided to
the experimenters to produce the expected results. Secondly, it was noted that in one
respect the experiments were ecologically invalid, as the experimenters were only tasked
with one condition of expectancy, either success or failure. An experiment conducted by
Laszlo (cited in Rosenthal, 1976) covered these two areas. Firstly, the experimenters were
not offered an extra incentive to achieve the expected results, and secondly experimenters
conducted both success and failure rating conditions. The results of this experiment were in-
line with the previous two, when experimenters were expecting higher ratings they
obtained higher ratings. However, in contrast to the two previous experiments, there was
some overlap in Laszlo’s data, in that some of those expecting positive ratings actually
received negative ratings, and vice versa. Nonetheless, these results do appear to suggest
an experimenter expectancy effect regardless of cash incentive or a mixture of
expectancies.
The implications of the motivations of the experimenter have received further attention in
the research literature. In a study designed to measure the effect of both experimenter and
subject motivation, Rosenthal, Fode and Vikan-Kline (cited in Rosenthal, 1976), conducted
an experiment similar to those detailed above. In this instance twelve graduate students
were recruited as experimenters. They were required to conduct the photo-rating task, but
were led to expect mean ratings from their subjects of +7. The experimenters were
randomly allocated to a moderately motivated group (paid $2 per hour) or a highly
motivated group (paid $5 per hour). The subjects, of which there were 58, were also
randomly allocated into a moderately motivated group (unpaid), and a highly motivated
group (paid 50 cents for their participation). Contrary to the hypothesis of the study the
moderately motivated experimenters received the highest mean ratings and therefore the
greatest expectancy effects, with the moderately motivated subjects. Whilst the highly
motivated experimenters received the lowest mean ratings with the highly motivated
subjects.
Early research in this area has also considered the characteristics of both the experimenter
and the subject in an attempt to determine whether some experimenters are more likely to
influence their subjects, and whether some subjects are more susceptible to influence. The
biosocial attributes of the experimenter and subject, for example their gender was
considered. Recent research with rodents suggests that the gender of the experimenter
does indeed have an impact. Mogil et al., (2014, cited in “Lab mouse test results depend on
scientist's gender,”) found that lab rodents behaved differently according to the gender of
the experimenter. In this study they did not exhibit the usual signs of pain when injected
with an inflammatory agent, but only when male experimenters were present.
Nevertheless, with human subjects, contradictory research findings abound, with some
studies reporting a difference between female and male experimenters (Binder, McConnell
& Sjoholm, 1957; Sarason & Harmatz, 1965), and other studies finding no difference
(Ferguson & Buss, 1960). Rosenthal (1967) suggested that the gender of the experimenters
and the subjects are important variables to be considered in an experiment because of the
differing behaviours male and female experimenters are found to exhibit. He found that
male experimenters exhibit more friendly behaviour than female experimenters, whilst
female subjects are smiled at more often than male subjects.
When considering whether male or female experimenters are more likely to influence their
subjects a number of studies have been conducted with varying results. Rosenthal (1976)
reports two experiments using the photo rating task where male experimenters
demonstrated expectancy effects with both male and female subjects. Female
experimenters demonstrated expectancy effects with female subjects, however, with male
subjects female experimenters obtained ratings opposite to those expected. When the
experimenter gender was held constant (only male experimenters) female subjects were
more susceptible to the expectancy effect than the male subjects (Rosenthal, Persinger,
Mulry, Vikan-Kline, & Grothe, cited in Rosenthal, 1976). Research then seems to suggest
that male experimenters are more likely to influence their subjects, whilst female subjects
are more susceptible to influence. However as Rosenthal (1976) highlights, whilst some
studies have found male and female subjects to have no difference in their susceptibility to
influence, they have never found male subjects to be significantly more susceptible to
influence than female subjects.
Research conducted to test the Pygmalion hypothesis (increasing a teacher’s expectation of
a pupils performance will lead to an increase in that performance), outside of the classroom
has consistently found the Pygmalion effect with male subjects in military and industrial
settings. However, when male and female subjects are compared in a military setting, the
Pygmalion effect was found for the male subjects but for the female subjects was
dependent on the gender of the trainer. The research conducted by Dvir, Eden, and Banjo
(1995) found that when the trainer was male there were statistically significant differences
in the performance of male and female trainees in the Pygmalion condition compared to
male and female trainees in the control condition. However, when the trainer was female
there were no statistically significant differences between female trainees in the Pygmalion
condition and female trainees in the control condition.1 This research in-line with the
research reviewed above suggests that females are susceptible to the Pygmalion effect, but
are not apt at delivering it.
Whilst research has considered readily assessable and stable characteristics of both the
experimenter and the subject, studies have also examined those less readily assessable
characteristics, namely psychosocial attributes, including anxiety, need for approval,
hostility, authoritarianism, intelligence, dominance, status, and warmth (Rosenthal, 1976). It
has been suggested that experimenters who exude differences in these attributes elicit
different responses from their subjects. However, in a review of seven studies of
experimenter and subject anxiety Rosenthal (1976) found that levels of anxiety in the
experimenter and subject are significantly related to expectancy effects but not in a
discernible pattern. Low, medium and high levels of anxiety in both experimenters and
subjects are found to be significantly associated with expectancy effects. The effect of the
status of the experimenter was directly tested by Vikan-Kline (cited in Rosenthal, 1976). The
experimenters, either graduate students (lower status) or faculty members (higher status),
were required to try to influence their subjects to give ratings of success or failure on the
photo-rating task.  Overall the higher status experimenters were more influential than the
lower status experimenters. However, when the results were analysed in terms of
chronology, they found that lower status experimenters were more influential than higher
status experimenters with the first half of subjects. This relationship was reversed for the
second half of subjects.
In addition to the characteristics of the experimenter, the situational factors of the
experiment are also considered, for example the experimenter’s prior acquaintanceship
with the subject. Again the research in this area is not definitive. A study by Sacks (1952)
found that not only did prior contact between the experimenter and the subject increase
the subject’s performance on an IQ test, but the warmth of that contact was also important.
It is widely thought that the prior contact serves to reduce the anxiety felt by the subject,
thereby improving their performance on the task. However, further research has found
1 There was no condition of female trainers training male trainees. The authors highlight the need for researchin this area.
contradictory results, Stevenson, Keen and Knights (1963) state that strangers were more
influential experimenters than those known to the subject. Rosenthal (1976) argues that it
may be the type of experiment that mediates the effect of the relationship between the
experimenter and the subject. Where the task is more onerous for the subject, such as an
intelligence task, as in the Sacks (1952) study, there may be an increase in anxiety levels,
resulting in a greater effect of prior contact. Whereas with a more simple motor task, as in
the Stevenson et al., (1963) study, there is less anxiety and therefore less of an effect of the
relationship between the experimenter and subject. When considering expectancy effects,
research has suggested that prior acquaintanceship between the experimenter and subject
leads to expectancy effects (Rosenthal, Persinger, Vikan-Kline, & Mulry, cited in Rosenthal,
1976). However, this relationship is not so straightforward when the gender of the
experimenter is taken into account. Male experimenters were more influential with
acquainted subjects, whereas female experimenters were more influential with
unacquainted subjects (Persinger cited in Rosenthal, 1976).
Further situational factors have been studied in this respect, including the experimenter’s
experience of conducting such experiments, and how the behaviour of the subject during
the experiment affects the behaviour of the experimenter. Research has firstly suggested
that participants respond differently in experiments if their experimenter is experienced in
conducting the experiment. Furthermore, it has been observed that the experimenter’s
behaviour is influenced by the responses obtained from their participants. If the first group
of participants respond in a manner consistent with the hypothesis then the experimenter
will change their behaviour to successive participants, thereby influencing those participants
to also respond in the same manner (Rosenthal, 1976).
Due to the pervasive nature of experimenter expectancy effects and the vast amount of
research that this topic has spurned from areas as diverse as education and the workplace,
Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) conducted a meta-analysis of the research conducted. The body
of the meta-analysis consisted of 345 studies of interpersonal expectancy effects conducted
in eight research areas; reaction time, inkblot tests, animal learning, laboratory interviews,
psychophysical judgments, learning and ability, person perception, and everyday situations.
The aim of the meta-analysis was to determine whether the first 345 studies were actually
measuring an experimenter expectancy effect at a greater than chance level, or whether the
345 studies constitute a biased sample. The results of the meta-analysis found that in all of
the eight research areas a much greater proportion of studies achieved statistical
significance than would be expected by chance. Furthermore, it was calculated that non-
significant results from 65,000 studies would be required to reduce the probability values to
levels of significance that would not be acceptable. Overall, analysis of probability values
and effect sizes found unwavering evidence for the presence of experimenter expectancy
effects. Indeed, a contemporary of Rosenthal, Rosenberg (1980) suggests that the meta-
analysis indicates that the expectancy effect is “replicable ... it operates over a broad range
of substantive research areas [and is] capable of contaminating research procedures of the
non-experimental as well as the experimental variety” (p. 473).
1.4. The communication of an experimenter’s expectancy
Indeed from the beginnings of research concerning experimenter effects conducted in the
laboratory and the classroom, the concept has been extended to fields as diverse as the
judicial system and the healthcare system (Rosenthal, 2003). Research has evolved from
studying the experimenter-subject and teacher-pupil relationship to also considering the
judge-juror, doctor-patient, and manager-employee relationships. Furthermore, as the
research field has expanded so has the understanding of the “covert communication” (p.
151), the means of transmitting the expectations of the experimenter to the subject. Early
research, attempting to explain how experimenters communicate their expectancies to their
subjects, involved experimenters intentionally trying to influence their subjects. It was
hoped that the cues used by experimenters would be the same overstated cues used in an
unintentional condition. In a replication of the photo-rating task described above, where the
experimenter tried to influence their subjects and observers tried to discern the
experimenters’ expectancy, it was found that observers are very accurate at discerning
experimenters’ expectancies (Rosenthal, 1976). The observers of this experiment suggested
two modes of expectancy communication, a visual-kinesic mode and an auditory-
paralinguistic mode.
Research was then conducted to try to determine the importance of these two modes of
communication (Rosenthal & Fode 1963b). A variation of the photo-rating task described
above, where the photos were mounted onto card and not handled by the experimenter
was used. Eighteen experimenters were led to expect ratings of -5 for the photos and were
randomly assigned to three experimental conditions; visual only condition, auditory only
condition, and visual and auditory condition. In the visual only condition the experimenters
handed the subjects written instructions and did not speak to them during the photo-rating
task, although they remained in view of the subject. In the auditory only condition the
experimenters read the instructions to the subjects but sat behind a screen during the
photo-rating task. In the visual and auditory cues condition the experimenters read the
instructions to the subjects and remained in their view for the photo-rating task. Rosenthal
and Fode (1963b) found differences in the expectancy effects for the three conditions.
There was no expectancy effect in the visual only condition; but there was a significant
expectancy effect in the auditory only condition. However, the visual and auditory condition
showed the most significant expectancy effect. The authors therefore conclude that
auditory cues are more important for communicating expectancy than visual cues, although
the most effective method appears to be a combination of visual-kinesic and auditory-
paralinguistic modes.
Rosenthal (2003) has furthermore demonstrated the process of experimenter expectancy
effects by three linked variables. Firstly there is the expectancy for the behaviour of the
other person (E). Secondly, there is the communication or mediating variables (M). Thirdly,
there is the response of the person for whom there are expectations (O). The link between E
and M explains the effect of the expectancy on the mediating communication variables,
whilst the link between M and O describes how the mediating communication variables
affect the outcome variable. The E-M link and the M-O link described above has been used
to explore judges expectations of guilt, how this expectation affects their instructions to
jurors and how jurors decisions about the defendants’ guilt are affected by the instructions
(Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, & Rosenthal, 1997). It is argued that in their capacity as arbiters
of criminal justice proceedings, judges may have made a decision about a defendants’ guilt
or innocence, which they then convey, through verbal or non-verbal means to the jurors.
Research concerned with the relationship between judges belief in a defendant’s guilt and
the jurors decisions of guilt or innocence (Hart, 1995) found a causal relationship between
these two factors. After hearing audio-taped testimony participants were then shown a
video-tape of a judge giving the jury instructions, the judge’s expectation of the defendant’s
guilt was manipulated. The participants who viewed the judges who had guilty expectations
were more likely to return a guilty verdict.
Halverson et al., (1997) propose that jurors may be particularly susceptible to the non-
verbal leakage of the judge’s beliefs about the defendant’s guilt for two reasons. Firstly,
being part of a jury is a novel experience for most people. In times of uncertainty as how to
act people will look to the authority figure in a situation, in this case a judge, and follow
their lead as how to behave. Secondly, if a juror is confused by the instructions given by the
judge, they will attend more to the judge’s non-verbal behaviour and take their cues from
that. Halverson et al., (1997) therefore devised an experiment which reduced the
complexity of the judge’s instructions, and made them more understandable. They
hypothesised that with clearer instructions jurors would attend less to the non-verbal
behaviour of the judge, and therefore be less influenced by it. The experiment was
conducted with two populations, students and adults. With the student population no
discernible biasing effect of the judge’s expectations was found, either with the clearer
instructions or the standard instructions. However, with the adult population decisions of
guilt were strongly linked to judge’s expectations of guilt with the standard instructions but
this relationship was weaker with the revised instructions.
Following the Pygmalion experiments and those that succeeded it Rosenthal and colleagues
suggested a theory of four factors to explain teacher expectancy effects (Rosenthal, 1994).
Firstly Rosenthal argues that teachers create a warmer socio-emotional climate for those
students who they have high expectations for. Secondly, he argues that teachers will give
more input and teach more material to those high expectation students. The third factor,
output, suggests that teachers will ask the high expectation students more often for
answers to questions in the classroom. Fourthly, Rosenthal suggests that teachers will give
more differentiated and personal feedback to high expectation students. The validity of the
four-factor theory proposed by Rosenthal was vindicated by a meta-analysis (Harris &
Rosenthal, 1985 and 1986) which found that the four factors which mediate the expectancy
effects are significantly related to the teacher’s expectations and the student’s
performance. Although the meta-analysis concentrates on the expectancy effects through
the teacher-pupil relationship, because the majority of the studies were conducted with this
interaction, some of the mediating behaviours may also be pertinent to other types of
interaction. Of the twelve behaviours found to associate strongly with teacher expectations,
creating a less negative climate, maintaining closer physical distances, creating a warmer
socio-emotional climate, having longer interactions, engaging in more eye contact, and
smiling more, may also relate to other expectancy interactions.
Indeed the warmer socio-emotional climate may explain why rats that were expected to
perform better in a maze or Skinner box did indeed perform better. When asked to rate
their attitudes and behaviour towards their rats, those experimenters who thought they had
‘bright’ rats rated them as more pleasant and likeable than those with ‘dull’ rats. The ‘bright’
rat experimenters also handled their rats more, and more gently, and were more pleasant
and friendly towards their rats than the ‘dull’ rat experimenters. Furthermore, the ‘bright’
rat experimenters watched their rats more closely than ‘dull’ rat experimenters. The
researchers suggest that the reinforcement provided by the extra handling and closer
observation may explain the superior performance of the rats in the maze and the Skinner
box (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963a; Rosenthal & Lawson, 1964).
1.5. Moderating experimenter expectancy effects
Despite the prevalence of experimenter expectancy effects, researchers have also identified
possible aspects which moderate the expectancy effect. Firstly it has been suggested that
initial impressions of the character of a person, that they are lazy for example, cannot then
be overcome by a subsequent expectancy (Jones, 1991). Indeed, it has been argued that
where there is greater contact between the teacher and the student, where the teacher
may have already formed an impression of that student, the Pygmalion effect is reduced
(Raudenbush, 1984). Secondly, it is suggested that experimenter expectancy effects may be
moderated because some individuals may not have the ability to understand or interpret
the cues of the experimenter, therefore rendering the expectancies obsolete (Rosnow,
Skleder, Jaeger, & Rind, 1994). It is furthermore imperative to note here that the vast
majority of people are unaware of how susceptible they are to the subtle cues advertently
or inadvertently communicated to them by other people (Wright, Carlucci, Evans, & Compo,
2010). Indeed as Wright et al., (2010) point out, people are more likely to believe that a
horse can do mental arithmetic, rather than believe that it was due to cues from the
audience or experimenter. Even in situations where an experimenter is actively trying to
influence the response of the subject, 70% of the subjects, when asked if they thought the
experimenter was trying to influence them, gave the lowest possible rating of influence
(Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 2009).
1.6. Chapter summary
There has been a gradual assimilation of the knowledge that the experimenter can
inadvertently affect the results of their research. Research in this area did not begin in
earnest until Rosenthal and colleagues began studying experimenter expectancy effects in
the 1950’s and 1960’s. Since then there has been a proliferation of research in the physical,
biological and behavioural sciences as researchers have taken note of the effect they can
have on their research. A vast quantity of research has been conducted by Rosenthal and
colleagues finding support for experimenter expectancy effects with human and animal
subjects. A finding which was further validated by the results of a meta-analysis of 345
studies of experimenter expectancy effects. The effects of experimenter’s expectancies have
also moved beyond the laboratory and now permeate educational, judicial, healthcare, and
management arenas. Theories of how expectancies are communicated have also been
highlighted, and research has attempted to determine whether some people are more
susceptible to influence or whether some people are more able to influence others.
Chapter 2: The Interpersonal Nature of the Social Psychology Experiment –
The Role of the Subject
The previous chapter dealt with the effect that an experimenter’s expectancy can have on
the subject; in this chapter we turn our attention to how the subject can in turn provide
influence through their expectations. This chapter therefore aims to answer a question
proposed by Rosenthal (1976), if an experimenter communicates their expectations to the
subject “why do subjects act so as to confirm these expectations?” (p. 180).
As Orne (1962) highlights, the experimental procedure described in the previous section can
reduce the participant to a passive responder who is to be exposed to stimuli, and observed
for differences in their reactions or behaviour. Orne (1962) contends that human subjects
cannot be manipulated in the same way as stimuli in the physical sciences. Instead humans
are conscious and thinking individuals, with motivations, perceptions, and expectations of
their own to be accounted for. As Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson contend, man as the
experimenter is “imperfectly standardised...he is imperfectly calibrated” (1976, p. 280). The
same must also be said of man as the experimental subject.
2.1. The unique nature of the experimental situation
The demand characteristics of the experimental procedure were identified by Orne (1962)
at approximately the same time as Rosenthal and colleagues were investigating
experimenter expectancy effects. In essence Orne suggested that participants modified their
behaviours in-line with the cues from the experimenter as to the ‘true’ meaning of the
experiment, and what the experimenter really wanted to find from the participant. In
medical research it has long been established that patients report an alleviation of
symptoms or an aggravation of side effects when they believe they are taking a particular
medication, even if they are in the placebo condition. Subjects, whether in medical or
psychological research, therefore respond to the experimental procedure and behave as
they believe they should behave.
Orne (1962) also draws attention to the acquiescence of free will of subjects in experimental
situations, and the control that is given to experimenters. This submission to the
experimental procedure is demonstrated in an example by Orne (1962), who details an
attempt to devise a task so boring and meaningless that subjects would give up the task
after a short while. However, he reports that it could not be done; it was not possible to
devise a task so boring or meaningless that a subject would refuse to do it, or would be
discontinued quickly. In a monotonous addition task, where subjects were required to rip up
each page of work after they had completed it, subjects would still continue for several
hours without any hostility towards the experimenter. Furthermore, subjects have been
shown to place themselves in physical danger (picking up a poisonous snake or putting their
hands in nitric acid) in order to fulfil the wishes of an experimenter (Orne & Evans, 1965).
Orne (1962) argues that there is something fundamentally unique about the experimental
situation and “taking part in an experiment” (p. 777) which means people acquiesce to the
will of the experimenter without question. Orne (1962) suggests that the experimenter-
subject relationship is unequal in power, and likens it to a parent-child or doctor-patient
relationship. That fundamental unique attribute is a shared belief by the experimenter and
the subject that the experiment is important, that it will benefit science and humanity, and
that the experimental procedure is justified. Orne (1962) demonstrated the acquiescence to
the experimental method with a very simple procedure. When acquaintances were asked to
do push-ups as a ‘favour’ they generally questioned the validity of the request. However,
when another group were asked to do push-ups as part of an ‘experiment’ they did not
question the request and were more than happy to participate. It is suggested that this is
because of the unequal nature of the relationship between the experimenter and the
subject. The experimenter holds a position of power as they hold the knowledge of what
constitutes a correct response, whilst the participant can only guess as to how they are
supposed to act (Rosenberg, 1965).
2.2. The demand characteristics of the experimental procedure and why they are attended
to
Participants it is argued also want to play the role of the “good subject” (Orne, 1962: p.
778), with participants anxious to perform well and in accordance with the aims of the
experiment. The role of a good subject will mean different things to different subjects, for
some it may involve appearing intelligent and giving the ‘correct’ answer, to others it may
mean appearing normal or healthy (Orne, 1969). The ‘good subject’ effect was investigated
initially by Orne (1959) with experiments using hypnosis. He contended that a person’s
behaviour whilst hypnotised may be determined by how they believe a hypnotised person
should act. A group of introductory Psychology students were informed that catalepsy of the
dominant hand is a normal reaction during hypnosis. The other group of students were not
informed about catalepsy. Students from the two groups were then asked to volunteer to
be hypnotised by experimenters who were blind to the groupings of the students. Of the
nine students in the first group to be hypnotised, five demonstrated catalepsy of the
dominant hand. Out of the second group of students however, none demonstrated the
reaction. This according to Orne suggests that in an attempt to be ‘good subjects’ the
students adapted their trance behaviour to their knowledge of what is expected during the
hypnotic state.
Therefore, in order to be good subjects, participants will attempt to uncover the true
rationale for the experiment and condition their responses or behaviour to fit the
experimenter’s hypothesis. Orne (1962) suggested that there are a number of cues which he
labelled ‘demand characteristics’ that the subject will attend to which will give them insight
into the purpose of the experiment. They include rumours about the research the subject
may have heard, the information given to the subject when recruiting them, the setting of
the laboratory, and the communication during the experiment whether implicit or explicit.
The experimental procedure itself can provide cues to the subject. A repeated measures
design, where a subject is tested twice on the same measure, can lead a subject to expect
some change. However, demand characteristics may not be perceived in the same way by
all subjects. The perception will depend upon the experience and expectations of the
subject. It will also depend on the amount of time and effort invested by the subjects in the
experimental procedure, the greater the investment in the procedure the greater the
investment in the outcome of the experiment.
Orne (1962) suggests that the inherent nature of demand characteristics in human subjects
means that it is not possible to devise an experiment where these characteristics are not a
factor. As Orne highlighted in the monotonous addition task, subjects will always ascribe
some meaning to the task they have been set. In the addition task for example, participants
surmised they were part of an endurance task. Orne contends that where participants
ascribe meaning they will also ascribe a hypothesis for the experiment; therefore instead of
trying to remove demand characteristics, he instead suggests acknowledging their presence
and trying to determine the effect of the characteristics. However, determining the demand
characteristics that the subject was aware of may not be a simple task to accomplish.
Interviewing the subjects after the experiment, about what they perceived to be the aim of
the experiment is one possible way advocated by Orne (1962) to achieve this. However, he
also states that this action in itself could have demand characteristics, and a correlation
between the participant’s behaviour and their perception of the hypotheses may not
explain the causes of the behaviour.
In order to counter these problems Orne (1962) suggested a pre-experimental inquiry,
whereby participants from the same population as the experimental participants are shown
the experimental materials, and the procedure is explained to them, but they do not take
part in the experiment. They are then asked what they think the aims of the research and
the hypotheses are. The demand characteristics of the experimental condition can then be
estimated. Orne (1962) also advocates the use of simulating subjects, where a group of
participants do not take part in the experimental condition, but are asked to act as if they
have. Using his work on hypnosis to illustrate this point, Orne (1959) contends that a blind
administrator, unaware that some participants are hypnotised whilst some are only
pretending, treats the two groups the same. Moreover, experimenters have been found to
be unable to distinguish the hypnotised participants from the simulators, even when they
are highly trained hypnotists. Therefore, it can be argued that the simulators are using the
cues from the experimental situation and the experimenter’s behaviour to act how they
think a hypnotised person should act. Orne (1962) then maintains that if the simulating
group are using these cues, then the same cues may also be responsible for the behaviour in
the experimental group, not the hypnotised state.
Following Orne’s (1962) theory of an altruistic ‘good subject’, other researchers have
attempted to explain the power of the experiment and the experimenter. In particular,
Rosenberg (1969) argued that participants when faced with the experimental procedure are
apprehensive about how they will be perceived and evaluated, and therefore developed the
term ‘evaluation apprehension’. Especially in social psychology experiments, where
participants are aware that their inner psyche (intelligence, mental health, and competence)
is being evaluated, they are anxious to appear ‘normal’ to the experimenter. The subjects
therefore attempt to discern the rationale of the experiment, and then behave in a manner
which will gain them a positive evaluation from the experimenter (Rosenberg, 1980). It is
also suggested that feedback to the participants as to their performance in the experiment,
results in participants further changing their behaviour in order to secure more
complimentary feedback.
Utilising Rosenthal’s person perception task, Rosenberg (1969) empirically measured the
impact of evaluation apprehension on expectancy effects by manipulating the level of
evaluation apprehension. Firstly, Rosenberg had participants read a communication before
participating in the person perception task. In the high evaluation apprehension condition
participants read a communication which indicated a link between poor performance on the
perception task and psychological maladjustment, thereby increasing the apprehension of
the participant that if they fail the perception task they will appear maladjusted. In the low
apprehension condition the communication indicated that the task was to collect base-line
data, participants were actively discouraged from linking their performance to their
psychological attributes. The results of this experiment found that a strong expectancy
effect was found in the high apprehension condition, but no such effect was found in the
low apprehension condition.
Whilst this research seemed to suggest that the expectancies of the experimenter are more
appreciable to participants experiencing higher levels of evaluation apprehension,
Rosenberg was concerned that the experiment did not include a control condition where
the apprehension of the participants was not manipulated. Duncan, Rosenberg, and
Finkelstein (1969) therefore conducted a replication with high and low evaluation
apprehension conditions, and a control condition with no apprehension manipulation which
Rosenberg likened to the level of evaluation apprehension in Rosenthal’s experiments. The
results of this replication found a strong linear relationship between apprehension and
expectancy. In the low apprehension condition as before, no expectancy effect was
identified. The expectancy effect was identified in the control condition, therefore
supporting Rosenthal’s research, and also to a greater extent in the high apprehension
condition. Thereby providing evidence of a link between evaluation apprehension, and the
experimenter expectancy effect.
In a series of experiments which have become infamous in the chronicles of psychology,
Milgram (1974) proposed the ‘obedient participant’. Orne (1962) had already identified the
unequal balance of power between the experimenter and the subject, however, Milgram
disagreed with Orne’s argument that participants attempt to work out the rationale of the
experiment and act accordingly. Instead he suggested that the participant acts in
accordance with the demands of the experiment because they are obedient to the authority
of the experimenter. Indeed even Milgram was surprised by the level of obedience that the
participants would demonstrate on the encouragement of an experimenter (Van Avermaet,
2001).
In the initial experiment subjects were offered a financial reward to participate in a study
concerned with memory and learning. Participants were led to believe that they had been
randomly selected to be the ‘teacher’ and the other participant (actually a confederate of
the experimenter), would be the ‘learner’. The teachers were instructed to administer
electric shocks, of increasing intensity, to the learner if they gave an incorrect answer, or
failed to provide an answer to a paired association task. The electric shocks ranged from 15
volts to 450 volts. If the teacher hesitated or refused to administer an electric shock they
were prompted by the experimenter. Milgram (1974) reported that almost two thirds
(62.5%) of the participants administered the highest level of electric shock to the learner
(450 volts), and on average the maximum shock was 368 volts. Participants were therefore
willing to administer painful punishments to the learner on the encouragement of the
experimenter, even though they could hear the learner scream in pain.
Milgram (1974) conducted a number of variations of the original experiment, all of which
cemented the power of the authority of the experimenter. When the experimenter was not
in the same room as the participant and gave instructions to administer the electric shocks
over the phone, only 21% of participants gave the learner the maximum voltage shock.
Furthermore, when the experimenter left the room and the authority for the experiment
was passed from the experimenter to a confederate participant, some participants
physically prevented the confederate participant from administering shocks, and only 20%
of the participants administered the maximum electric shock. It would therefore appear
that as Orne contended, the scientific experimenter occupies a uniquely privileged position
which invokes unparalleled levels of obedience.
As with many aspects of human behaviour, it is difficult to find a definitive and absolute
cause of such behaviour. As with many of the explanations of behaviour it is often true that
it may be a combination of theories which provide the best explanations. It may be so with
the cause of experimenter expectancy effects. It may be that the theory of altruism
purported by Orne, or evaluation apprehension argued by Rosenberg, or obedience to
authority suggested by Milgram all have a place in explaining the behaviour of participants
during the experimental procedure (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1997). Indeed, the above
proposition was validated in a study conducted by Aiken and Rosnow (as cited in Rosenthal
& Rosnow, 1975). College students were asked to rate how similar differently motivated
behaviours are to being a subject in a psychology experiment. There were two altruistically
motivated behaviours ‘give anonymously to charity’ and ‘work free as a lab assistant.’ Two
evaluation apprehension motivated behaviours ‘taking a final exam’ and ‘being interviewed
for a job.’ And two obedience to authority motivated behaviours ‘obeying a no smoking
sign’ and ‘not arguing with the professor.’
Using Multidimensional scaling the researchers created a visual map of the psychological
differences between the motivated behaviours. The map revealed that the college students
rated the altruistically motivated behaviours as closest to being a subject in a psychology
experiment, thereby providing evidence for Orne’s ‘good subject’ effect. However, this does
not mean that the other two theories should be discounted. Indeed, the evaluation
apprehension and obedience to authority motivated behaviours were also associated with
being a subject in an experiment. It would therefore appear then that subjects attend to the
demand characteristics of an experiment, because they want to be a good subject, they are
anxious at how they will be evaluated, and are obedient to the authority of the
experimenter.
Regardless of the reasons for attending to demand characteristics, Rosenthal and Rosnow
(1991) suggest that there are three mediatory steps which determine whether subjects
comply with them. The first step they propose is receptivity, whether the subject is
receptive to the expectations of the experimenter. They suggest that there are two
possibilities; subjects are either receptive or non-receptive. Non-receptive subjects at this
stage demonstrate non-compliant behaviour to the demand characteristics, they did not
understand the demand characteristics therefore they could not comply with them.
Receptive subjects then move to step two, motivation. It is argued that subjects are either
acquiescent to the demand characteristics, non-acquiescent to them, or counter-
acquiescent to them. At this stage non-acquiescent subjects are non-compliant to the
demand characteristics, they are not motivated by the demand characteristics therefore
they could not comply with them. Acquiescent and counter-acquiescent subjects then move
to the final step, capability. Subjects are either capable of acting on their motivation or they
are not. Both acquiescent and counter-acquiescent subjects who are incapable of acting on
their motivation are non-compliant to the demand characteristics. They could not act
acquiescent or counter-acquiescent to the demand characteristics therefore they could not
comply with them. Counter-acquiescent subjects who are capable of acting on their
motivation demonstrate counter-complaint behaviour; that is they behave in an opposite
manner to the demand characteristics. Acquiescent subjects who are also capable of acting
on their motivation demonstrate compliant behaviour; they cooperate with the demand
characteristics. It is therefore suggested that demand characteristics can only affect the
subject’s behaviour when the subjects are receptive to them, are motivated towards or
against them, and are capable of acting on their motivation.
2.3. Chapter summary
Research has attempted to explain why subjects in experiments behave so as to validate the
experimenters’ hypothesis. It is suggested that subjects attune to the demand
characteristics of the experiment to determine the aims and hypotheses of the experiment.
A number of reasons to explain this have been postulated. Orne (1962) suggests that
subjects attend to the demand characteristics because they wish to be a good subject,
Rosenberg (1969) suggests that it is because they are apprehensive of being negatively
evaluated, and Milgram (1974) suggests that it is because subjects are obedient to the
authority of the experimenter. Regardless of why subjects attend to the demand
characteristics of the experiment it is argued that they must be receptive to them,
motivated by them, and capable of acting on them, for demand characteristics to be a factor
in an experiment.
From the review of the literature in the first two chapters it is clear that the social
psychology experiment is indeed a social interaction between the experimenter and the
subject. As such, the interpersonal behaviour, personality, beliefs, knowledge and a
seemingly endless list of factors of both the experimenter and the subject all become
variables in the experiment. The social psychology experiment is therefore particularly
susceptible to bias from both the experimenter and the subject (Carlsmith et al., 1976).
Chapter 3: Experimenter Expectancy Effects in Eyewitness Identification
Procedures
In Chapter 3 we move from examining the role of the experimenter and the subject in the
social psychology experiment, to considering a specific area of research; the effect of
experimenter expectancy and demand characteristics in eyewitness identification
procedures.
3.1. The empirical evidence of bias in eyewitness identification procedures
Before the police line-up became a common feature of the criminal justice system,
eyewitness identification consisted of show-ups and courtroom identifications. The aim of
instituting the line-up procedure was to protect innocent suspects; in order to do this the
construction of the line-up must be fair and unbiased towards the suspect. For the line-up
to be fair the original rules for conducting a line-up, derived from case-law, stated that the
suspect should not stand out to the witness. Therefore a number of fillers who physically
resemble the suspect and each other were required. The specific number of fillers needed
or the specificities of the resemblance were not mandated, and different law enforcement
agencies developed their own standards (Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, 2006).
In Chapter 1 the possibility of role bias by members of the criminal justice system was
highlighted. It is clear that police officers may also be susceptible to the same bias. Police
officers are the front-line of the adversarial criminal justice system and therefore identify
their role as working for the prosecution. This bias may result in police officers conducting
biased line-ups in order to obtain an identification (Roberts, 2009). The presence of biased
eyewitness identification procedures has been accepted by members of the criminal justice
system for many years, as the quote from Supreme Court Justice William Brennan attests:
“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known... A major factorcontributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistakenidentification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which theprosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pre-trial identification...Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtleways.”(United States v. Wade, 1967).
Whilst eyewitness identification has always been a popular topic for experimentation by
Psychologists, the introduction of DNA technology to the criminal justice arena, highlighting
the inadequacies of such identification evidence, through the number of false
identifications, has resulted in a resurgence of interest (Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass,
Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). In particular there has been a resurgence in research
focussing on the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identifications. Utilising the research
conducted by Rosenthal and colleagues, studies have attempted to uncover the effect that
an administrator can have on an identification procedure.
In order to achieve this Wells and Luus (1990) proposed that an analogy be drawn between
a social psychology experiment and a line-up procedure. They argue that the important
aspects of an experiment have comparable elements in a line-up. For example the
experimenter is the police officer conducting the line-up, the subjects are the eyewitnesses.
The hypothesis of the experiment is that the suspect in the line-up is the perpetrator, and
that the eyewitness will identify the suspect. Therefore, as with any experiment the types of
bias discussed above, confirmation, response, and expectancy, can infiltrate the line-up
procedure. From the stand-point of a line-up as an experiment, Wells and Luus (1990)
suggest that the best practice for conducting line-ups can be empirically tested. Indeed,
there are a number of examples of studies which seek to improve the line-up procedure by
utilising the experimental framework.
Firstly, Wells and Luus (1990) state that mock witness line-ups can be used to test whether
the construction of the line-up is biased towards the person the police believe is the
suspect. In such situations the witness did not view the crime (hence the term mock
witness) but has instead read a description of the suspect (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973). It is
argued that if the mock witness identifies the suspect above chance level then the line-up
construction is biased towards the suspect, or the experimenter’s hypothesis of who the
suspect is has become apparent to the mock witness. The second test of witness
susceptibility to inference from the line-up administrator is called the blank line-up control
(Wells, 1984). In this type of line-up an actual eyewitness is shown a suspect absent line-up,
if the eyewitness picks a person from the line-up then they can be excluded from the line-up
containing the actual suspect, as they have been shown to be either susceptible to response
bias, or have a poor memory of the event.
The decision process of the witness has been extensively studied, and Wells (1984) has
argued that the witness undertakes one of two decision processes, an absolute judgement
or a relative judgement. In an absolute judgement the witness compares each member of
the line-up with their memory for the suspect. If no member of the line-up matches the
memory of the suspect no identification is made. In a relative judgement the witness picks
out the person that best fits their memory of the suspect relative to the other members of
the line-up. The evidence for the relative judgement model is most apparent in target-
absent line-up procedures. As the witness is comparing each line-up member to each other
rather than their memory of the suspect, they will identify the person who looks most like
the culprit even if the culprit is not in the line-up (Wells, 1984). It is argued that a number of
factors can affect the fairness of a line-up procedure by shifting the witnesses’ willingness to
make a relative judgement rather than an absolute judgement.
Using the line-up as experiment analogy and the research on experimenter expectancy
effects and demand characteristics reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2, it is clear that a line-up
procedure can be susceptible to both of these procedures. Firstly the line-up administrator,
fulfilling the role of the experimenter, knows the location of the suspect in the line-up and
may be motivated to obtain an identification if there is a belief among the law enforcement
officials that they have found the culprit. Therefore, the administrator may unconsciously
influence the witness into identifying the suspect. Secondly, the three explanations for
demand characteristics may also apply to line-up procedures. Eyewitnesses may be
susceptible to the good subject effect by identifying someone from a line-up because they
want to help the police and catch the ‘bad guy’. Furthermore, a witness may be
apprehensive that the line-up is an evaluation of their memory, and therefore want to prove
that their memory of the event is good by identifying someone from the line-up. Finally, as
line-up procedures are normally conducted by a law enforcement professional it is clear that
witnesses may be susceptible to the cues exhibited by the line-up administrator because
they are in a position of authority (Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). The line-up
procedure when viewed as an interaction between the administrator and the witness is
therefore open to bias which can affect the reliability of an identification. Below the sources
of bias in a line-up procedure are discussed.
3.1.1. Instruction bias
The line-up procedure has been the subject of numerous experiments, where aspects of the
procedure have been varied. For example, in one early study the type of instruction given to
the witness and the presence or absence of the suspect in the line-up were manipulated
(Malpass & Devine, 1981). In this experiment undergraduate students viewed a staged act
of vandalism and were then asked to take part in a line-up to identify the culprit. The line-up
procedure was varied; some of the witnesses were given biased instructions; they were led
to believe the culprit was in the line-up, and they did not have the option not to make an
identification. The other witnesses were given unbiased instructions; they were told the
culprit may be in the line-up, but they were also given the option of not identifying anyone
from the line-up. Furthermore, in half of the line-ups the suspect was present; in the other
half the suspect was absent. The results of this study indicate that the instructions given to
witnesses are extremely important. Those witnesses given biased instructions were more
likely to choose a suspect from the line-up, even when it was a suspect absent line-up.
Therefore, the biased witnesses were more likely to make false identifications.
The study conducted by Malpass and Devine (1981) has been criticised for lacking ecological
validity. Cutler and Penrod (1995) suggest that the biased instructions do not represent the
instructions that would be given by police officers in the real world. Therefore, Cutler,
Penrod, and Martens (1987a) devised an experiment using more subtle suggestions. Student
eyewitnesses again viewed a staged crime, this time a videotape of a liquor store robbery,
and again half of the eyewitnesses received bias instructions before viewing the line-up.
However, in this experiment the biased instructions did not indicate that the suspect was in
the line-up, they were told to pick the person they believed was the suspect. The other half
of the witnesses were given unbiased instructions, and therefore given the option to not
make a choice from the line-up. Even with more subtle biasing instructions this experiment
found comparable results to Malpass and Devine (1981), those eyewitnesses who received
biasing instructions were more likely to make a false identification from a target absent line-
up.
This research and more in the same vein (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987b; Cutler, Penrod,
O’Rourke, & Martens, 1986; O’Rourke, Penrod, Cutler, & Stuve, 1989), has highlighted the
effect of biased instructions. However, other researchers have argued that laboratory
studies of instruction bias cannot be generalised to real world police line-ups as the
laboratory studies cannot adequately imitate the seriousness and stress for the witness
viewing an actual crime. Indeed, the ecological validity of laboratory studies in this area has
been questioned, and has led some researchers to move away from the mock crime
scenario. One such study (Kohnken & Maass, 1988), whilst still using a staged crime, only
informed half of the eyewitnesses that the event had been staged, the other half believed
the event to be a real crime. This study again varied the bias of the instructions and the
presence and absence of the suspect. Kohnken and Maass (1988) reported that those
eyewitnesses who believed they were in a real situation were more likely to not identify
anyone from the line-up. The reality of the situation therefore appeared to render the
eyewitness more cautious about making an identification.
A meta-analysis of biased instructions from eighteen studies was conducted by Steblay
(1997). The results of this analysis indicate that the performance of an eyewitness is
significantly affected by biased line-up instructions. In particular, instructions that imply the
suspect is in the line-up and not providing an option of not choosing from the line-up are
most influential. Moreover, the meta-analysis addresses the issue of the validity of
laboratory studies. Steblay (1997) stresses that eleven of the studies included in the analysis
involved “high-realism” (p. 295) events, and whilst the effect sizes are lower in these events
than lower realism events, the effect of biased versus unbiased instructions is still
significant.
The majority of studies in this area have one feature in common; they employ a comparison
between target present line-ups and target absent line-ups, simulating police investigations
conducted in the real world. Target present line-ups represent line-ups where the police
suspect is in the line-up, and target absent line-ups represent line-ups where the police
suspect is innocent (Clark, 2005). The meta-analysis conducted by Steblay (1997), found that
biased instructions had differing effects according to the presence or the absence of the
suspect in the line-up. Notably, in target absent line-ups there is a consistent increase in
false identifications, whereas in target present line-ups there is an inconsistent effect on
correct identification rates.
Clark (2005) argues that whilst the increase in false identifications through biased
instructions in target absent line-ups is understandable, as the biased instructions lower the
witnesses’ decision criteria, there should also be a concomitant increase in the number of
correct identifications in target present line-ups. In a review of Steblay’s (1997) meta-
analysis, Clark (2005) suggests that there are more correct identifications in target present
line-ups with biased instructions, and the biased witnesses are accurate above chance.
Therefore, whilst Steblay’s (1997) analysis indicated that biased instructions were inherently
bad (producing more false identifications, and no increase in correct identifications), Clark
(2005) has found that biased instructions can increase correct identifications. He does not
suggest that biased instructions should be allowed though, as they can lead to the false
identification of an innocent suspect.
3.1.2. Suggestibility
Research has shown that suggestive remarks made by line-up administrators, can have a
substantial effect on how a witness perceives what they saw, and can induce an eyewitness
to make an identification (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). In an experiment conducted by Wells
and Bradfield (1998), witnesses were shown a simulated crime, and then were asked to
identify the culprit from a suspect absent line-up. Some of the witnesses were then given a
suggestive remark confirming that they had identified the culprit, whilst the other witnesses
were given no such remark. In the group given the suggestive remark, 27% reported that
their view of the culprit was good or excellent, and 20% reported easily making out the
details of the culprits face. This is compared to the group who were not given a suggestive
remark, where none of the witnesses reported a good or excellent view, and none could
easily make out the details of the culprits face.
Research in this area has devised the term the ‘post identification feedback effect’, and this
effect is not confined to direct feedback about whether they had identified the correct
person, but also concerns feedback as to whether they had chosen the same person as
other witnesses. Luus and Wells (1994) found that witnesses informed that they had made
the same choice as other witnesses were more confident in their identification than those
who had received no such information. The post identification feedback effect has been
found to be particularly robust and reliable through meta-analytic study (Douglass &
Steblay, 2006). This meta-analysis of 14 studies which included 20 experimental tests found
that witnesses reported significantly better witnessing conditions; and stronger and sharper
memories if they received post-identification feedback confirming the accuracy of their
identification. This finding, the authors contend, has important implications for real world
situations. As post-identification feedback increases confidence, it also distorts the original
memory and compromises the reliability of the memory. Therefore witnesses will appear
more confident and compelling at trial, but this will be based on the post-identification
feedback and not the accuracy of their memory, which may be quite poor. Research has also
suggested that the post-identification feedback effect can be moderated, whereby
confidence ratings are not inflated if the witness is asked to consider their confidence
before feedback is given (Wells & Bradfield, 1999).
Research conducted by Clark et al., (2009) investigated how different statements during the
line-up procedure can influence eyewitness identification decisions. They employed three
statement conditions, in the control condition the line-up administrator did not speak to the
witness during the procedure. In the subtle-influence condition the line-up administrator did
not speak for the first 12 seconds of the procedure, after 12 seconds they made statements
including “take your time” “look at each photograph carefully” and “there’s no rush” (p. 66).
In the third and final condition, the similarity-influence condition, again the administrator
did not speak for 12 seconds, then they asked the witness “Is there anyone in the line-up
who looks more similar to the person you saw than anyone else in the line-up” (p. 66). In
the two influence conditions, if the witness had failed to make an identification after the
statements above, the line-up administrators prodded the witnesses with one more
statement “If you’re unable to make an identification, that’s ok, just let me know” (p. 66).
The results of this study found that despite administrators in all conditions giving unbiased
instructions; that the suspect may or may not be in the line-up, witnesses’ identification
decisions were influenced by the administrator in the two influence conditions.
Furthermore, the influence differed between the subtle-influence condition and the
similarity influence condition. In the similarity-influence condition there was an increase in
overall identification rates, correct identifications, and false identifications, in both target-
present and target-absent line-ups. These results are in-line with the researcher’s
hypothesis, and they argue, can be explained by the criterion shift and relative judgment
models of eyewitness decision making.
The subtle-influence condition however, did not conform to the hypothesis that subtle
influences would change the decision process, resulting in a greater willingness to make an
identification, and therefore cannot be explained by the criterion shift and relative
judgement models. In this condition there was only an increase in identifications in the
target-absent line-ups, false identifications increased, but positive identifications did not
increase. In order to explain this contradiction, the authors propose a model similar to the
Feature Contrast Model (Tversky, 1977), which explains how the way memory is matched to
a line-up member, can be altered. It is suggested that the comments made in the subtle-
influence condition allow the subject to reassess and reconsider the importance and
weighting of the matching and mismatching features of the suspect. Clark et al., (2009)
argue that the weight-shifting model can explain not only why false identifications but not
positive identifications increased in the subtle-influence condition, but can also explain the
same results found in other research (Clark, 2005; Steblay, 1997).
3.1.3. Foil bias
The aim of a fair and unbiased line-up is to protect against mistaken identification, whereby
the foils match the description of the suspect, and the suspect does not stand out as
different from the other members of the line-up. Anecdotal examples of biased line-up
construction include a line-up constituted of one black man and five white men, where the
witness had described the suspect as a black man (Ellison & Buckhout, 1981). In another
case the witness described three Indian suspects and then took part in a line-up containing
three Indian men and three white men (Pelwani v. S. 1963, cited in Malpass et al., 2006).
Although the above real-world examples may seem extreme and overtly biased, studies
with more subtle differences in the line-up construction, line-ups with very similar looking
foils compared to very dissimilar looking foils, have shown notable results. Research
manipulating the quality of the foils used in a line-up has shown that in target present line-
ups there is not a considerable difference in identification accuracy between high similarity
line-ups and low similarity line-ups. However, in target absent line-ups, 70% of eyewitnesses
made false identifications from a low similarity line-up, compared to 31% in the high
similarity line-up (Lindsay & Wells, 1980). However, it is also argued that it is important that
the fillers in a line-up are not too similar to each other, as the witness will not be able to
differentiate between a line-up of clones (Malpass et al., 2006).
The homogeneity of the appearance of the line-up extends to the clothing worn by the
members of the line-up. A study conducted by Lindsay, Wallbridge and Drennan (1987),
attempted to examine whether the type of clothing worn can affect the number of false
identifications. In a series of experiments Lindsay et al., (1987) conducted line-ups with
biased clothing. In condition 1 (biased clothing) the suspect wore the same clothing worn
during the crime and the foils wore different clothing. In condition 2 (usual clothing) all line-
up members wore different clothing to that worn during the crime. In condition 3 (dressed
alike) all line-up members wore similar clothing. Whilst for correct identifications the
clothing condition was not a significant factor, the number of false identifications were
significantly different according to the clothing condition. For the dressed alike condition
they constituted 10% of the identifications, for the usual clothing condition they constituted
21% and for the biased clothing condition they constituted 38% of the identifications.
Clark and Godfrey (2009) reviewed the literature on foil selection, and compared seven
experiments which manipulated foil similarity over both target present and target absent
line-ups. They reported that in six of the seven experiments both correct and false
identification rates increased when the similarity of the foils was low. The issue of foil
selection has long been a contentious one in the literature, with arguments raging about the
best practice for selecting foils. Two competing procedures for foil selection have been
advocated. In a suspect-matched selection, foils are selected to coincide with the
appearance of the suspect. This is by far the most popular method for constructing a line-up
used by law enforcement agencies (Wogalter, Malpass, & McQuiston, 2004). However, this
type of construction has been criticised for both resulting in line-ups where the members
are too similar (Luus & Wells, 1991), and in line-ups where the suspect stands out
(Wogalter, Marwitz, & Leonard, 1992). This approach has also been criticised as it relies on
the suspect being the actual culprit and not an innocent suspect, this can result in increased
mistaken identifications (Clark & Tunnicliff, 2001).
The second procedure is description-matched selection, whereby foils are selected to
coincide with the verbal description of the culprit by the eyewitness. It is argued that this
procedure produces a less biased line-up, where the suspect does not stand out, but there is
still some diversity within the line-up (Wells, Seelau, Rydell, & Luus, 1994). Research has
suggested that more correct identifications are obtained with this type of line-up (Wells,
Rydell, & Seelau, 1993). However, unless the eyewitness can provide a very detailed
description of the suspect’s face it is difficult to construct a line-up that adequately matches
the suspect (Malpass et al., 2006). The contention between suspect-matched and
description-matched foil selection shows no sign of abating. Indeed, a meta-analysis
conducted by Clark, Howell, and Davey (2008) reviewed studies which compared the two
types of line-up construction, and found mixed results. The description-matched method
produced more correct identifications, but also more false identifications. Nevertheless,
researchers have called for the adoption of description-matched procedures for foil
selection (Luus & Wells, 1991; Clark & Tunnicliff, 2001), although, Clark and Godfrey (2009)
stress the need for further research.
3.1.4. Presentation bias
Line-up procedures have historically followed a simultaneous format, where the witness
views the suspect and the foils at the same time. In the first study of its type, Lindsay and
Wells (1985) varied the line-up procedure shown to undergraduate eyewitnesses. Half of
the eyewitnesses were given the standard simultaneous line-up containing six photos, whilst
the other half were shown the same six photos sequentially (although witnesses in this
condition were unaware of how many photos they would view). Both line-ups were also
varied according to the presence of the suspect. Whilst the type of line-up did not affect the
number of correct identifications in the target present line-up, the results in the target
absent condition were remarkable. In the simultaneous presentation 43% of eyewitnesses
made a false identification, whereas in the sequential presentation false identifications
dropped to 17%.
In a replication of this study, Cutler and Penrod, (1988) informed witnesses in the sequential
condition how many photos they would view, however the results did not change, the
authors therefore concluded that the sequential line-up still produced less false
identifications even with knowledge of the number of photos to be viewed. This result was
also reported by Lindsay, Lea, and Fulford (1991), who concede that whilst the effect of the
sequential line-up was not as pronounced in their study, it was still apparent when the size
of the sequential line-up was known to the witness.
The full force of this effect was highlighted in a series of experiments conducted by Lindsay,
Lea, Nosworthy, Fulford, Hector, Le Van, and Seabrook (1991). In these experiments line-ups
were biased according to clothing, foil selection and instruction given. The results suggested
that the sequential line-up reduced the effect of the bias on false identifications.
Furthermore, when the biases were combined, Lindsay et al., (1991) found that the
sequential line-up still had a remarkable effect on reducing false identifications (84% in the
simultaneous condition compared to 25% in the sequential condition). A meta-analysis of
studies comparing simultaneous and sequential line-ups was conducted by Steblay, Dysart,
Fulero, & Lindsay (2001). Twenty three papers (providing 30 tests of the hypothesis) were
included in the analysis. The results of the analysis found for the complete data-set only a
small effect of the superiority of the sequential line-up. When target-present line-ups alone
were compared, simultaneous line-ups provided more correct identifications. However, in
target-absent line-ups sequential line-ups provided more correct rejections of the line-up.
The results also indicated that witnesses are more likely to make a choice from a
simultaneous line-up.
The results of the meta-analysis also provided some insight into factors which reduce the
superiority of the simultaneous line-up in target-present line-ups. Firstly, it is argued that
there is a smaller difference in correct identifications between simultaneous and sequential
line-ups when the stimulus used in line-up experiments is more realistic. Secondly,
simultaneous line-ups display even higher rates of correct identification when biased
instructions are employed. However, as unbiased instructions are widely employed it would
appear that the different rates for correct identifications between the two line-ups, is not so
great in real-world situations. Moreover, a verbal description of the suspect by the witness
before the line-up has been reported to have the strongest effect on simultaneous line-ups,
as it completely removes its superiority for correct identifications over the sequential line-
up. As it is not practical for the police not to obtain a verbal description from a witness
again, it appears that the difference between the two line-ups will not be as great in real-
world situations. Finally, the sequential line-up proved superior in crime situations as
compared to non-crime situations. In sum Steblay et al., (2001) report that the correct
rejection rate for sequential line-ups increases whilst the correct identification rate for
simultaneous line-ups decreases as real-world conditions are maximised.
It is argued that the success of the sequential line-up stems from the fact that it forces
witnesses to make an absolute judgement; they must compare each photo individually with
their memory of the suspect and make a decision before they see the next photo. Whereas
in the simultaneous line-up witnesses can make a relative judgement, the person most
similar to the suspect, relative to the other members of the line-up, is chosen. Ebbesen and
Flowe (2002) however, have argued against the absolute relative judgement process, and
instead propose the criterion shift model. In this model it is argued that the sequential line-
up produces a higher criterion for making a positive identification, but does not increase the
accuracy of the memory. Whilst the studies presented above seem to imply the superiority
of the sequential line-up, some researchers have issued words of caution (Phillips, et al.,
1999), arguing that sequential line-ups are particularly susceptible to investigator bias,
which will be reviewed in due course.
Acceptance of the superiority of the sequential line-up has not been universal. In a
divergence from traditional laboratory studies the Report to the Illinois Legislature: Illinois
Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind Lineup Procedures (Illinois Pilot Report)
conducted a year-long field study to examine the sequential line-up. The results obtained
were contradictory to those expected; sequential double-blind line-ups actually resulted in
more known false identifications than the simultaneous single-blind line-ups. The authors of
the Illinois Pilot Report stress the importance of the field study methodology in this area for
providing “real world factors” (Mecklenburg, Bailey, & Larson, 2008, p. 22) that laboratory
studies are lacking. In particular the field study incorporates the psychological experience of
viewing a real crime, authentic viewing conditions, the impact of the line-up procedure on
the witness, and an understanding of the consequences by the witness of identifying or not
identifying someone from the line-up.
Although the design of the Illinois Pilot Report has received criticism (Schacter, Dawes,
Jacoby, Kahneman, Lempert, Roediger, & Rosenthal, 2008), namely for the confound of
comparing blind sequential line-ups with non-blind simultaneous line-ups, Mecklenburg et
al. (2008) maintain that it still provides a “significant and valuable contribution to the study
of eyewitness identification” (p. 23), for three reasons. Firstly, it is argued that the studies
which demonstrate the “sequential superiority effect” themselves contain confounds, for
example, different line-up presentational formats (Cutler & Penrod, 1988), line-up
instructions, foil similarity (Lindsay, et al. 1991), randomization of photographs (Sporer,
1993), and size of photos (Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, Baranoski, &
Southwick, 2004), between simultaneous and sequential line-ups.
Secondly, Mecklenburg et al. (2008) argue that the data from the Illinois Pilot Report can
still be evaluated regardless of the confounding factor. If the comparison between the
double-blind sequential line-up and the single-blind simultaneous line-up is removed, the
known error rate of 9.2% for the double-blind sequential line-up can be compared to field
data that has controlled for investigator bias. An example of this, as noted by Mecklenburg
et al. (2008), is the data collected by the Office of the District Attorney in Queens, New York,
which found a known error rate of filler identifications between .58% and 5.62%. The third
reason for the efficacy of the Illinois data is that it does not necessarily follow that the low
filler identifications in the non-blind simultaneous line-ups are due solely to the non-blind
procedure. Again Mecklenburg et al. (2008) point to field data, this time from the New York
City Police Department, which compared blind simultaneous line-ups with non-blind
simultaneous line-ups, and found no difference in identification rates.
Recently, borrowing from the medical literature, Mickes, Flowe, and Wixted (2012) have
used Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis to compare simultaneous and
sequential line-up practices. As the sequential line-up has been found to decrease the rate
of false identifications, whilst at the same time decreasing the rate of correct identifications,
Mickes et al., (2012) have argued that the traditional method of comparing diagnosticity
ratios (proportion of guilty suspects correctly identified / proportion of innocent suspects
incorrectly identified) does not always indicate the superior procedure. Instead they suggest
that ROC analysis can determine which type of line-up is diagnostically more accurate. After
conducting three experiments comparing simultaneous and sequential line-ups, ROC
analysis found no sequential superiority effect, even when biased foils were used. The
authors concede that a decrease in the number of false identifications (as shown with the
sequential line-up) may be worth the corresponding decrease in the number of correct
identifications. However, they argue that using a simultaneous procedure with a more
conservative decision rule (for example only counting identifications made with over 70%
confidence in that identification) can result in lower false identification rates, but higher
correct identification rates.
3.1.5. Investigator bias
The line-up as experiment analogy has also been used to support the ‘investigator bias’
hypothesis, which posits that through verbal and non-verbal means the line-up
administrator, with their knowledge of who the suspect is, can intentionally or
unintentionally influence who the witness identifies from the line-up. This is a relatively new
application of the work conducted by Rosenthal that has only recently gained attention in
the eyewitness psychological literature. Indeed by the early 1990’s researchers (Wells, 1993;
Wells & Luus, 1990) were beginning to hypothesise about the possibility of investigator bias,
although research had yet to substantiate the hypothesis (Cutler & Penrod, 1995).
A real-life example of investigator bias is provided by Loftus and Ketcham (1991) and details
the case of Howard Haupt, who was wrongly identified by a witness from a photo-spread for
the kidnap and murder of a young boy. In this instance the line-up procedure was tape-
recorded therefore the researchers were able to analyse the transcripts. This analysis
revealed that whilst the witness had reservations about being able to identify the suspect;
the officer conducting the line-up pressed the witness and repeatedly referred to Haupt’s
photo, only ending the line-up when the witness had made some concession that Haupt’s
photo was closest to the suspect.
Whilst the above case provides one anecdotal example of investigator bias, researchers
have attempted to empirically test the phenomenon. In one such experiment, Phillips et al.,
(1999), manipulated the administrator’s knowledge of the identity of the suspect in the line-
up and the presentation of the line-up. After viewing a live staged crime involving two
perpetrators, witnesses were asked to identify the suspects from target absent photo-
spread line-ups. There were two conditions of administrator knowledge in this experiment;
half of the administrators did not know the identity of the suspect (double-blind condition).
And half of them were informed by the experimenter who the suspect was (single-blind
condition). Each administrator conducted simultaneous and sequential line-ups. The results
of this study confirmed the researchers’ hypothesis; sequential line-ups in the single-blind
condition were more likely to result in false identifications.
The Phillips et al., (1999) study included one further variable, the presence of an observer
during the line-up procedure. The researchers hypothesised that the presence of a silent
observer during a line-up procedure would negate the effect of investigator bias. However,
the reverse was found, more false identifications were recorded when the observer was
present. The researchers explained this turn-around of expectations by suggesting that the
presence of the observer (who was also the experimenter) provided extra incentive for the
administrator to perform well and produce the expected result.
Haw and Fisher (2004) argue that whilst double-blind procedures may eliminate the cues
from the administrator as to the identity of the suspect, it does not eliminate the perception
of the witness to changes in the administrators’ demeanour, posture, or expression. They
argue that there will always be “biasing factors” (p. 1107) when there is an interaction
between the administrator and the witness. They therefore conducted an experiment which
limited the amount of contact between the administrator and the witness. In the high
contact condition the administrator sat close to or across from the witness whilst
administering the line-up procedure. In the low contact condition the administrator sat
behind the witness out of their eyesight whilst the witness administered the line-up
procedure themselves. The administrator stayed in the room to ensure the correct
procedure was followed. Both target-absent and target-present line-ups were conducted in
both a sequential and simultaneous format. A number of interesting results emerged from
this study, firstly witnesses were more likely to make a choice from the line-up in the high
contact condition, and secondly in the target-absent condition witnesses were more likely to
select the target-substitute, thereby, making a false identification.
Haw and Fisher (2004) therefore conclude that reducing the contact between the
administrator and the witness is particularly useful as false identifications were reduced,
without adversely affecting the number of correct identifications. However, they also
highlight an apparent contradiction in their research, and one that has been found in many
of the studies reviewed above also. Although double-blind procedures and limiting contact
reduced false identifications there was no comparable increase in correct identifications
when the target was present in the high contact and single-blind conditions. The authors
cautiously suggest that the presence of the perpetrator serves in “outshining” (p. 1110) the
effect of the administrator.
The administrator effect has been shown not only to influence the witness’s identification,
but also their confidence in their identification. In an experiment which manipulated
administrator knowledge of the location of the suspect in a target absent line-up, Garrioch
and Brimacombe (2001), found that witnesses were more confident in their identifications if
the administrator of their line-up knew the location of the suspect. Even though the
administrators were overtly informed that they should not give any feedback to the
witnesses, the video-taped interactions between the administrators and witnesses revealed
verbal behaviours (the questioning tone when repeating the witnesses choice) and non-
verbal behaviours (maintaining eye contact with the witness and smiling), which the authors
claim explains the increased confidence ratings.
Although the above literature provides some compelling evidence for investigator bias,
there are also a number of studies which did not find this effect. As Greathouse and Kovera
(2009) point out, the effect of investigator bias is not “robust” (p. 72), with inconsistent
results emerging from the data. In an attempt to provide some clarity in this area
Greathouse and Kovera (2009) conducted a large study which manipulated target presence
(target present vs. target absent), administrator knowledge (single-blind vs. double-blind),
line-up presentation (simultaneous vs. sequential), and line-up instruction (biased vs.
unbiased). They found that witnesses were more susceptible to the effects of administrator
knowledge when other biasing factors (simultaneous line-ups and biased instructions) were
present. In these conditions witnesses were more likely to make an identification in the
single-blind administration regardless of the absence or presence of the culprit.
Greathouse and Kovera (2009) also examined the interaction between the line-up
administrator and the witness by video-recording the procedure. They observed that the
behaviour of the administrator changed according to their knowledge of the identity of the
suspect. The blind observers found that single-blind administrators displayed certain
behaviours at greater rates than double-blind administrators. In particular, they were more
likely to tell the witness to examine the line-up carefully, or to look again at the line-up, and
in some cases they also told the witness they knew the location of the suspect. The
observers also noted non-verbal behaviours which were more prevalent with single-blind
administrators, for example they were more likely to remove the picture of the suspect
more slowly if the witness failed to identify it. Furthermore, as the line-up administrator is in
control of the procedure, they can control the duration of the line-up. They can end the
procedure quickly if the witness picks the suspect, or they can prolong the procedure if a
filler is chosen, giving the witness chance to change their mind (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009).
Indeed a number of other suggestive behaviours by line-up administrators have been
identified. For example, verbal utterances during the line-up, or non-verbal behaviour, such
as nodding, head shaking, smiling, and leaning forward (Buckhout, 1974), have been argued
to influence the witness as to whom they should choose. Although verbal behaviours are
more discernible in the experimental procedure, Garrioch and Brimacombe (2001) stress
that non-verbal behaviours can be just as effective as verbal behaviours in their influence.
Indeed the research conducted by Rosenthal (1976), reviewed in Chapter 1, has found that
experimenters expectancies can be communicated through both kinesic and paralinguistic
channels. They are most effective though when they are communicated through both of
these channels.
From their research Greathouse and Kovera (2009) tentatively claim evidence for demand
characteristics and hypothesis leaking in line-ups, and stress the importance of double-blind
line-up procedures. However, they also concede the need for continued investigation in this
area. In particular they stress the need for a concerted effort to investigate the effects of
administrator knowledge with different moderating variables such as the presentation
method of the line-up. Furthermore, they call for an exploration of how the strength of the
witness’s memory trace interacts with administrator effects.
3.2. Line-up good practice and the need for double blind procedures
As we have seen, research has highlighted the potential for bias in police line-up
procedures. In response to this, researchers have compiled a number of recommendations
of good practice when conducting line-ups (Wells, 1988). Indeed one of the most vociferous
proponents in this field Gary Wells was responsible for drafting good practice
recommendations for the American Psychology/Law Society (Wells et al., 1998). Wells and
colleagues devised four rules for reducing the risk of false identifications from a line-up.
1. The person who conducts the line-up should not be aware of which member of the line-up
is the suspect.
This rule addresses the issue of investigator bias. As we have seen in the section above,
whether intentional or not, the line-up administrator can influence who the witness selects
from the line-up. Wells et al., (1998) therefore advocate the use of double-blind line-up
procedures, where the person conducting the line-up is not involved with the case and does
not know who the suspect is.
2. Eyewitnesses should be explicitly told that the person in question might not be in the line-
up, and they should not feel they have to make a selection from the line-up. Furthermore,
eyewitnesses should be told that the person administering the line-up does not know which
person the suspect is.
This rule addresses the issue of instruction bias and follows from the research cited above
that witnesses are less likely to make a false identification if they have been warned that the
suspect may not be in the line-up.
3. Based on the eyewitness’s description of the suspect the suspect should not stand out in
the line-up as different to the foils.
This rule addresses foil bias and states in order for the line-up to be fair and unbiased all
members of that line-up should match the description given by the witness. As Wells et al.,
(1994) point out, this does not mean that all foils should look exactly the same as the
suspect, rather they should match the description of the suspect, and there should be some
variation in the line-up, but not enough for the suspect to stand out.
4. A statement of the confidence of the eyewitness that they have picked the right person
should be taken at the time of the line-up and before any feedback on their selection.
This rule addresses the issue of suggestibility and the over-inflation of confidence that a
witness may have in their identification if they receive confirming feedback. Whether the
feedback specifically tells them that they have selected the person the police suspect is
responsible (Wells & Bradfield, 1998), or they are told they have picked the same person as
another witness (Luus & Wells, 1994). Over-inflation of confidence is a serious issue in
eyewitness testimony, as eyewitnesses are often asked how confident they are in their
identification in court. If they have received confirming feedback their confidence will be
inflated even if their identification is false.
Wells et al., (1998) stress that whilst the four recommendations have minimal financial costs
for the police; the benefits of following these procedures far outweigh these costs. They do
concede that Rule 1, that a person blind to the location of the suspect should conduct the
line-up, involves the most effort on the part of the law enforcement official to implement.
However, the authors maintain that the implementation of Rule 1 is possible as there is no
extensive training needed to conduct line-ups, therefore, any person in the department
whether a police officer or a civilian could conduct the line-up. The authors furthermore, do
not regard the above recommendations as exhaustive. For example they also recommend
the use of sequential line-ups over simultaneous line-ups (although only in conjunction with
double-blind procedures) and the video-recording of line-up procedures.
The police however continue to resist these recommendations particularly the double-blind
line-up procedure. In particular police officers point to the financial costs and organisational
effort of ensuring there is an administrator who is not aware of the identity of the suspect
available. They also argue that it is beneficial to have a trained police officer who is familiar
with the details of the investigation to oversee the line-up in order to “recognise relevant
information during the identification procedure” (Mecklenburg, 2006: p. 57). Officers from
the Illinois Pilot Program report that they received complaints from witnesses and victims
because of the delay whilst waiting for a blind administrator. Moreover, they stress that the
double-blind procedure is the antithesis of the ethos of collaboration and information
sharing, and can have a detrimental effect on the rapport established between an
investigating officer and a vulnerable witness.
Despite the objection to some of the research recommendations, legislation has begun to
implement a number of the suggested procedures. In England and Wales eyewitness
identification procedures are governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984.
Code D of the Act, which was revised in 2011, addresses some of the issues of bias reviewed
above (Home Office, 2010). The code states that a line-up must contain at least eight foils
for one suspect, furthermore, the age, general appearance, and position in life of the foils
must resemble the suspect. The suspect must not stand out from the foils; any unusual
physical features should be where possible concealed or replicated on the foils. Witnesses
should be informed that the culprit may not be present in the line-up, and they should
indicate if they cannot make a positive identification. The code also prescribes the use of
video identification procedures wherever possible, unless a live line-up is more appropriate.
However, the sequential format of the video identification in the Code differs to the
procedure advocated by Wells et al., (1998) as the Code allows the witness to view the
sequential line-up more than once, and the witness is not required to make a decision about
each person before they see the next one (Roberts, 2009). Whilst the Code states that the
person conducting the line-up should not be involved in the case, it does not stipulate that
the administrator should be blind to the location of the suspect. A number of jurisdictions in
the United States have recently begun to implement double-blind line-ups, although the
vast majority still do not (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009).
3.3. Chapter summary
In this chapter we have seen through the line-up as an experiment analogy and the vast
amount of research that this methodology has spurned, that a line-up administrator can
bias a line-up procedure in a number of ways. They can provide bias through their
instructions to the witness, through their post-identification feedback to the witness, how
the line-up is presented, and the selection of line-up fillers. Moreover, from the research
conducted by Rosenthal and colleagues it is clear that the line-up procedure is also
susceptible to experimenter expectancy effects. The knowledge of the location of the
suspect in the line-up and the expectation that the eyewitness will identify the suspect can
bias the witness’s response. The mediation of experimenter’s expectancy is usually
unconscious and is a very subtle process that involves minute kinesic and paralinguistic
communications. Therefore, research is still attempting to uncover the channels that
communicate experimenter expectancies.
The criminal justice system has taken note of the psychological research conducted.
Legislation has implemented some of the recommendations that have been advanced.
However, many law enforcement agencies still resist the blind administrator
recommendation, which is perhaps the most important. This may be because it is the
recommendation that lay people have the most trouble understanding. The processes
involved are so minute and people generally feel that they can control their speech and
behaviours; therefore the criminal justice system does not give adequate weight to the
dangers of administrator bias. Mecklenberg (2006) reported that the general feeling
amongst the police officers in the Illinois Pilot Program was to dismiss the effect of their
knowledge of the location of the suspect; “a witness who can identify the offender can do
so under either procedure” (p. vi).
Chapter 4: Human Memory and Eyewitness Identification
In Chapter 3 the various ways that an experimenter can bias an identification procedure
were reviewed. In this chapter we examine how the bias exhibited by experimenters can be
exacerbated by the witness’s memory of the event and the identification procedure.
Memory, and the ability to identify a person from that memory is dependent on a large
number of factors, some of which will now be discussed.
4.1. The memory process and its fallibilities
It is now generally understood that there are three stages in the memory process,
perception, storage, and retrieval. Research has found that errors can occur at each of these
three stages (Ainsworth, 2000). The first of these stages, perception involves the acquisition
and encoding of the information. A number of errors can occur at this stage, firstly
perception is subjective to the individual, and secondly it is selective as not all information
can be encoded. Finally, perception is effected by an individual’s prejudices and stereotypes
(Duncan, 1976). In a criminal situation specifically, the high level of arousal, caused by
witnessing a traumatic event such as a violent crime, can disrupt the encoding of the
memory (Deffenbacher, 1983).
The length of the retention interval, the time between encoding the information and
retrieving it, can affect the accuracy of the memory retrieved. Indeed over 100 years ago
Ebbinghaus (1885, cited in Wells & Quinlivan, 2009) was reporting on the ‘forgetting curve’
which states that forgetting occurs most quickly just after the event. Research has
determined that the accuracy of a memory declines over time (Deffenbacher, Carr, & Leu,
1981), and therefore culprit identification rates also decline as the length of the retention
interval increases (Shapiro, & Penrod, 1986). This decline has been shown to occur quickly,
one or two days after the event (Tollestrup, Turtle, & Yuille, 1994), and has been reported as
substantial after seven days (Behrman, & Davey, 2001). As Wells and Quinlivan (2009) point
out, the reliability of the ‘forgetting curve’ has been substantiated; however, the time frame
of forgetting can vary according to the type of information to be remembered. They suggest
that a name can be forgotten after a few minutes whereas a telephone number can be
remembered for years. Remembering, they argue, is facilitated by rehearsal of the memory.
Whilst memories can fade over time, they can also be significantly transformed by new
information which is received after perception of the original memory. In an oft cited study,
Loftus and Palmer (1974) found that recall can be affected by verbal information given to
the eyewitnesses. After viewing a film of a car accident, participants were asked to judge the
speed of the cars, however, the questions to the participants varied. Some participants were
asked how fast the cars were going when they hit each other, other questions used
smashed, collided, contacted, or bumped to describe the accident. The witnesses estimates
of the speed of the car were faster when the word ‘smashed’ was used compared to when
the word ‘contacted’ was used. Indeed, Loftus has consistently found that witness’s
memories are particularly malleable when presented with post-event information, and most
notably, witnesses are unaware that their memory has changed even if they are deliberately
misled (Weingardt, Toland, & Loftus, 1994). It is unknown whether the original memory is
changed by the new information, or a new memory is created which then consumes the
original (Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, 1999). However, studies in this area indicate
that once the new information has been presented to the witness, the original memory is
lost and cannot be retrieved (Fruzzetti, Toland, Teller, & Loftus, 1992). Furthermore,
research suggests that witnesses are more susceptible to the damaging effects of post-event
information when there is a longer time interval between the event and the introduction of
the information (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978).
In a similar vein to memory transformation by new information, numerous studies have also
found that memory is susceptible to the ‘misinformation effect’ where misleading
information is introduced to the witness. In one such study (Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010)
participants were shown photographs depicting the theft of a wallet, where the thief placed
the wallet in his jacket pocket. Participants later listened to narratives of the photographs
which included misleading information, including that the thief had put the wallet in a
pocket of his trousers. When asked about the photographs a number of the participants
reported seeing the thief put the wallet in his trouser pocket from the photographs.
Research has attempted to understand why some people are susceptible to the
misinformation effect. Loftus (2005) has suggested that misinformation can take hold in a
person’s memory if the person is forgetful or has a poor memory. When considering
personality and cognition, a number of factors have been found to correlate with the ability
to resist or not resist misinformation. A study conducted by Zhu et al. (2010a; 2010b) found
that intelligence, perception, memory, and face judgement all correlate negatively with false
memories following exposure to misinformation. When personality characteristics were
considered, negative correlations were also found between false memory and depression,
fear of negative evaluation, novelty seeking, and negative coping. Positive correlations
though were found for persistence, self-directedness, and active coping strategies. Subjects
were found to be particularly susceptible to the misinformation effect if they had low
cognitive abilities combined with certain personality characteristics, including high self-
directedness, high reward dependence, high cooperativeness, low harm avoidance, or low
fear of negative evaluation.
The final stage of the memory process is retrieval. At this stage eyewitnesses can be
particularly affected by the stress of the situation, whether attending an identification
parade or giving evidence in court, which can affect the recall of the memory. However, the
method of retrieving the information is also important for its accuracy. Indeed, it has been
suggested that if eyewitnesses are asked to give a “full and complete” description of the
suspect they are more likely to inaccurately fill-in gaps in their memory in order to give the
full and complete description (Meissner, cited in Brigham et al., 1999).
Research has also suggested that eyewitnesses are susceptible to the unconscious
transference phenomenon whilst retrieving memories. Extensively studied by Loftus and
colleagues, the term unconscious transference relates to the bystander effect, where a
witness mistakenly identifies a person familiar to them as the suspect. In real-life example a
railway ticket agent, who was the victim of an armed robbery, identified his assailant from a
line-up. The man he identified though had a cast-iron alibi, and could not have committed
the robbery. The witness stated that the man looked familiar to him, and it transpired that
the man had been a customer of the witnesses on a number of occasions. The witness had
transferred the familiarity of the man’s face from being a customer to the robber. Early
empirical research of unconscious transference found that 60% of subjects mistakenly
identified an innocent bystander (Loftus, 1976).
4.2. Eyewitness identification
The importance of eyewitness identifications to the criminal justice system cannot be
overstated. The police and judicial system rely heavily on eyewitnesses to accurately and
objectively recall what they witnessed, and then confidently identify the culprit, regardless
of the amount of time that has passed. In court, jurors find eyewitness testimony to be
persuasive and of high evidential value (Loftus, 1996). However, it has been argued that the
expectations placed on the human memory by the criminal justice system are improbable
(Ainsworth, 1998). This view would appear to be substantiated by the number of wrongful
convictions due to eyewitness testimony that have come to light since the implementation
of DNA testing.
In recent years cases of wrongful convictions have received widespread attention and
publicity. Indeed there are a number of high profile cases of wrongful conviction due to
faulty eyewitness testimony, including the case of Ronald Cotton who was convicted and
spent over ten years in prison for rape, on the basis of a single identification from a
photographic line-up. In this case the victim was convinced that she had correctly identified
her attacker. When asked if she recognised the man who was the actual perpetrator based
on DNA evidence, she stated she had never seen him before (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009).
Research conducted by Wells et al., (1998), has found that 90% of 40 trials of wrongful
convictions involved eyewitness testimony, and some of these innocent people were
identified by more than one witness. In America to date the Innocence Project has secured
the exoneration of 303 individuals through DNA testing, who had been wrongly convicted. It
is stated that for 75% of those exonerated, faulty eyewitness testimony was the cause of the
wrongful conviction (The Innocence Project, 2013). However, 303 exonerations must be
seen as the tip of the iceberg of wrongful convictions as it is estimated that only 5-10% of
criminal cases include DNA evidence (The Innocence Project, 2013). Nevertheless,
eyewitness testimony has long been, and continues to be deemed as very strong evidence
of a persons’ guilt. Indeed, uncorroborated evidence from one eyewitness can still be
sufficient to secure a conviction.
4.2.1. The fallibility of eyewitness identification
The fallibility of eyewitness identification has been recognised for a number of years, indeed
in 1925 the Home Office provided guidelines for the collection of identification evidence. In
response to a number of high profile cases of miscarriages of justice the Devlin Committee
was convened in the 1970’s to consider the role of mistaken identifications in these
miscarriages. The Committee found that in approximately 260 cases the defendant was
convicted when the only evidence against them was eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, in
half of these cases the eyewitness evidence consisted of just one eyewitness identification.
The recommendations of the Devlin report (1976) led to a judgement in R. v. Turnball.
Where identification is disputed the judge must caution the jury that a confident witness is
not necessarily accurate, and when considering the reliability of the identification the
circumstances of that identification must be considered. However, it was not until 1984 that
the U.K. government produced legislation in this area in the form of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE) (Valentine & Heaton, 1999) which provides a code of practice for
eyewitness identification procedures (Home Office, 2010).
In a meta-analysis of eyewitness accuracy in natural settings, for example, a convenience
store, Cutler and Penrod (1995) found that correct identifications ranged from 34% - 48%,
whilst false identifications ranged from 34% - 38%, indicating that eyewitnesses are as likely
to be correct as incorrect. In a review of real-life line-ups which included over 1500
witnesses, Wright and McDaid (1996) found that almost 20% of the witnesses picked a foil
from the line-up. However, the unreliability of the human memory does not deter the
criminal justice system from assuming that memories are accurately perceived, then stored
in the brain waiting to be recalled, much like a video-camera (Ainsworth, 2000). Indeed,
research suggests that jurors are poor assessors of eyewitness credibility, as they can be
unaware that eyewitnesses can be inaccurate. In fact they have been found to overestimate
the abilities of witnesses to both retain memories and produce accurate identifications
(Cutler & Penrod, 1995). Furthermore, research has shown that people are unaware of the
bias inherent in many of the identification procedures conducted by the police. In particular
people do not consider a non-blind line-up procedure to be less reliable or more biased than
a double-blind procedure (Wright et al., 2010).
It is precisely the over-reliance on eyewitness identifications by the criminal justice system
that has led to the large body of psychological research that we have today. Researchers
have attempted, under experimental conditions, to determine why eyewitnesses make
mistakes in their identifications, whether accurate identifications can be discriminated from
inaccurate identifications, and what measures can be introduced to improve the reliability
of eyewitness identifications. The vast majority of this research can be classified as
laboratory studies where volunteers (usually undergraduate students) view a staged event
and then are asked to identify the suspect from a line-up under varying conditions. A
number of variables have been studied and these variables can be characterised as
belonging to one of two groups. Firstly there are estimator variables, which are those
variables which are not under the control of the criminal justice system, including, lighting
conditions, credibility of the witness, confidence of the witness, and the presence of a
weapon. The second group of variables are system variables, which are (or could be) under
the control of the criminal justice system, and include how a line-up is conducted, how
questions are asked of the witness, and the level of support given to the witness (Wells,
1978). Many of the system variables were discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
In an area as large as eyewitness identifications it is impossible to adequately review the
entirety of the research conducted. However, an attempt is made here to review some of
the more pertinent studies, in order to highlight some of the factors that can affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications. Starting with estimator variables, it is necessary to
divide this group into two sub-groups; witness characteristics and event characteristics.
4.3. Estimator variables – Witness characteristics
The research comparing male and female witnesses is contradictory and complex; the
overall impression of the literature is that males and females cannot be distinguished by
their accuracy. A meta-analysis conducted by Shapiro and Penrod (1986) suggested that as
females were more likely than males to make an identification, they were slightly more
likely to make both correct and false identifications. A study by Shaw and Skolnick (1994)
found evidence for an own-gender bias, female witnesses were more successful at
identifying female targets, whilst male witnesses were more successful at identifying male
targets. The same own-gender bias was found in a replication by the authors (Shaw &
Skolnick, 1999), however, this effect was found to be dependent on the object the culprit
was seen carrying at the time of the crime. When the culprit was viewed not carrying an
object, or when the object was an expected item (a book) the own-gender bias was found.
However, when the culprit carried a weapon or an unusual or salient item (a child’s toy or a
stethoscope) the eyewitnesses were more accurate in their identifications of culprits of the
opposite sex. To explain this contradiction Shaw and Skolnick (1999) suggest that when
carrying an interesting object a witness attends to the culprit more closely when they are of
the opposite gender because they are more interesting and attractive. However, they
suggest that the interesting object only serves to distract the witness from attending to the
culprit when the culprit is of the same gender.
Perhaps one of the most widely known concepts in eyewitness research is the ‘own race
bias’ which states that witnesses are better at recognising members of their own race than
members of other races (Anthony, Cooper, & Mullen, 1992). This finding has been validated
as robust in a meta-analysis conducted by Meissner and Brigham (2001), which considered
data from 39 research articles and almost 5,000 participants over a period of 25 years. The
meta-analysis found what the authors have termed a “mirror effect” (p. 15), whereby
witnesses were more likely to correctly identify, and less likely to mistakenly identify
members of their own race. Whilst the finding of an own race bias is consistent, the reasons
for such findings have been less consistent. Studies have suggested that there may be a
number of reasons for the own race bias, including racial attitudes and prejudice,
physiognomic homogeneity of faces, low interracial contact, perceptual learning, and
cognitive processes (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for a review).
A large amount of research has been conducted looking specifically at the age of the witness
and how this affects the reliability of their memory. Overall the vast majority of this
research would seem to suggest that witnesses at either end of the age spectrum are the
least reliable (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998; Wells & Olson, 2003). In particular, post-event
information and suggestive questioning are most damaging to children and the elderly
(Yarmey, 1996). Young adults have been found to be significantly superior to older adults
when recalling perpetrator characteristics, environmental details, and details of actions and
events, for both free recall and cued recall (Yarmey, Jones, & Rashid, 1984). Furthermore,
older adults are less descriptive about the perpetrator (Brimacombe, Quinton, Nance, &
Garrioch, 1997), they are more likely to falsely recognise a face (Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon,
1997), they are more open to source monitoring deficits, and are more confident than
younger adults (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003). In a series of studies conducted by
Memon, Gabbert, and Hope (2004) they found that older adults were more susceptible to
the ‘mug-shot exposure effect’, they were significantly more likely to make false
identifications from both the mug-shot album and the photo line-up. Furthermore, when
they split the older adults into two groups, young-old (under 68) and old-old (over 69) they
found a significant difference in line-up performance between the two groups, with the old-
old group making more false choices from the target-absent line-up.
When considering child witnesses, a review of studies has suggested that as children get
older the number of correct identifications increases. Children aged three to five years only
make correct identifications at slightly above chance level. By the age of eight children are
correct between 50% and 58% of the time. By the age of eleven this has risen to between
60% and 70%, and by age fourteen up to 80% of witnesses are accurate (Chance &
Goldstein, 1984). In an ecologically valid experiment, groups of children of differing ages
were unwitting eyewitnesses to a staged theft. When asked to identify the suspect from a
six-person photo-array, older students were significantly more accurate than the younger
children (Brigham, Van Verst, & Bothwell, 1986).
It is generally assumed that people with learning disabilities are unreliable witnesses (Green,
2001), due to the belief that a learning disability results in impairment at each stage of the
memory process (Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999). However, research conducted in this area
suggests that the criminal justice system exacerbates many of the memory problems
experienced by witnesses with learning disabilities (Kebbell & Hatton, 1999). It is argued
that if the criminal justice system were to increase the number of open-ended questions,
facilitating free recall, then witnesses with learning disabilities would be more reliable and
credible. As with witnesses with learning disabilities witnesses with mental illness are not
taken seriously, their credibility and reliability are questioned (Karras, McCarron, Gray, &
Ardasinski, 2006).  Research has suggested that there is a link between mental illness, most
notably depression, and memory impairment. In a meta-analysis Burt, Zember and
Niederehe (1995) found a relationship between depression, schizophrenia and memory
impairment, but they found no such relationship in those subjects with substance abuse
issues or anxiety disorders. An early study by Howells (1938) seemed to indicate a
relationship between low levels of intelligence and poor face recognition accuracy.
However, research conducted since has found a paucity of evidence for this relationship
(Brown, Deffenbacher, & Sturgill, 1977).
Early laboratory research suggested that there was no difference in the accuracy of victims
and witnesses (Hosch & Cooper, 1982), however, a subsequent study by Tollestrup et al.
(1994), using actual criminal cases, found that victims of robbery were more likely to
identify the suspect than witnesses of robbery. This effect though seems dependent on the
type of crime, as they also found that victims of fraud had lower levels of correct
identifications than witnesses of robbery. Researchers explain this in terms of the emotional
arousal experienced (Yuille, 1993). This arousal will be greater in those who directly
experience an emotional event, compared to those who only witness it. However, Behrman
and Davey (2001) argue that witnesses can still experience high emotions, and correctly
identify at the same rate as victims, even though they were not directly involved in the
crime.
4.4. Estimator variables – Event characteristics
The amount of time the witness views the suspect and the distance from which the witness
views the suspect both have an impact on the quality of the memory that the witness will
have. Research has suggested that up to a distance of 25 feet, face perception and face
identification is accurate. This steadily decreases until 150 feet, where face perception and
identification is zero (Loftus & Harley, 2005). If people are aware of the identity of a person,
they state that they can clearly identify those people even from several hundred feet away.
In what has been termed a ‘visual hindsight illusion’ people fill in the details that they think
they can see. However, when they do not know the identity of the person, and therefore
cannot fill in the details, they cannot identify that person past 150 feet (Harley, Carlsen, &
Loftus, 2004). A meta-analysis found that there is a relatively weak relationship between the
duration of the exposure to the face and the accuracy of the identification (Shapiro &
Penrod, 1986). Furthermore, witnesses reliably over-estimate the time they were exposed
to the suspect’s face (Shiffman & Bobko, 1975); whilst under-estimating the time that the
witnesses face is occluded (Wells & Murray, 1983).
Whilst the criminal justice system considers the time spent looking at the suspects face as
equalling the time spent attending to the suspects face, researchers have suggested that
this is not the case. Instead they have drawn attention to the type of attention and the type
of processing that the witness undertakes. The human memory is limited in its capacity;
witnesses are therefore restricted to what they can attend to. Processing all of the features
of a person’s face (specific processing) takes time and uses mental capacity, whilst
processing the face globally saves time and capacity. However, each type of processing has
its own advantages; global or holistic processing of the face results in increased facial
recognition (Patterson & Baddeley, 1977), whereas attending to the individual features
increases the ability to reconstruct the face (Wells & Hryciw, 1984). Due to the capacity of
memory, research has suggested that an eyewitness who attends to the peripheral aspects
of a crime, may be able to give a detailed description of the event, but they will be less
accurate at identifying the suspect from a line-up (Cutler et al., 1987a).
A meta-analysis conducted by Steblay (1992) purported to confirm the long-held belief
among researchers that the presence of a weapon distracts the witness from attending to
the perpetrator, resulting in a decrease in the number of correct identifications. In studies
which track witnesses eye movements, researchers indeed found that a witness’s visual
attention is drawn to a weapon, away from other aspects, including the culprit’s face
(Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). However, in a review of actual criminal cases Behrman and
Davey (2001) reported the opposite, suspect identifications increased when a weapon was
present, although this is in contrast to another real-world study which did find evidence
(albeit only slightly significant evidence) of the weapon effect (Tollestrup et al., 1994). The
stress experienced by a witness during an event can also affect their perception and recall of
an event. A certain amount of stress can actually improve a witness’ perception and
encoding of the event. However, when stress levels become too high, such as when there is
violence or a weapon present, the stress can negatively affect memory.
In a review of the research literature Clark and Godfrey (2009) argue that the literature
concerning factors that can affect memory accuracy, including exposure duration, stress,
and retention interval, is counterintuitive and controversial. Clark and Godfrey (2009)
reviewed published data, and compared longer exposures, lower stress, and shorter
retention intervals (better memory conditions), with shorter exposures, higher stress, and
longer retention intervals (worse memory conditions). They found that in the worse
memory conditions the correct identification rate decreased, however, there was little
effect on the false identification rate, and the innocence risk increased (the probability that
the suspect is innocent, given that the suspect was identified). Results that they conclude
are “self-contradictory” (p. 26).
4.5. System variables – How line-ups are conducted
As noted above, system variables concern those factors affecting an identification
procedure which are or can be under the control of the criminal justice system. The
procedure for conducting line-ups varies by country to country and even within countries.
There are a number of different identification procedures, each with their own positive and
negative features. In mug-shot inspections witnesses are shown the mug-shot files which
contain photos of convicted criminals. The benefits of this procedure include reducing the
stress on the witness as they do not need to physically see the perpetrator. However, there
are some problems with this approach, namely that only those who have been previously
convicted of an offence are contained within the mug-shot files. Research has also found
that the more photos a witness views the more likely they are to make a false identification
(Ellis, Shepherd, Flin, & Davies, 1989).
Show-ups are the simplest form of identification procedure, and involve the police showing
the witness one person who they believe is the perpetrator. Research suggests that show-
ups are particularly popular with criminal justice personnel in the USA, with studies
reporting a show-up use rate of between 30% and 77% (Gonzalez, Ellsworth, & Pembroke,
1993; McQuiston & Malpass, 2001, cited in Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003).
However, this procedure has also been found to produce the most false identifications
(Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989; Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996), and has been
described as inherently suggestive (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Phillips et al., 1999).
Despite the popularity of show-ups and the concerns over the reliability of this method,
there is a dearth of research in this area. When attempting to conduct a meta-analysis
comparing line-ups and show-ups, researchers could only find eight articles to include
(Steblay et al., 2003). Regardless of the small sample size, the results of the meta-analysis
were contradictory to the accepted view that show-ups produce more false identifications.
For target present procedures, line-ups and show-ups had comparable correct identification
rates, whilst show-ups also had greater correct rejection rates in target present procedures.
Furthermore, when foil choices were removed from the analysis of false identifications,
these rates were again comparable for both line-ups and show-ups. Nevertheless, Steblay et
al. (2003) argue that the show-up can still produce a “dangerous error” (p. 532) whereby an
innocent suspect is identified because of their resemblance to the perpetrator. The chance
of this occurring in a line-up is mitigated by the presence of foils. A fact that the authors
suggest balances the performance of line-ups and show-ups.
Studies comparing line-ups and show-ups over a time-delay (Yarmey et al., 1996; Dekle,
1997) have found that line-ups and show-ups conducted immediately after the event had
comparable false identification rates, however correct identification rates for show-ups
were considerably higher than for line-ups. Both line-ups and show-ups showed sharp drops
in correct identification rates over a 30 minute, 2 hour, and 24 hour delay, although the
show-up maintained higher rates of correct identification throughout. Nevertheless, the
show-ups also exhibited a large increase in false identification rates compared to line-ups
over the time delay, at the 24 hour point correct and false identification rates for show-ups
had converged.
In contrast to show-ups, photo-spread identifications involve showing the witness an array
of photographs, containing foils and the suspect, and have been found to be preferable to
both mug-shots and show-ups. However, they also have their own problems. Firstly,
witnesses who saw a live person may not recognise them in a static photograph, and
secondly witnesses may feel pressured to pick someone (Ainsworth, 2000). Identification
parades are similar to photo-spread identifications, but witnesses see the suspect amongst a
number of foils. They are also susceptible to the same problems as photo-spread
identifications.
In order to reduce the costs of conducting identification parades for the criminal justice
system, researchers have suggested the use of video identifications. Valentine and Heaton
(1999) argue that a video line-up can provide a fairer and less biased option to the standard
photo line-up or identification parade. In particular they suggest that a large database of
volunteers could be compiled which would allow fair line-ups to be constructed quickly,
without having to ensure that the witness, suspect, and suitable foils are all available at the
same time and place. Thereby also reducing the number of cancelled identification
procedures. Furthermore, video line-ups are less intimidating for the witness, resulting in
less anxiety, which it is argued improves the likelihood of the witness correctly identifying
the suspect (Ainsworth & King, 1988).
In order to determine the reliability of identifications from video line-ups Valentine and
Heaton (1999) compared them to traditional photo line-ups using a mock witness paradigm.
They argued that in a fair line-up 11% of mock witnesses should identify the subject by
chance. However, more mock witnesses identified the suspect from photo line-ups (25%)
compared to video line-ups (15%). The authors conclude that video line-ups are therefore
fairer. In subsequent research conducted by Valentine, Darling, and Memon (2007), the use
of moving video images (members of the line-up face the camera, turn to show the right
profile, then turn to show the left profile, then turn back to face the camera), was compared
to static images. The authors hypothesised that the witness would be better able to identify
the culprit from a moving image which showed the face from different angles. The results
however did not conform to the hypothesis; the correct identification rates from culprit-
present moving and static video line-ups were indistinguishable. Nevertheless, the moving
video line-ups do result in a decrease in false identifications from a culprit-absent line-up.
4.6. The determinants of the accuracy of a line-up identification
A number of further factors, which cannot be described as either estimator or system
variables, have been found to relate to the accuracy of an identification from a line-up.
Researchers have attempted to determine whether the confidence of the witness in their
identification and how quickly a witness makes the identification, can inform the accuracy of
their identification. In court proceedings it is imperative that witnesses appear credible and
confident in their testimony. There is a widespread belief amongst criminal justice officials
that witness confidence and witness accuracy are linked (Wells, Malpass, Lindsay, Fisher,
Turtle, & Fulero, 2000). Indeed the Supreme Court of the United States in 1972 stated that
eyewitness accuracy could be indicated by eyewitness confidence (Howitt, 2006).
Traditionally however researchers have maintained that overall the relationship between
confidence and accuracy is weak (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). This relationship is
not straight-forward though; indeed research has found that older adults are more
confident in their identifications even when they are incorrect (Dodson & Krueger, 2006).
However, when research has limited its analysis to the confidence of accurate
identifications, and when confidence is measured immediately after the identification, a
considerable correlation between confidence and accuracy has been reported (Behrman, &
Davey, 2001; Brewer, & Wells, 2006; Sporer et al., 1995).
A theoretical basis for a strong correlation between confidence and accuracy has also been
suggested. Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, and Weber (2010) highlight that the evidence for an
accurate identification, such as optimal viewing conditions and a short retention interval, is
the same evidence used for a confidence rating, therefore, there should be a correlation
between the two. As the memory of the event is said to be responsible for both the
accuracy and the confidence of the identification, and as the accuracy of an identification
decreases with a greater retention interval, Sauer et al. (2010) have studied the effects of
retention interval length and confidence. Using an immediate identification condition and a
delayed identification condition (with retention intervals ranging from 20 to 50 days), they
found that as expected, accuracy was greater in the immediate identification condition.
There was a relationship between accuracy and confidence in both of the conditions,
however, participants in the delay condition were more overconfident than participants in
the immediate condition.
As has been reviewed above (Chapter 3), witness confidence is particularly malleable,
especially in those witnesses who make mistaken identifications and receive confirmatory
feedback (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; Wells, & Bradfield, 1998). Witness confidence can
also be affected by repeated testing of the memory. In particular, repeatedly questioning a
witness about an inaccuracy in their testimony increases their confidence in said testimony
(Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996).
The time taken for a witness to make an identification from a line-up is argued to be a
better predictor of the witness’s accuracy than their confidence. The finding that witnesses
who make an identification in less time are more accurate has been reported in a number of
studies (Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Sporer, 1993). Indeed
Smith et al. (2000) found 69% of their witnesses to be accurate within 15 seconds. Denning
and Perretta (2002) found their witnesses to be almost 90% accurate when they made their
identifications in less than 10-12 seconds. Witnesses who made an identification after this
were only accurate 50% of the time. However, a review of the 10-12 second rule has
suggested that whilst identification speed is a valid predictor of identification accuracy, it is
not necessarily within the 10-15 seconds. Furthermore, combining identification speed and
confidence is a better predictor of identification accuracy than considering these aspects
separately (Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004).
4.7. Chapter summary
In this chapter we have discussed the fallibilities of human memory and eyewitness
testimony. Memory is limited in its capacity; people can only attend to a certain amount of
information. The information that is attended to is then susceptible to being forgotten or
transformed, and the procedure used to retrieve the memory can also have detrimental
effects on the reliability of that memory. Despite the fallibility of memory the criminal
justice system places great stock in the testimony of eyewitnesses.
Many of the studies described in Chapter 3 measure the bias of an identification procedure
by the number of correct and incorrect identifications after a staged event. There is
therefore a fundamental problem with assessing whether the line-up procedure is biased
when a poor memory of the event or a characteristic of the witness may confound the
influence of the administrator. In Chapter 6 the rationale for removing the memory
component in the current research is discussed.
Chapter 5: The Background to the Present Research: A real-life example of a
questionable identification from a line-up procedure?
5.1. The case of Al Megrahi
On the evening of the 21st of December 1988, Pan Am flight 103, a Boeing 747, exploded
over the Scottish border town of Lockerbie. The 259 passengers and crew on board were
killed along with 11 people from the town of Lockerbie. Almost two years after the
bombing, following an extensive multi-jurisdictional investigation, Scottish and American
authorities charged Abdelbaset Ali Mohmad Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah with the
murder of 270 people through the bombing of flight 103. Both men, who were of Libyan
descent, were believed to be members of the Libyan Intelligence Services. However, it was
to be a further eight years after these indictments before the two suspects were
surrendered by the Libyan government to U.N. officials to stand trial.
The trials of Al Megrahi and Khalifa Fhimah, under Scottish law, began on the 3rd of May
2000 at a former military base in the Netherlands. Subsequently Al Megrahi was convicted
and sentenced to life in prison; his co-defendant however, was acquitted. Much of the
evidence against Al Megrahi centred on a small shop in Malta and the eyewitness testimony
of the shopkeeper Mr Anthony Gauci. Despite a number of unsuccessful appeals against the
conviction and sentence, Al Megrahi remained in prison until August 2009 when he was
released on compassionate grounds. Although he maintained his innocence until his death
in May 2012, his conviction was not quashed and he remains to date the only person to be
convicted, and to have served time in prison, for the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103.
Almost as soon as the bomb exploded innumerable conspiracy theories were advanced as to
who was responsible for the attack. Against a complex backdrop of international political
intrigue and conspiracy theories, many doubted Al Megrahi’s and indeed the Libyans
involvement in the bombing. Al Megrahi and the Libyan government maintained their
innocence, and this appeared to have been vindicated in 2007, when, at the culmination of
a four year investigation, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) stated
that “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred” and granted Al Megrahi leave to appeal
against his conviction for a second time. Nevertheless, before the appeal could be heard, it
was abandoned in August 2009, and amid much controversy Al Megrahi was released on
compassionate grounds. Therefore, only some of the evidence contained within the appeal
was heard before the appeal court. However, due to a number of miscarriage of justice
campaigners, most notably the Justice for Megrahi Committee, much of the evidence that
was to form the basis of the appeal has become public knowledge.
There were a number of grounds of appeal proposed by Al Megrahi’s defence team.
Grounds 1 and 2 were argued in court before the appeal was dropped. They maintained that
the circumstantial evidence on which Al Megrahi was convicted was inherently weak and
therefore no reasonable jury could have returned a guilty verdict. In particular the
identification evidence of Anthony Gauci, the date of the purchase of the clothing from
Gauci’s shop, and the inference that the suitcase containing the bomb was ingested at Malta
were challenged as unreasonable inferences. Grounds 3 of the appeal were due to be heard
before the court in November 2009. These grounds maintained that the appellant had been
denied a fair trial, specifically, in relation to how the identification evidence from Anthony
Gauci was obtained, and a failing by the Crown to disclose information about Anthony Gauci
and his identification evidence. There were other grounds of appeal that at the time the
appeal was dropped had not been finalised, but dealt with concerns about forensic evidence
and defective representation.
5.2. The eyewitness identification evidence against Al Megrahi
It is evident that the identification evidence supplied by Anthony Gauci formed a crucial part
of the prosecution’s case against Al Megrahi. Indeed, the trial court found the identification
evidence to be “entirely reliable” (Trial Court Opinion [12] and [67]), and found Mr Gauci
himself to be a “credible and careful witness” (Trial Court Opinion [69]). Nevertheless, the
trial court also expressed views that Mr Gauci’s evidence was “not unequivocal” and “not
absolute” (Trial Court Opinion [88] and [89]).
The importance of Anthony Gauci’s identification evidence proceeds from the fact that
clothing from ‘Marys House’, the shop owned by Anthony Gauci in Sliema, Malta, was found
in the suitcase containing the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) which destroyed the Boeing
747. Anthony Gauci was first interviewed by police in September 1989 and over the next
eleven years participated in a number of interviews and identification procedures,
culminating in his courtroom identification of Al Megrahi in 2000. In addition to the
identification of Al Megrahi, Anthony Gauci also provided the police with details of the items
of clothing bought, the date that the items were bought, and the movements of the suspect
on the day he bought the clothing. Nevertheless, as with his identification evidence, there
are a number of discrepancies with the statements made by Mr Gauci.
Police officers investigating the Lockerbie bombing originally visited Mr Gauci’s shop on the
1st of September 1989. On this visit they showed Mr Gauci a sample of cloth and
photographs of “blast damaged” clothing. Mr Gauci told police that he remembered a
customer in the winter of 1988 that stood out in his memory because he bought a random
assortment of clothing, and did not seem to care about the sizes. Mr Gauci stated that the
man bought three sets of pyjamas, a tweed type jacket, brown trousers, lighter trousers, a
blue baby-gro with a sheep’s face on the front, a red and black tartan cardigan, and a black
umbrella. In a subsequent interview (13th September 1989) Mr Gauci stated “I cannot
remember anything else that this man bought in my shop”. On a later visit Mr Gauci was
shown a blast damaged fragment of shirt with a SLALOM label, on this occasion Mr Gauci
remained adamant that the man did not buy any shirts. However, in a statement a year later
(10th September 1990) Mr Gauci recollected that he had actually sold the man two shirts.
In his first statement Mr Gauci gave a very clear account of the man’s movements on the
day he bought the clothing. He stated that the man entered the shop at 6:30pm, bought a
number of items, paid 56 Maltese pounds in cash then left the store stating he had other
shops to visit and would return for his purchases. Mr Gauci recollects that it was raining and
the man opened his umbrella as he left the shop. Mr Gauci states that the man returned 15
minutes later, he took the parcels, saying he had a taxi waiting, left the shop, turning left
and walking up the street. Mr Gauci recalls seeing a white Mercedes taxi waiting.
However, in subsequent statements Mr Gauci’s recollection of events that day changed. In
his first statement he recalls the man took his purchases to a waiting white Mercedes taxi.
In his evidence though Mr Gauci states that he carried the purchases to the taxi for the man,
(Day 31, page 4752, line 15). Furthermore, initially Mr Gauci recalls that he was working
alone in the shop when the man came in. However, in the Crown precognition (18th March
1999 and 25th August 1999), he stated that his brother was present in the shop as the man
returned to collect his parcels.
Furthermore, from the outset Mr Gauci was not certain of the date that the purchase took
place. In his initial statement he thought that it had been a week day in late November
1988. In a later statement (19th September 1989) when trying to pinpoint the date of the
transaction Mr Gauci stated that Christmas lights were not up at the time the man bought
the clothing. However, when giving evidence at trial he reversed his original statement and
stated that there were Christmas lights, thereby claiming that the man had visited the shop
in the middle of December (Day 31, page 4739).
5.2.1. Timeline of identification evidence
In the years between the Lockerbie bombing and the trial in 2000 Anthony Gauci was
interviewed a number of times and made several statements about the identification of the
man who bought the clothing from him. The timeline of this evidence will now be reviewed.
• 1st September 1989 – As well as detailing the items sold, Mr Gauci provided a
description of the man who bought the clothing.
• 8th September 1989 – Mr Gauci was shown a photo-spread containing 23
photographs, no identification was made from this photo-spread.
• 13th September 1989 – Mr Gauci constructed an artist’s impression and facial
composite of the man who bought the clothing. He also states that he had seen the
man about three months ago in a bar in Malta.
• 14th September 1989 – Mr Gauci identifies Mohamed Salam from a photo-spread as
“similar” to the man who bought the clothing.
• 26th September 1989 – In a statement to the police Mr Gauci states that the person
who bought the clothing in 1988 visited the shop again the day before (25th
September 1989) and bought four elasticised girls dresses.
• 2nd October 1989 – Mr Gauci viewed a freeze frame image of Abu Talb and described
him as “similar” to the man who bought the clothing.
• 6th December 1989 – Mr Gauci viewed a photo-spread of 12 photographs (one of
which was Abu Talb) but failed to identify anyone.
• 5th March 1990 – Mr Gauci stated that Abu Talb “may” have been the man who
bought the clothing after viewing his picture in a newspaper.
• 10th September 1990 – Mr Gauci viewed a photo-spread of an unspecified number of
photographs (one of which was Abu Talb). Mr Gauci failed to definitively identify
anyone, but identified three other men (Salem Mohd Abdel Hady Taha, Khalil, and
Ayad Salama Hussein Mustafa Abueweiner) as “similar” to the man who bought the
clothing.
• 15th February 1991 – Mr Gauci made a qualified identification of Al Megrahi for the
first time, after picking his photograph out of a 12 photograph photo-spread. Mr
Gauci stated that he was “similar” to the man who bought the clothing if he was a bit
older.
• December 1998 – Mr Gauci viewed a photograph of Al Megrahi in a magazine article
(Focus) which named him as the person responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
• 28th February 1999 – Mr Gauci viewed a photograph of Al Megrahi in a magazine
article (It Torca) which named him as the person responsible for the Lockerbie
bombing.
• 13th April 1999 – Mr Gauci attended an identity parade at Kamp Zeist where he
makes a qualified identification of Al Megrahi.
• July 2000 – Mr Gauci identifies Al Megrahi from the dock during the trial.
5.3. Expert witness reports on the identification evidence of Anthony Gauci
For the 2009 appeal against his conviction, Al Megrahi’s defence team commissioned a
number of expert witness reports to review the evidence given by Anthony Gauci. Three of
these reports compiled by Professor Valentine, Professor Clarke, and Professor Canter (with
the assistance of Dr Youngs and Dr Hammond) are reviewed here.
Each of the reports highlights serious inconsistencies with the evidence provided by
Anthony Gauci, and discusses a number of reasons why Mr Gauci’s evidence should be
treated with caution. These reasons can be grouped under two headings, firstly the fallibility
of Mr Gauci’s memory after a time delay, and secondly the procedural impropriety
employed by the police when conducting line-ups, photo-spreads, and during questioning of
Mr Gauci.
5.3.1. The fallibility of Mr Gauci’s memory
As has already been stated, memory is susceptible to decay over time. Unless active
practising techniques are employed, research has shown that there is a rapid forgetting of
the information after the event (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1997). It must be remembered that
nearly 10 months had passed between the man entering the shop and Mr Gauci being asked
by the police to recall the events and the person who bought the clothing. A further 17
months passed before Mr Gauci identified Mr Megrahi for the first time. Although research
has not examined the extent of forgetting over a 27 month period Shepherd, Ellis, and
Davies (1982), found that after an interval of 11 months the correct identification rate was
11%, and therefore no better than chance. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that people
are more likely to remember events that are unusual or uncommon in their experience. Low
saliency events; those that occur on a daily basis, are much less likely to be remembered,
particularly after a time delay. Canter (2009), Clark (2008), and Valentine (2008), all
maintain that for a shopkeeper such as Mr Gauci, selling clothes must be an everyday
occurrence, and therefore a low saliency event.
The time delay and the low saliency of the event both concur with the view of Canter
(2009), that Mr Gauci did not have a clear memory of the event or the person, which
explains why Mr Gauci’s evidence changed and was so often contradictory. This may also
explain why Mr Gauci’s identifications of Mr Megrahi were qualified and never definitive.
On the first occasion that Mr Gauci identified Mr Megrahi he stated that he “resembled” the
man who bought the clothing. At the line-up parade at Camp Zeist Mr Gauci again qualified
his identification with the following statements “I wasn’t sure but the one who looked most
like him was number 5,” and “I’m not 100 percent sure.” Furthermore, throughout the
course of the police investigation, Mr Gauci made a number of similar qualified
identifications of other men. Prior to the line-up of February 1991 (in which Mr Gauci
identified Mr Megrahi), Mr Gauci picked out three other men who were “similar” to the
man who bought the clothing.
5.3.2. Procedural impropriety
Professor Valentine highlights that procedural impropriety was employed by investigating
officers from the beginning of their contact with Mr Gauci (Valentine, 2008). From very early
in the investigation (from at least the 26th September 1989) Mr Gauci realised that he was
being questioned in relation to the Lockerbie bombing as he was shown fragments of blast
damaged clothing. Indeed, Canter (2009) argues that this constitutes a poor interview
procedure which pervades throughout the police investigation. Instead of allowing Mr Gauci
to provide an open and detailed account of the clothing he remembers selling to the man,
the police, by showing him the fabric, lead the witness and imply that this evidence is
important. Thereby the cue of the fabric allows Mr Gauci to reconstruct a memory of selling
shirts, which he had previously consistently denied doing.
In the eleven years between the event of selling the clothes and giving evidence at the trial
of Al Megrahi, Mr Gauci was interviewed many times and subjected to repeat questioning.
Research has suggested that repeated questioning can result in increased confidence in
answers given, even if those answers are incorrect (Odinot, Wolters, & Lavender, 2009).
Moreover, as Canter (2009) observes, the knowledge that his evidence was imperative to
the investigation coupled with the repeated interviewing may have led Mr Gauci to believe
that he needed to add more detail to his evidence in order to help the police, even though
some of this evidence may not have been accurate.
All three reports cite problems with the line-up procedures as casting considerable doubt on
the reliability of Mr Gauci’s identification evidence. In particular it is argued that the
photographs used in the line-up of the 15th February 1991 (the first time Mr Gauci identified
Mr Megrahi) may have been biased against Mr Megrahi. Valentine (2008) contends that the
quality of the picture of Mr Megrahi is poor compared to the others and therefore, stands
out. Whilst Clark (2008) argues that there are serious issues with the composition of both
the photo line-up of February 1991 and the line-up parade of April 1999, resulting in a bias
against Mr Megrahi. In the photo line-up Mr Megrahi stands out as the closest in age and
ethnicity to Mr Gauci’s description. Furthermore, in the line-up parade, nine of the eleven
fillers were on average thirteen years younger than Mr Megrahi. Clark (2008) maintains that
based on age, eight of the eleven fillers should have been excluded. Of the three remaining
fillers, one had a Dutch name (could thereby be eliminated due to his ethnicity), and one
was 5’3”, therefore shorter than Mr Megrahi, who was also shorter than 6-foot or more
description given by Mr Gauci in 1989.
It is clear from the documentation of the photo line-up and the line-up parade that a “blind”
procedure was not carried out at either time. In particular during the 1991 photo line-up
Valentine (2008) points out that there were four police officers present during the
procedure who knew the location of the suspect in the line-up. Furthermore, the
statements taken from this line-up procedure show that Mr Gauci was prompted by one of
the police officers. After viewing the photo line-up, which is included in Appendix 1, Mr
Gauci stated that all of the men in the line-up were younger than the man who had bought
the clothing. DCI Bell told Mr Gauci to look at the photographs carefully and try to allow for
any age differences. This serves as a very strong cue to the witness that he is expected to
make an identification and that the suspect is present (Valentine, 2008). Research in this
area suggests that prompting a witness during a line-up can result in an increase in mistaken
identifications, particularly when the line-up composition is biased (Clark and Tunnicliff,
2001).
In the intervening years between Mr Gauci’s “identification” of Mr Megrahi and the trial,
whilst the authorities attempted to extradite Mr Megrahi and Khalifa Fhimah, the media
published many stories and pictures of Mr Megrahi as the Lockerbie bomber. Indeed two of
these publications (Focus and It Torca) were viewed by Mr Gauci a matter of months before
he identified Mr Megrahi at the trial. This exposure to outside information, according to
Valentine (2008) has allowed Mr Gauci to “learn” Mr Megrahi’s appearance (pg. 50). This
outside information would also serve to increase Mr Gauci’s confidence that he had
identified the correct person, which therefore raises further questions as to the validity of
the identification at Kamp Zeist in 1999.
Mr Gauci made a final identification of Mr Megrahi, from the dock during the trial. However,
it is argued that dock identifications are highly suggestive and should be treated with
extreme caution for their lack of reliability. A review of six studies comparing show-ups
(which is effectively what a dock identification is) and line-ups, have found that the show-up
both increases the false identification rate whilst also slightly decreasing the correct
identification rate (Clark & Godfrey, 2009). Moreover, as Mr Gauci had been shown the
Focus magazine article with Mr Megrahi’s picture, naming him as the Lockerbie bomber,
only minutes before, it is highly unlikely that Mr Gauci would not identify Mr Megrahi from
the dock.
5.4. Chapter summary
Now twenty five years after the event, and with the only person convicted of the Lockerbie
bombing deceased, we will perhaps never know who was actually responsible. We will
moreover perhaps never know whether Mr Gauci truly recognised Mr Megrahi as the
person he sold the clothing to. However, what can be said with some certainty is that the
line-up identification of Mr Megrahi by Mr Gauci was flawed and biased towards the
identification of Mr Megrahi as the culprit. Of particular concern in this instance is the fact
that police officers who knew the identity and location of the suspect administered the line-
up to Mr Gauci.
In addition to the possibility that Mr Gauci attended to the expectancy of the line-up
administrator, could it also be argued that the procedural impropriety displayed by the
police led Mr Gauci to attend to the demand characteristics of the situation? A number of
aspects of Mr Guaci’s evidence suggest that this was the case. Firstly, Mr Gauci continued to
be a part of the investigation and to be repeatedly questioned and interviewed by
authorities even though it was against the express wish of his family. Secondly, it is clear
from an early stage that Mr Gauci was aware his evidence was an important part of a high
profile international criminal investigation. Thirdly, Mr Gauci changed aspects of his
testimony possibly to coincide with cues he received from the police officers. This all
indicates that Mr Gauci was anxious to appear as the ‘good eyewitness.’
The review of the literature in Chapters 1 to 3 has suggested that individuals are inherently
susceptible to bias. Firstly, it has been highlighted that experimenters can influence the
responses of their participants through their expectations. Secondly, subjects can bias their
responses with their attention to the demand characteristics of the procedure, and their
susceptibility to the influence of the experimenter. Thirdly, in addition to influencing an
eyewitness identification with their knowledge of the location of the suspect, line-up
administrators have also been shown to influence the identifications from their line-ups
through their instructions and comments to the subject, the foils chosen, and the
presentation method of the line-up. Finally, from Chapter 4 it is clear that an eyewitness’
memory can be imperfect; a range of estimator and system variables can affect the quality
of the memory. Therefore, the presence of a memory may confound the influence of the
experimenter. In Chapter 6 then, a case will be made for examining experimenter
expectancy effects without the memory component.
Chapter 6: Isolating the Experimenter Expectancy Effect: Removing the
memory component
6.1. The antecedents of the research
In order to highlight the impact of conducting a non-blind line-up procedure Professor
Canter devised an experiment to examine the effect of an informed administrator on
respondent choice. This experiment was detailed in the report prepared by Canter and
colleagues for Mr Megrahi’s appeal. Using the photographs from the line-up of the 15th
February 1991, two groups of participants were asked to guess which person from the line-
up was a terrorist. In one group the person who conducted the line-up was informed of the
position of Mr Megrahi; in the second group they were not informed. The results of this
small experiment are particularly striking, out of the 56 participants over a quarter picked
out Mr Megrahi, and all of those participants were in the informed condition (Canter, 2009).
Therefore, even without a memory of Mr Megrahi, participants identified him as a terrorist
at a much higher rate than chance when the administrator of the line-up was informed of
his location.
To explore this phenomenon further and to improve on the validity of the first study a
second, larger experiment was devised. In addition to a larger sample size, the researchers
also included a comparison condition whereby a different target was chosen. To conduct
the experiment ten facilitators were recruited, six facilitators were assigned to condition A,
and four to condition B. Each facilitator was required to recruit two administrators. In this
experiment there were four experimental conditions:
• AI – Three facilitators and six administrators. Both the facilitator and the
administrator were informed that the suspect was in location number 8.
• AU – Three facilitators and six administrators. The facilitator was informed that the
suspect was in location number 8, but the administrator was not informed.
• BI – Two facilitators and four administrators. Both the facilitator and the
administrator were informed that the suspect was in location number 4.
• BU – Two facilitators and four administrators. The facilitator was informed that the
suspect was in location number 4, but the administrator was not informed.
Each administrator recruited twenty participants. The sample of 400 participants was shown
the same photo-spread from the first experiment. The administrators asked each participant
to identify the man they thought was most likely to be the man convicted for the Lockerbie
bombing. The results of this study show the same effect as the first study, what the authors
have termed a “fundamental administrator effect” (Canter, Youngs & Hammond, 2009).
Although the effect is not as strong as the first experiment, the results are still compelling.
In condition AI 25% of the participants identified target eight, compared to 10.83% in the
uniformed condition (AU). Similar results were found for condition B. In the Informed
condition (BI) 26.25% identified target four, compared to 12.50% in the uninformed
condition.
6.2. The rationale for removing the memory component
Despite the significant implications of investigator bias on the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, there has been a paucity of research in this specific area (Greathouse &
Kovera, 2009; Haw & Fisher, 2004; Phillips et al., 1999). As Canter, Youngs, and Hammond
(2013) stress, the research that has been conducted to date, instead of providing clarity, has
only served to muddy the water. Studies have combined different factors of line-up
administration, such as different levels of contact between the administrator and witness,
or different levels of motivation between the administrators. Furthermore, when devising
the experiments detailed above, Canter et al., (2009) argued that the ability of an
administrator to influence a witness depends partly on the susceptibility of the witness to
that influence. In an eyewitness identification procedure, the memory for the event may
confound the administrator’s influence. It is suggested that the strength of the memory
trace is an important factor in choosing rates from a line-up, if a witness has a poor memory
of the suspect they will be unwilling to choose from a line-up. The poor memory trace may
then make the witness more or less susceptible to the administrator’s influence (Russano,
Dickinson, Cass, Kovera, & Cutler, cited in Russano, Dickinson, Greathouse, & Kovera, 2006).
The differences in the variables in the studies and the confounding variable of the memory
for the suspect has resulted in, in the small number of studies reported, a variation in the
magnitude of the administrator effect and therefore an un-clear picture of administrator
influence.
Therefore, in order to examine the true extent of the administrator effect, it is necessary to
remove the memory component. Canter proposed the novel experiment detailed above,
which differs from the traditional mock witness paradigms. In such paradigms mock
witnesses are given a description of the perpetrator and then asked to select from a line-up
who they think the culprit is. Mock witness paradigms are used to test the validity of the
construction of the line-up. If all members of the line-up are selected equally then the line-
up is well constructed, however, if one member of the line-up is selected more often than
chance then there is a bias in the construction of the line-up. There is an important
distinction between mock witness experiments and the research conducted by Canter
reviewed here, and the present research. Mock witness experiments provide ‘witnesses’
with some form of information about the features of the suspect, whereas the approach
proposed by Canter asks participants to make a selection with no such information or
background knowledge.
6.3. The aims of the present research
From the review of the literature in the preceding chapters we have seen that
experimenters bias their data with their expectations and influence. Subjects also bias their
responses with their attention to the demand characteristics of the experiment and their
susceptibility to the influence of the experimenter. Line-up administrators can produce
biased line-up procedures through their knowledge of the location of the suspect and their
expectancy that the witness will identify the suspect. Moreover, bias in a line-up procedure
is exacerbated and mediated by the memory of the event and the identification procedure.
We have also seen in a real-life example what can happen when biased identification
procedures are employed.
This research however, does not aim to replicate the research conducted on the effects of
investigator bias in a line-up situation (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Haw & Fisher, 2004;
Phillips et al., 1999). This research is not a standard memory paradigm experiment, there is
not a staged event for participants to view and then identify the suspect with varying
conditions of administrator knowledge. Instead this research examines experimenter
expectancy effects in a similar way to Rosenthal’s original person perception photo-rating
task. In those experiments when experimenters were led to expect ratings of photos in a
particular direction, they indeed obtained ratings from their subjects in that direction. In
this research administrators are led to expect the participant to pick a particular person
from the line-up. Consequently, if participants pick the person expected by the
experimenter more often than the other members of the line-up, this provides evidence for
an experimenter expectancy effect. In Rosenthal’s original experiments, experimenters
influenced participants to rate photographs as more or less successful. In this experiment, if
there is an experimenter expectancy effect present, they will be influencing the participant
to pick a particular photo. Therefore, this research does link to the research concerning
biased line-up procedures, as this is the same type of influence that a line-up administrator,
who knows the identity of the suspect, can exert on an eyewitness.
As the participants in this research are being influenced to do different things, then the
processes underlying the influence highlighted by Rosenthal may also be different. It is
argued that the influence and processes proposed by Rosenthal in his classroom studies and
his studies with rats is fundamentally different to the processes involved in a procedure
where a respondent is requested to make a choice by an administrator who is informed of
the correct response. Indeed it is argued that the four factor (climate, input, output, and
feedback) theory of expectancy effects proposed by Rosenthal (1994) cannot be extended
to explain administrator effects in a line-up procedure. In the classroom studies teachers
had an extended period of interaction with their pupils, during which they can subtly modify
their behaviour, by creating a warmer socio-emotional climate, and giving more input and
personal feedback to students they expect to excel. The line-up procedure however is a
short interaction. The line-up administrator does not have the time to influence the
participant by altering the climate of the interaction. It is therefore the aim of this research
to expand upon the research conducted to date by Canter and colleagues and to explore in
greater depth the process involved in transmitting the experimenter expectancy effect
during a short interaction between the administrator and the participant.
To achieve this, the research will focus on the interaction between the administrator and
the participant. Using an experimental design the knowledge of the location of the suspect
will be varied amongst line-up administrators. Participants will then make a choice from the
line-up. In order to further the understanding of the process of the influence, administrators
and participants will complete the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation –
Behaviour questionnaire (Schutz, 1958), a full description of which is given in Chapter 7.
Suffice to say at this point that this research will attempt to uncover the interpersonal
behaviour that may account for experimenter expectancy effects. Furthermore, as has been
shown in the review of the literature concerning expectancy effects, demand characteristics,
and biased line-up procedures, experimenters can make seemingly innocuous statements to
their subjects, which nonetheless have an effect on the responses of those subjects. This
research will therefore take an interest in the verbal interaction between the experimenter
and the subject during the experiment.
6.3.1. The interpersonal relations factor
As part of the body of research that Rosenthal and his colleagues have conducted in the
area of experimenter expectancy effects, they have studied the interaction between the
experimenter and the subject, in order to determine behaviours that are associated with
greater expectancy effects. The data for these analyses has come from accounts of the
experimenter’s behaviour from their subjects, and observations of experimenter behaviour
from recordings of the interaction between the experimenter and the subject. Rosenthal
(1976) has suggested that experimenter expectancy effects are communicated through
kinesic and paralinguistic means. From direct observations of the experimenter by the
subject, those experimenters with the greatest expectancy effects were judged to display
subtle movements of the legs and head (kinesic communication), and speak in an expressive
tone of voice (paralinguistic communication). This communication is aided by the
interpersonal style of the experimenter. Experimenters who achieved the greatest
expectancy effects were judged to have a number of interpersonal traits; they tended to be
more professional and business-like with their subjects, but also more interested,
enthusiastic, relaxed and personable than experimenters who were not as influential.
Similar results were found when observers of the interaction between the experimenter and
the subject were asked to rate the experimenter (from 1 to 10) on five variables;
dominance, professionalism, friendliness, likeability, and activity. Those experimenters who
the observers judged as more professional, more dominant, less hyperactive, and more
likeable, demonstrated greater expectancy effects. Rosenthal (1976) suggests that observers
view experimenters as less professional and less in control if they are hyperactive. The
professionalism, dominance, and likeability traits identified by the observers relate to the
characteristics professional, business-like, and personable identified by the subjects. Overall
then it would appear that experimenters exert the most influence over their subjects when
they are likeable professionals, who are in charge of the situation, and relaxed in their
movements. As Harris and Rosenthal (1985) point out in their meta-analysis, there are
numerous behaviours which can mediate expectancy, some of which are yet to be
discovered. This research will therefore consider how the mediating variable of
interpersonal behaviour, as measured by the FIRO-B questionnaire, can aid the
communication of expectancy effects.
6.3.2. Research hypotheses
This research is predominantly exploratory in nature. With regard to the link between
interpersonal relations and experimenter expectancy effects, the FIRO-B questionnaire has
not been used as the test instrument in this area before. Therefore, fixed hypotheses about
the results of the FIRO-B will not be made, although the research will be looking for
differences between participants in their FIRO-B scores. In particular the research will look
for differences in the FIRO-B scores for those who have been subject to the administrator
effect, compared to those who have not. This research will also examine whether some
administrators are more likely to influence participants than others, and whether some
participants are more susceptible to influence than others. Regarding the experimenter
expectancy effects, more concrete hypotheses can be proposed. It is therefore hypothesised
that;
• Those participants in the informed condition will identify the target more often than
those participants in the uninformed condition and the control condition.
• Those participants in the uninformed condition will identify the target more often
than those in the control condition.
Examining the verbal interaction between the experimenter and the participant is again
exploratory. However, if the presence of an experimenter expectancy effect is established
then it would be hypothesised that some evidence of this would be apparent in the verbal
interaction between the Administrator and the participant.
Chapter 7: Methodology
7.1. A methodology for studying administrator effects
There are a number of methodological issues to consider when conducting experimental
research. The psychological experimental model has been borrowed from the natural and
physical sciences. In eyewitness research this model has allowed researchers to empirically
test aspects of the line-up. This experimental paradigm has also given researchers control
over which aspects of the line-up to manipulate. Control of extraneous factors is the precise
reason why the experimental procedure has been used in this instance. This research is
interested in the effect of administrator knowledge of the location of the suspect. It is
therefore important that participants undergo the same experimental procedure, where
only the administrator’s knowledge of the location of the suspect is varied. Controlling for
extraneous variables is not the only advantage of the experimental procedure. The random
assignment of participants into the different experimental conditions, alongside the control
of the variables, allows researchers to infer a causal relationship from a correlation between
two variables (Carlsmith et al., 1976).
Despite the benefits of experimental research there are concerns about the ecological
validity of such research. One area of contention is the over-use of students as subjects in
these experiments. Indeed, research of human behaviour has been described as “the
science of the behaviour of sophomores” (McNemar, 1946, p. 333), due to the
overrepresentation of undergraduate students as subjects in psychological research.
However, reviews in this area (Pozzulo, 2006; Bartlett & Memon, 2006) have found that
students tend to perform better than other members of the public, and therefore
underestimate the observed effects, such as suggestibility. In this research, although a
proportion of the participants are students, they are not exclusively so.
Notwithstanding student subjects, concern has been raised generally at the
representativeness of research conducted with the “volunteer subject” (Rosnow &
Rosenthal, 1997, p.89). Precisely what motivates people to volunteer for an experiment
could affect the responses that they give or the behaviour that they exhibit. There is also the
possibility that the volunteer subject differs in some fundamental way from the population
to which the research wishes to generalise to. Whilst in a strict sense the participants in this
research did not volunteer to be part of the experiment, they did agree when asked to take
part. We do not know how many people were asked by the administrators and who refused
to take part, and whether these individuals would have behaved or responded in a
fundamentally different way to the present sample. Therefore, caution must be taken when
generalising the results to a wider population.
A criticism often levelled at the type of eyewitness research reviewed above is that the
experimental situation cannot adequately (for valid ethical reasons) replicate the stress
experienced by actual eyewitnesses. Although, when research has put the witness under
stress (Morgan et al., 2004) they have found that stress proves a hindrance when encoding
memories. Finally critics argue that the experimental line-up cannot reproduce the real-
world significance or consequences of taking part in line-up procedure. Archival research of
real cases has shown, nevertheless, that even with serious crimes eyewitnesses still identify
a known innocent filler on average 30% of the time (Wright, & Skagerberg, 2007). Moreover,
as explained in Chapter 6, this study forms part of a group of new and novel experiments
which removes the memory component and attempts to “disentangle” (Canter et al., 2013,
p. 85) the experimental expectancy effect from the memory process. Therefore, as the
participant is not being tested on their memory of an event those concerns are not
pertinent to this research.
7.1.1. Ethics and confidentiality
In compliance with university policy, the author submitted a proposal of the research to the
Human and Health Sciences School Research Ethics Panel (SREP). SREP approved the
research as meeting their ethical guidelines for conducting research with human
participants (see Appendix 2 for the SREP approval certificate). The main ethical issues
concerning this research were ensuring the confidentiality and anonymity of the people
involved, and providing support to participants who may experience distress as a result of
taking part in the study. Firstly the research guaranteed the anonymity of the individuals
conducting the line-ups. The identity of each Facilitator and Administrator was known only
by the author, and they were given a corresponding code for the analysis. The anonymity of
the participants was also maintained by ensuring that they did not provide any identifiable
information to the administrator conducting the experiment. Each participant was given a
code which delineated who their administrator was and which condition they were in.
Secondly, to ensure the confidentiality of the data, hard-copies of completed questionnaires
and answer sheets were stored in a locked cupboard that only the author had access to. The
recordings of the experiments were transcribed and the original recordings deleted, and
electronic data was stored on a password protected computer.
Although the Lockerbie bombing occurred over twenty years ago, as it involved a terrorist
attack, it is possible that the research may inadvertently trigger emotional or psychological
distress for the participant. In order to mitigate this distress the consent form (Appendix 3)
emphasised that the participant was under no obligation to take part in this experiment,
and if they felt uncomfortable they could withdraw their participation. The telephone
number and e-mail address of the university counselling service, along with the authors e-
mail address was provided on the consent form in case the participant wished to seek help,
or ask questions about the research.
7.2. The recruitment of Facilitators and Administrators
In the first stage of the experiment the experimenter (author) randomly recruited six people
to act as Facilitators (four females and two males). All Facilitators were told that the aim of
the experiment was to research different types of line-up. The Facilitators were divided into
three groups (informed, informed of alternative, and control) and were briefed separately
by the experimenter. Three of the Facilitators were randomly assigned into group A or the
informed group, two of the Facilitators were assigned to group B or the informed of
alternative group and one Facilitator was assigned to group C or the control group. Each
Facilitator was asked to recruit as many people as possible to act as administrators to
conduct the experiments.
There were no specific guidelines for the recruitment of administrators; they were just
required to be over the age of 16. The Facilitators recruited differing numbers of
administrators, in total sixteen administrators were recruited (twelve females and four
males). The three Facilitators in the informed condition (A) recruited seven administrators
between them, with Facilitator one recruiting four administrators, Facilitator two recruiting
two administrators, and Facilitator three recruiting one administrator. In the informed of
alternative condition (B) Facilitator four recruited five administrators and Facilitator five
recruited one administrator. Finally in the control condition (C) Facilitator six recruited three
administrators.
There were two reasons for using Facilitators to recruit administrators, who in turn
recruited participants. Firstly, this procedure allowed the true rationale for the study to
remain concealed from the administrators, as the Facilitators who briefed them were
themselves unaware. Furthermore, using separate Facilitators for each condition (informed,
informed of alternative, and control), rather than the author who knew the correct location
of the suspect, allowed for firstly, a true double-blind control condition where both the
Facilitator and the administrators were uninformed of the location of the suspect. Secondly,
this allowed for the informed of alternative condition. In this condition the Facilitators and
administrators were informed that the suspect was number four in the line-up, which is
incorrect.  If the author had recruited the administrators in this condition their knowledge of
the correct location of the suspect may have confounded the communication of the
incorrect location.
The second reason for employing Facilitators was to investigate whether they
communicated their knowledge of who the suspect was to administrators who were
supposed to be blind to the location of the suspect. By doing this the study becomes more
akin to line-ups conducted in real world settings. In Chapter 3 the financial and practical
objections of the police to conducting double-blind line-ups were discussed. However, even
if these objections can be overcome and a blind administrator conducts the line-up, the
possibility that the administrator may have been briefed by an investigator who is not blind
to the identity of the suspect has not been considered. This study, by using Facilitators,
therefore aims to investigate the implication of a non-blind investigator asking a blind
investigator to conduct a line-up.
7.3. The sample
The participants of the study consist of a convenience sample of 526 people from the
general population. Again there were no specific requirements for the recruitment of
participants; administrators were asked to recruit people over the age of sixteen, and to try
to recruit an equal number of males and females from as diverse a background as possible.
Table 7.3.1 shows the number of participants recruited by each administrator.
Table 7.3.1: The number of participants recruited by each administrator
Administrator Number of participants Percentage %1 38 7.22 30 5.73 32 6.14 40 7.65 40 7.66 5 1.07 18 3.48 32 6.19 40 7.610 40 7.611 40 7.612 39 7.413 22 4.214 40 7.615 30 5.716 40 7.6Total 526 100
7.3.1. General and social characteristics
Gender and Age
The aim of the research was to include a representative sample of the general population,
by recruiting male and female participants in roughly equal numbers, and by sampling a
wide age range of people. The sample of 526 participants consists of 245 (46.6%) male
participants, and 278 (52.9%) female participants (three participants failed to record their
gender). The aim of the research was also to sample a wide range of ages. The age range of
the participants in the sample is 72 years, with ages ranging from 16 years to 88 years. The
mean age of the sample is 31.74 years (Standard Deviation = 14.47 years), with a median
age of 25 years.
Education and Occupation
The participants were asked about their highest level of education and their occupation.
Table 7.3.1.1 shows the level of education of the participants. For 28 participants (5.3%)
there is no data on the highest level of education. The table shows that approximately 90%
of the participants had gained some formal educational qualifications, with the majority
(32.7%) of participants gaining GCSE’s or equivalent. Only 1% of the sample had gained no
formal qualifications.
Table 7.3.1.1: The educational attainment of the participants
Educationalattainment Number ofparticipants Percentage %No Qualifications 5 1.00GCSE/O-Level/NVQ 172 32.70A-Level/BTEC 120 22.80Degree/Diploma 157 29.80Masters/PhD 44 8.40Total 498 94.70Note: 28 participants failed to indicate their educational attainment
The Standard Occupational Classification (2010) from the Office for National Statistics was
used to categorise the occupations of the participants. Table 7.3.1.2 shows the occupational
categories of the sample, twelve participants did not indicate their occupation, and three of
the occupations could not be categorised. The majority of the sample, 30.6%, are students.
A further 28.3% of the sample are grouped in the first three categories,
Managers/Directors/Senior Officials, Professionals, and Associate Professionals and
Technical occupations. The rest of the sample are quite evenly distributed through the
elementary occupations, sales and customer service occupations, administrative and
secretarial, and skilled trade occupations. A small percentage of the sample consists of
caring, leisure and other service occupations, process, plant and machine operatives,
unemployed participants, and retired participants.
Table 7.3.1.2: The occupational categories of the participants
Occupational category Number ofparticipants Percentage%Managers/Directors/Senior Officials 20 3.8Professionals 80 15.2Associate Professionals and Technical 49 9.3Administrative and Secretarial 30 5.7Skilled Trade 29 5.5Caring/Leisure and Other Services 20 3.8Sales and Customer Service 41 7.8Process/Plant and MachineOperatives 3 0.6Elementary Occupations 46 8.7Student 161 30.6Unemployed 13 2.5Retired 19 3.6Total 511 97.1
7.4. The procedure
As stated above, all of the Facilitators were misinformed as to the true rationale for the
experiment. In their individual briefings they were informed that the study was to research
different types of line-up administration. The three groups of Facilitators also received
slightly different instructions. The Facilitators in the informed condition (A) were informed
of the correct location of the target suspect, photograph number eight in the line-up. The
Facilitators in the informed of alternative condition (B) were informed that the target
suspect was number four in the line-up. The Facilitator in the control condition (C) was not
informed of the location of the suspect. The Facilitators were supplied with instructions
according to their condition.
7.4.1. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition A
You are taking part in an experiment examining the effects of type of line-up on
identifications made from a police photographic line-up. What we would like you to do is
enlist ‘line-up administrators’ – people to help you conduct this experiment. To half of
these, please give the instructions for condition ‘A1’, and to the other half give the
instructions for condition ‘A2’. They will each ask a number of ‘respondents’ to pick the
person that they think is most likely to be the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing from
a photographic line-up consisting of 12 pictures. They should do this using the instructions
for respondents given below, so please make sure these are available to them. The
individual who was actually held responsible for the bombing is the person in photo number
8, although only the line-up administrator in condition A1 will know this. In condition A2 the
administrator will be blind to the position of the target within the line-up. Each
administrator will conduct both simultaneous and sequential line-ups and will therefore
need both copies of the photographic line-up to use, and the sheet for recording responses
and participant information.
7.4.2. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition B
You are taking part in an experiment examining the effects of type of line-up on
identifications made from a police photographic line-up. What we would like you to do is
enlist ‘line-up administrators’ – people to help you conduct this experiment. To half of
these, please give the instructions for condition ‘B1’, and to the other half give the
instructions for condition ‘B2’. They will each ask a number of ‘respondents’ to pick the
person that they think is most likely to be the man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing from
a photographic line-up consisting of 12 pictures. They should do this using the instructions
for respondents given below, so please make sure these are available to them. The
administrator in condition B2 will not have any prior beliefs about who might be the
‘suspect’ – the person convicted of the bombing – but in condition B1 the administrator will
be told that it is the individual in position 4 in the line-up, even though it’s not. Each
administrator will conduct both simultaneous and sequential line-ups and will therefore
need both copies of the photographic line-up to use, and the sheet for recording responses
and participant information.
7.4.3. Instructions for Facilitators in Condition C
You are taking part in an experiment examining the effects of type of line-up on
identifications made from a police photographic line-up. What we would like you to do is
enlist ‘line-up administrators’ – people to help you conduct this experiment. To these
administrators, please give the instructions for condition ‘C1’. They will each ask a number
of ‘respondents’ to pick the person that they think is most likely to be the man convicted of
the Lockerbie bombing from a photographic line-up consisting of 12 pictures. They should
do this using the instructions for respondents given below, so please make sure these are
available to them. Each administrator will conduct both simultaneous and sequential line-
ups and will therefore need both copies of the photographic line-up to use, and the sheet
for recording responses and participant information.
7.4.4. Instructions for the line-up administrators
Facilitators were given the instructions for line-up administrators for their group and were
asked to recruit and brief the administrators individually. They were instructed to provide
each administrator with a copy of the instructions and a copy of the guidelines for
conducting the experiment as detailed below.
Instructions for Line-Up Administrator in Condition A1:
You have been provided with two photographic line-ups, line-up X1 and line-up Y1. Both
line-ups have also been provided in a sequential format. The line-ups consist of photographs
of 12 men, one of which is the man believed to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
This is the man in position number 8. What we would like you to do is to ask different
people (preferably an equal split of males and females) to look at the pictures and decide
which of the people they think is most likely to be the man who did it, using the instructions
specified. Please record the age, gender, occupation, and educational achievement of each
respondent and the number they pick as the most likely culprit on the sheet provided. Each
respondent must make a selection. Hopefully most people should correctly identify the
suspect from the line-up.
Instructions for Line-Up Administrator in Condition A2:
You have been provided with two photographic line-ups, line-up X1 and line-up Y1. Both
line-ups have also been provided in a sequential format. The line-ups consist of photographs
of 12 men, one of which is the man believed to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
What we would like you to do is to ask different people (preferably an equal split of males
and females) to look at the pictures and decide which of the people they think is most likely
to be the man who did it, using the instructions specified. Please record the age, gender,
occupation, and educational achievement of each respondent and the number that they
pick as the most likely culprit on the sheet provided. Each respondent must make a
selection. Hopefully most people should correctly identify the suspect from the line-up.
Instructions Given to Line-Up Administrators in Condition B1:
You have been provided with two photographic line-ups, line-up X1 and line-up Y1. Both
line-ups have also been provided in a sequential format. The line-ups consist of photographs
of 12 men, one of which is the man believed to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
This is the man in position number 4. What we would like you to do is to ask different
people (preferably an equal split of males and females) to look at the pictures and decide
which of the people they think is most likely to be the man who did it, using the instructions
specified. Please record the age, gender, occupation, and educational achievement of each
respondent and the number they pick as the most likely culprit on the sheet provided. Each
respondent must make a selection. Hopefully most people should correctly identify the
suspect from the line-up.
Instructions Given to Line-Up Administrators in Condition B2:
You have been provided with two photographic line-ups, line-up X1 and line-up Y1. Both
line-ups have also been provided in a sequential format. The line-ups consist of photographs
of 12 men, one of which is the man believed to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
What we would like you to do is to ask different people (preferably an equal split of males
and females) to look at the pictures and decide which of the people they think is most likely
to be the man who did it, using the instructions specified. Please record the age, gender,
occupation, and educational achievement of each respondent and the number that they
pick as the most likely culprit on the sheet provided. Each respondent must make a
selection. Hopefully most people should correctly identify the suspect from the line-up.
Instructions Given to Line-Up Administrators in Condition C1:
You have been provided with two photographic line-ups, line-up X1 and line-up Y1. Both
line-ups have also been provided in a sequential format. The line-ups consist of photographs
of 12 men, one of which is the man believed to be responsible for the Lockerbie bombing.
What we would like you to do is to ask different people (preferably an equal split of males
and females) to look at the pictures and decide which of the people they think is most likely
to be the man who did it, using the instructions specified. Please record the age, gender,
occupation, and educational achievement of each respondent and the number that they
pick as the most likely culprit on the sheet provided. Each respondent must make a
selection. Hopefully most people should correctly identify the suspect from the line-up.
7.4.5. Guidelines for conducting the experiment
All administrators were provided with a copy of the guidelines detailed below.
Procedure for conducting the line-ups:
All line-ups must be recorded with a dicta-phone. You need to give each participant a
unique code so that their answer sheet can be matched with their recording. The participant
code needs to be written on the answer sheet and recorded on the Dictaphone.
Condition 1
Twenty witnesses (10 male/10 female). Show half (10) of the witnesses a simultaneous line-
up and half (10) of the witnesses a sequential line-up using photo array X1 (simultaneous)
and X2 (sequential). Record their personal details and their choice on the sheet provided.
Then give the witnesses the FIRO.
In this condition you need to record whether the witness took part in a simultaneous or a
sequential line-up.
Condition 2
Twenty witnesses (10 male/10 female)
1. Show ten witnesses a simultaneous line-up using photo array X1. Record their
personal details and their choice on the sheet provided. Then give them the FIRO.
Then show them a sequential line-up using photo array Y2. Record their choice
again.
2. Show ten witnesses a sequential line-up using photo array X2. Record their personal
details and their choice on the sheet provided. Then give them the FIRO. Then show
them a simultaneous line-up using photo array Y1. Record their choice again.
In this condition you need to record whether witnesses took part in option 1 or 2.
Procedure for conducting simultaneous line-ups
A simultaneous line-up is where the witness sees all the suspects at once. These are the X1
and Y1 photo-spreads. In this condition you need to place the photo-spread in front of the
witness. The witness can have as much time as they need to identify the suspect.
Procedure for conducting sequential line-ups
A sequential line-up is where the witness sees one suspect at a time. These are the X2 and
Y2 photo-spreads. In this condition you need to place one photo at a time in front of the
witness. The witness can have as much time as they need to look at each photo. They must
make a decision on each photo whether that person is the suspect. If they choose a photo
as that of the suspect they should not see the rest of the photos. If by the end of the photos
they have not chosen a suspect you can show them the sequential photos again in the same
order. It does not matter which order you present the photos, any random order is fine, but
change the order for each witness. Figure 7.4.5.a. shows a pictorial representation of
Conditions 1 and 2 of the experiment.
Figure 7.4.5.a: A pictorial representation of conditions 1 and 2
Condition 1
Half of the participants Half of the participants
Simultaneous line-up(X1) Sequential line-up(X2)
Record personal detailsand choice of suspect Record personal detailsand choice of suspect
Give participant theFIRO Give participant theFIRO
Condition 2
Half of the participants Half of the participants
Simultaneous line-up(X1) Sequential line-up(X2)
Record personal detailsand choice of suspect Record personal detailsand choice of suspect
Give participant theFIRO Give participant theFIRO
Sequential line-up(Y2) Simultaneous line-up(Y1)
Record choice ofsuspect again Record choice ofsuspect again
During their individual briefings the Facilitator ensured that the administrator understood
how to conduct the line-ups, and the administrator had the opportunity to ask the
Facilitator any questions they had about the procedure. Once the Facilitator was satisfied
that the administrator understood how to conduct the line-ups the Facilitator provided
them with a bundle of materials (detailed below) and the administrator could begin to
recruit participants.
In order to obtain a diverse sample of participants, administrators were permitted to recruit
participants from both within and outside the university. Line-ups were therefore conducted
in a variety of settings, including university classrooms, business offices and administrators
own homes. Despite the variety of settings administrators were told to conduct the line-ups
privately, in a quiet room, with one participant at a time.
7.5. The materials
The Facilitators were firstly provided with their instructions corresponding to their allocated
group. Once they had read through and understood the instructions they were given a
bundle of materials to give to the administrators. Included in this bundle was a consent form
for administrators to administer to participants (Appendix 3). The consent form explains
that the researcher is conducting a study on the effects of different types of line-ups on
eyewitness testimony, thus concealing the actual rationale for the research. The consent
form briefly indicates that the participant will be required to look at different line-ups and
also fill in a personality questionnaire. The consent form also indicates that the line-up
procedure will be audio-recorded. The anonymity of the participants is guaranteed, the
participants are asked to tick three boxes if they agree to take part in the experiment,
consent for their responses to be used in further analysis and research, and agree for the
experiment to be recorded. The consent form gives details of organisations and support
services for participants to contact if they feel they have been affected by any issues raised
in the study, and finally, the researchers details are given in order for the participants to ask
any questions about the research.
Also included in the bundle of materials were the instructions and guidelines for
administrators detailed above, and two photo-arrays. The first photo-array (Appendix 4) was
the photo-line-up used in the Al Megrahi case in 1991, with Mr Megrahi appearing in
position eight of the photo-array. This photo-array was provided in both a simultaneous (X1)
and a sequential format (X2). The X2 photo-array was constructed by cutting out the photos
from the X1 photo-array and backing them with cardboard to ensure they were the same
size in both types of line-up. The second photo-array (Appendix 5) was also from the Al
Megrahi case, but did not include a photo of Mr Megrahi, and therefore could be termed a
target-absent line-up. This photo-array was also provided in a simultaneous (Y1) format and
a sequential (Y2) format, with the same procedure utilised for the sequential photos.
An answer sheet was devised in order to record the participants’ responses (Appendix 6).
Participants were asked their age, gender, occupation, and highest level of education.
Participants were then also asked if they had ever been asked to identify someone from a
police line-up. Dependent on the condition of the experiment the answer sheet has the
space required to record the identifications of the participants. Finally the participant is
asked to describe how confident they are in their identification on a five point Likert scale (1
= Very unconfident, 5 = Very confident).
7.5.1. The FIRO-B Questionnaire
The bundle of materials also contained the FIRO-B questionnaire (Schutz, 1958; Appendix 7).
The Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation (FIRO) is a theory of interpersonal
personality developed by Schutz in the 1950’s, originally for use in a military setting. Since
then the theory has been revised, and expanded, and has been used in diverse settings
including public schools (Schutz, 1976), family therapy (Doherty & Colangelo, 1984), and
organisations (Schutz, 1994). During the extensive revision of the original theory a number
of instruments within the FIRO family were developed. In particular the Elements of
Awareness instruments which since 1984 have included a revised version of the FIRO-B,
Element B: Behaviour, but also included were Element F: Feelings; Element S: Self; Element
W: Work Relations; Element C: Close Relations; Element P: Parental Relationships; and
Element O: Organizational Climate (Schutz, 1992; 1994).
In this instance it is the FIRO-Element B instrument that was utilised (from now on referred
to as FIRO-B). Schutz (1992) states that the original FIRO-B was designed to identify
individuals who were compatible with one another and who would work well together, by
predicting the interaction between two individuals. However, the FIRO-B instrument has
been taken up by others and has been widely used in training, human relations and
personality arenas. The FIRO-B questionnaire gathers insights into how an individual’s needs
for inclusion, control, and affection can shape their interactions with others. The FIRO
theory is based on the facet framework originally developed by Guttman (1959). In the
original theory Schutz proposed three Form domains for describing interpersonal
personality, Control, Affection, and Inclusion. During the revision of the FIRO-B Affection
became known as Openness, as it was felt that Affection related more to a feeling not a
behaviour. Schutz (1992) describes the Control scale as measuring the amount of control
people desire to have over other people, indicating that some people enjoy control and
responsibility over other people, whilst others actively seek situations where they have no
control or responsibility. The Openness scale measures the extent to which people desire to
be open with others, with some preferring relationships where they confide in people,
whilst others prefer impersonal relationships. Finally, the Inclusion scale measures how
much contact people seek with others, with some people seeking to be part of a group,
whilst others seeking more solitary pursuits.
In conjunction with these three Form domains Schutz (1992) described a Mode facet with
two levels, Expressed “what I do toward you” and Received “what I get from you” (p. 918),
which describes a persons’ tendency to convey Form behaviour or obtain Form behaviour
from another person. Finally there was an Experience facet with two levels, Wanted and
Perceived, which describes whether a person actually perceives these experiences, or wants
to experience these behaviours. A visual representation of Schutz’s model can be achieved
with the use of a mapping sentence (Borg & Shye, 1995) which can be seen in Figure 7.5.1.a.
Figure 7.5.1.a:Mapping sentence for Schutz’s (1992) theory of interpersonal relations
The extent to which a person (p) agrees with statements about their
A. Experience B.Mode C. Form{1. Wanting              } {1. To Express } {1. Control     }
{ } {                         } {2. Openness } in interactions withothers{2. Perceived } {2. To Receive  } {3. Inclusion  }
1. Disagree2
3456. Agree
Where p is from a population of people P, who are not artificially selected with respect to the facets
The mapping sentence above indicates how the facets can combine to form a structuple
(Borg & Lingoes, 1987), or a template for the formation of the instruments questions. The
combination of the facets provides 12 (2 experience x 2 mode x 3 form) possible templates
of questions for the FIRO-B. Schutz (1958) developed nine questions for each of these
structuples resulting in a questionnaire consisting of 108 items.
In the present study the research was particularly interested in the actual experience of the
participants and how they perceive themselves. Therefore the Wanted domain of the
Experience facet was excluded, resulting in an instrument consisting of a more manageable
and expeditious 54 items. The mapping sentence for the reduced FIRO-B with only the
perceived experiences can be seen in Figure 7.5.1.b.
Figure 7.5.1.b: Revised mapping sentence for Schutz’s (1992) theory ofinterpersonal relations, perceived experiences only
The extent to which a person (p) agrees with statements about their
A. Experience B.Mode C. Form{1. Perceived } {1. To Express } {1. Control     }
{                                  } {                         } {2. Openness } in interactions withothers{                                  } {2. To Receive  } {3. Inclusion  }
1. Disagree2
3456. Agree
Where p is from a population of people P, who are not artificially selected with respect to the facets
The above mapping sentence results in six scales;
• Expressed Control – I control people
• Expressed Openness – I am open with people
• Expressed Inclusion – I include people
• Received Control – People control me
• Received Openness – People are open with me
• Received Inclusion – People include me
Examples of the items constructed from the above mapping sentence include item 1. I seek
out people to be with (A1, B1, C3), item 2. People decide what to do when we are together
(A1, B2, C1), and item 15. I am more comfortable when people do not get too close (A1, B1,
C2). Table 7.5.1.1 provides a list of the items from the FIRO-B which constitutes each scale.
Table 7.5.1.1: The item numbers of the FIRO-B for eachscale
Scale Item NumbersReceived Inclusion 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, 34, 40, 46, 52Expressed Inclusion 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37, 43, 49Received Control 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, 32, 38, 44, 50Expressed Control 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, 35, 41, 47, 53Received Openness 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, 54Expressed Openness 3, 9, 15, 21, 27, 33, 39, 45, 51
The received inclusion scale describes an individual’s tendency to obtain involvement and
attention from others, an example item of this scale is: People invite me to do things. The
expressed inclusion scale describes an individual’s tendency to seek involvement and
attention from others, an example item of this scale is: I join social groups. The received
control scale describes an individual’s tendency to be dominated by others, an example item
of this scale is: People decide what to do when we are together. The expressed control scale
describes an individual’s tendency to dominate others, an example item of this scale is: I am
the dominant person when I am with people. The received openness scale describes an
individual’s tendency to have intimacy and emotion from others, an example item of this
scale is: My close friends tell me their real feelings. The expressed openness scale describes
an individual’s tendency to be intimate and emotional with others, an example item of this
scale is: I am totally honest with my close friends. The FIRO-B questionnaire is measured on
a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Disagree, 6 = Agree). Eight of the Openness items (15, 18, 21, 27,
30, 33, 42, 45,) are reverse coded.
Gender and age norms for the FIRO-B have been postulated by Schutz (1992). Female
respondents have been found to score significantly higher on the received inclusion and
received openness scales. They are also higher, although not significantly, on the expressed
inclusion scale. For the expressed control and received control scales, males and females
have not been found to differ significantly. For the age of the respondent, Schutz (1992) has
found that the scores for the sociability factors, inclusion and openness, are higher for
younger respondents. Scores for expressed control appear to reduce with the age of the
respondent, whereas scores for received control appear to increase with age.
Despite the popularity and widespread use of the FIRO-B questionnaire, some have
questioned its construct validity, most notably in a series of papers by Hurley (1990; 1991;
1992). In contrast to Schutz’s three domains of Inclusion, Control, and Openness research
has suggested that Inclusion and Openness are not distinct components. Indeed, studies
examining the FIRO-B have suggested that there are in fact two dimensions. Mahoney and
Stasson (2005) have labelled the two dimensions Dominance (Schutz’s Control) and Socio-
Emotional Affect (Schutz’s Inclusion and Openness combined). Mahoney and Stasson (2005)
concur with the findings of Macrosson (2000) who labelled the two domains Control and
Nurturance.
It should be noted however, that the research conducted above examined Schutz’s original
FIRO-B questionnaire, not the updated Element-B questionnaire. Furthermore, they used
the coding framework originally developed by Schutz, and the scores of the six subscales
even though there is no psychometric basis for the coding framework or the subscales. As
described above the FIRO-B questionnaire was designed using a facet framework; however
the studies that have questioned the validity of the FIRO-B have utilised a factor analysis
approach. It is argued that in order to adequately examine the facet structure of the FIRO-B
a facet analysis approach is required. Research that has utilised this type of analysis of the
FIRO-B has been conducted by researchers of the International Research Centre for
Investigative Psychology (IRCIP, 2010). In order to do this the reduced FIRO-B (the 54 items
constituting the Perceived experience not the Wanted experience) was given to 186
respondents.
The completed FIRO-B questionnaires were analysed using a form of Multi-Dimensional
Scaling (MDS), Smallest Space Analysis (SSA-I) which was developed by Guttman and Lingoes
(Guttman 1968; Lingoes, 1973). SSA is now a well-established technique that has been used
in diverse settings; it has particularly been applied to studying criminality by Professor
Canter and colleagues. MDS and in particular SSA has been increasingly utilised in a variety
of studies concerning different aspects of criminality, including arson (Canter & Fritzon,
1998), murder (Salfati & Canter, 1999), sexual offences (Häkkänen, Lindlöf, & Santilla, 2004),
and stalking (Groves, Salfati, & Elliot, 2004).
The SSA programme correlates every variable with every other variable, the rank order of
these correlations then create a triangular matrix. Whilst SSA utilises similar mathematical
calculations as factor analysis and cluster analysis, the correlation coefficients of the SSA
form a spatial representation in a statistical geometric space that is visual, and therefore
more easily interpretable. The correlation coefficient plots each variable in the SSA space;
those variables that are more closely inter-correlated are closer together in the SSA space.
Therefore, those variables most likely to co-occur together are closer together in the plot,
whilst those variables that do not co-occur are further away from each other. Under this
assumption the thematic structure of a scale can be analysed by examining those variables
which are grouped together on the SSA plot.
The coefficient of alienation (Borg & Lingoes, 1987) indicates how closely the rank orders of
the distances between the points in the spatial representation relate to the rank orders of
the correlations between the variables. The smaller the coefficient of alienation the better
the fit between the derived SSA configuration and the correlation matrix from which it is
derived. Zero is considered to be a perfect fit, a coefficient smaller than 0.15 is considered a
good fit while a coefficient between 0.15 and 0.20 is considered a reasonable fit (Guttman,
1968). The particular advantage of using SSA as the form of MDS is that SSA is a non-metric
procedure, it is therefore less sensitive to high or low absolute frequencies as it uses the
rank order of the co-occurrences, for example, the relative differences between the
variables rather than the absolute values (Canter and Youngs, 2009).
The study conducted by IRCIP researchers (2010) used SSA to examine the FIRO-B scale
items and to delineate the thematic structures of the scale. It is hypothesised that those
variables of the FIRO-B scale that measure the same structure will be closely correlated and
therefore appear in the same area of the SSA plot, the closer that two points are to each
other on the plot the more likely that participants will have provided similar answers to
those questions. The SSA plot found that items of the Inclusion and Control facets each
occupied distinct separate areas of the plot, however, the items of the Openness facet are
distributed throughout the plot and do not occupy a distinct area. The results of this SSA
therefore indicate that, in concurrence with the research cited above, there are indeed two
Form facets of the FIRO-B. It is argued that Schutz’s Openness and Inclusion facets actually
form one Personal / Social Inclusion facet, which Mahoney and Stasson (2005) labelled
Socio-Emotional Affect, and Macrosson (2000) labelled Nurturance.
However, the facet analysis has allowed further insight into the thematic structure of the
FIRO-B that was not possible with factor analysis. The facet analysis indicates that there is
indeed a distinct Mode facet (Expressed and Received) that acts upon both the Inclusion and
Control facets. Furthermore, the facet analysis also suggests that Openness, rather than just
being an aspect of Inclusion, is actually a mediator of received behaviours. From this facet
analysis the IRCIP researchers have suggested four interpersonal relations tendencies
comprised of two facets:
• Expressed Personal / Social Inclusion
• Expressed Control
• Received Personal / Social Inclusion
• Received Control
Table 7.5.1.2: The item numbers of the revised FIRO-B structure
Scale Item NumbersExpressed Personal / SocialInclusion 1, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31,34, 37, 40, 46, 49, 52
Expressed Control 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, 35, 41, 43, 47, 53
Received Personal / SocialInclusion 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 39, 48, 51, 54
Received Control 2, 8, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27, 30,32, 33, 38, 42, 44, 45, 50
A number of items have changed position, below these changes are detailed.
• Expressed Personal / Social Inclusion – includes all of the original expressed inclusion
items except item 43, and now includes items 10, 16, 22, 28, 34, 40, 46, 52 of the
received inclusion scale.
• Expressed Control – includes all original expressed control items plus item 43 from
the expressed inclusion scale.
• Received Personal / Social Inclusion – includes item 4 from the received inclusion
scale, items 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, 54 from the received openness scale, and items 3, 9,
39, 51 from the expressed openness scale.
• Received Control – includes all of the original received control items, and also
includes items 18, 30, 42 from the received openness scale, and items 15, 21, 27, 33,
45 from the expressed openness scale.
The question of the structure of the FIRO-B will be returned to in Chapter 10, where the
structure will be explored with the FIRO-B data from the current study.
7.6. The design
There were five Facilitator/Administrator conditions which were labelled as follows:
• A1 – both the facilitator and administrator were informed of the correct location of
the suspect in the line-up (“informed”).
• A2 – the facilitator was informed of the correct location of the suspect, but the
administrator was not (“blind”).
• B1 – both the facilitator and administrator were informed of the alternative location
of the suspect in the line-up (“alternative informed”).
• B2- the facilitator was informed of the alternative location of the suspect, but the
administrator was not (“blind”).
• C1 – both the facilitator and administrator were not informed of the location of the
suspect in the line-up (“double-blind”).
Within the five Facilitator/Administrator conditions there were also two conditions of the
experiment, therefore there were ten groups of respondents. Figure 7.6.a. shows the ten
groups and the numbers of participants in each group.
Figure 7.6.a: The ten experimental groups and the number of participants in each group
This research utilises the actual photographic line-up containing Mr Megrahi’s picture.
Therefore, there is the possibility that instead of choosing Mr Megrahi from the line-up
because of some expectancy or influence on the part of the administrator, the participants
will choose Mr Megrahi because they recognise him. However, it is highly unlikely that the
Facil itator AN = 3 (Informed target 8)
Administrators A1N = 3 (Informed) Administrators A2N = 4 (Uninformed)
RespondentsA1(1)N = 50
RespondentsA1(2)N = 50
RespondentsA2(1)N = 53
RespondentsA2(2)N = 50
Facil itator BN = 2 (Informed target 4)
Administrators B1N = 3 (Informed) Administrators B2N = 3 (Uninformed)
RespondentsB1(1)N = 50
RespondentsB1(2)N = 62
RespondentsB2(1)N = 51
RespondentsB2(2)N = 50
Facil itator CN = 1 (Uninformed)
Administrators C1N = 3 (Uninformed)
RespondentsC1(1)N = 56
RespondentsC1(2)N = 54
participants in the study will have seen the picture used in the line-up before. Furthermore,
even if the participants had seen recent pictures of Mr Megrahi in the media, it is unlikely
that the participants would recognise the 25 year old photograph. Nevertheless, the design
of the study will indicate whether the participants do indeed recognise Mr Megrahi. In
conditions B and C Mr Megrahi’s picture is present in the line-up, although the
administrators are unaware that he is photograph number 8. If the participants in these
conditions recognise Mr Megrahi we would expect high numbers of identifications of Mr
Megrahi from these conditions. Furthermore, in Condition 2 (the target absent line-up) Mr
Megrahi’s photograph is not present. If photograph number 8 in group A of Condition 2 is
chosen more often it will indicate that the expectancy of the administrator is influencing the
participant to choose number 8.
In the proceeding chapters the analysis of the data collected will be conducted. In Chapter 8
the demographic data of the participants for each of the five administrator/participant
conditions will be analysed, and the homogeneity of the participants in these conditions will
be assessed. Chapter 9 will explore whether the frequencies of identifications indicate an
experimenter expectancy effect. Although not strictly an identification, as there is no
memory component to identify from, the term identification will be used for ease of
understanding. In Chapter 10 the results of the FIRO-B questionnaire for both the
participant and the administrator will be analysed. Finally in Chapter 11 the transcripts of
the recordings of the experimental procedure will be analysed.
In order to conduct the analyses, distinctions will need to be made between the different
groups of participants. For some analyses the five administrator/participant conditions (A1,
A2, B1, B2, and C1) will be used. For some analyses a distinction between informed and
uninformed participants will apply, whereby conditions A1 and B1 (informed) will be
compared to conditions A2, B2, and C1 (uninformed). For other analyses a distinction will be
made between the informed group (A1 and B1), the uninformed group (A2 and B2), and the
control group (C1).
Analysis Section 1 – Examining the Sample
Chapter 8:
It is the aim of this chapter to document the demographic features (gender, age,
occupational categories, and educational attainment) of the sample in each of the
respondent conditions. The confidence ratings of the participants will also be analysed, and
finally the homogeneity of the sample will be assessed.
8.1. The age and gender of the participants in each of the experimental conditions
Table 8.1.1 shows the percentage of male and female participants in each of the five
conditions. It is clear from this table that there is a fairly even split of male and female
participants in each of the conditions. There are proportionally more female participants in
condition A1.
Table 8.1.1: Percentage and frequencies of male and femaleparticipants in each condition
Respondentcondition % Males % Females TotalA1 40.00% (40) 60.00% (60) 100% (100)A2 49.51% (51) 50.49% (52) 100% (103)B1 49.11% (55) 50.89% (57) 100% (112)B2 47.52% (48) 49.50% (50) 97.02% (98)*C1 46.36% (51) 53.64% (59) 100% (110)Total 46.58% (245) 52.85% (278) 99.43% (523)* 3 participants in this condition failed to record their gender
Table 8.1.2 shows the age range and mean ages of the participants in each of the five
conditions. There is a good spread of ages in all of the conditions, with all of the means
around 30 years of age. Condition A1 has younger participants than the rest of the sample
with the lowest mean age, whilst condition B1 has older participants with the highest mean
age.
Table 8.1.2: Age range and mean ages of participantsin each condition
Respondentcondition Minimumage Maximumage Mean age(Std dev.)A1 16 62 26.79 (13.75)A2 16 88 30.65 (14.53)B1 16 75 36.76 (14.72)B2 16 63 33.29 (14.96)C1 16 72 30.74 (12.66)
8.2. The occupational categories and educational attainment of the participants in each ofthe experimental conditions
Table 8.2.1 shows the percentage of participants from each occupational category for each
of the five conditions. For conditions A1, A2, B1, and C1 the majority of the participants are
students. However, for condition B2 there are more professionals, associate professionals,
and sales and customer service workers than students. There is a high proportion of
elementary workers in condition A1, and professionals in condition C1. Overall though there
is a good spread of participants from different occupations in each of the five conditions.
Table 8.2.2 shows the level of educational attainment for participants in each of the five
conditions. It is clear that participants in condition A1 are clustered more towards the lower
end of the educational attainment table, with the vast majority obtaining GCSE’s or NVQ’s
and relatively few obtaining degrees or higher degrees. This could be explained by the lower
age of participants in this condition (mean age = 26.79 years). Condition B1 has a
disproportionate number of participants attaining a higher degree. This again could be
explained by the higher age of the participants in this condition (mean age = 36.76 years).
Table 8.2.1: Percentage of participants from each occupational category in eachcondition
Respondent conditionOccupational category A1 A2 B1 B2 C1
Managers/ Directors/Senior Officials ~ 3.9% (4) 6.3% (7) 8.9% (9) ~
Professionals 5% (5) 5.8% (6) 20.5% (23) 16.8% (17) 26.4% (29)
Associate Professionalsand Technical 5% (5) 9.7% (10) 7.1% (8) 16.8% (17) 8.2% (9)
Admin and Secretarial 7% (7) 3.9% (4) 7.1% (8) 3% (3) 7.3%(8)
Skilled Trade 5% (5) 8.7% (9) 4.5% (5) 5.9% (6) 3.6% (4)
Caring/Leisure andOther Services 1% (1) 2.9% (3) 2.7% (3) 7.9% (8) 4.5% (5)
Sales and CustomerService 2% (2) 7.8% (8) 8% (9) 14.9% (15) 6.4% (7)
Process/ Plant andMachine Operatives 1% (1) 1% (1) 0.9% (1) ~ ~
ElementaryOccupations 26% (26) 8.7% (9) 3.6% (4) 4% (4) 2.7% (3)
Student 40% (40) 40.8% (42) 24.1% (27) 12.9% (13) 35.5% (39)
Unemployed 5% (5) 1.9% (2) 1.8% (2) 2% (2) 1.8% (2)
Retired ~ 4.9% (5) 4.5% (5) 5% (5) 3.6% (4)
Table 8.2.2: Levels of educational attainment for participants in each condition
Educational attainment
Respondentcondition NoQualifications GCSE/ O-Level/ NVQ A-Level/ BTEC Degree/Diploma Masters/ PhDA1 ~ 55% (55) 22% (22) 12% (12) 4% (4)A2 4.9% (5) 33% (34) 23.3% (24) 35.9% (37) 2.9% (3)B1 ~ 23.2% (26) 14.3% (16) 31.3% (35) 22.3% (25)B2 ~ 33.7% (34) 26.7% (27) 25.7% (26) 9.9% (10)C1 ~ 20.9% (23) 28.2% (31) 42.7% (47) 1.8% (2)
8.3. The confidence ratings of the participants
A measure of an eyewitness’s confidence is a standard measure in eyewitness research and
in actual line-up identifications conducted by the police. Although the current research is
not a standard memory paradigm experiment, the author was interested to explore
whether levels of confidence differed according to the experimental condition. Immediately
following the identification each participant was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = Very
Unconfident, 5 = Very Confident) how confident they were in their identification. As can be
seen from Table 8.3.1 over half of the participants (55.10%) were unconfident or very
unconfident in their identifications, only a small percentage (19.6%), were confident or very
confident in their identifications. Low confidence ratings are to be expected in a procedure
where the participant has no memory of the event.
Table 8.3.1: Confidence ratings for all participants
Frequency Percentage %Very Unconfident 150 28.50Unconfident 140 26.60Neither Confidentor Unconfident 128 24.30Confident 90 17.10Very Confident 13 2.50Total 521 99%Note: Five participants failed to give a confidence rating
Table 8.3.2 provides a breakdown of the confidence ratings for the participants in each
condition, and Table 8.3.3 provides the mean scores for each condition. It is the aim of this
section to compare the confidence ratings of the participants in each of the respondent
conditions. Previous research suggests (Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001) that those in the
informed condition should be more confident in their responses. It is argued that the
administrator may exhibit subtle cues indicating that they are aware of the identity of the
suspect, thereby increasing the confidence of the witness that they have correctly identified
the suspect.
Table 8.3.2: Confidence ratings for each condition as a percentage (frequencies inparentheses)
Confidence ratings
Respondentcondition VeryUnconfident Unconfident Neither Confident orUnconfident Confident VeryConfidentA1 25% (25) 22% (22) 30% (30) 22% (22) 1% (1)A2 14.6% (15) 28.2% (29) 35.9% (37) 17.5% (18) 1.9% (2)B1 45.5% (51) 24.1% (27) 14.3% (16) 9.8% (11) 3.6% (4)B2 32.7% (33) 34.7% (35) 18.8% (19) 9.9% (10) 4% (4)C1 23.6% (26) 24.5% (27) 23.6% (26) 26.4% (29) 1.8% (2)
From Table 8.3.3 we can see that the mean confidence ratings are very low for each of the
five conditions, with all of the means below the median point for the scale. Conditions A2
and B1 reported the highest and lowest mean scores respectively.
Table 8.3.3:Mean confidence ratings for each condition
Respondentcondition
Meanconfidencerating StandarddeviationA1 2.52 1.12A2 2.63 1.01B1 1.99 1.17B2 2.18 1.12C1 2.58 1.17
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence ratings for the
informed conditions (groups A1 and B1), and the uninformed conditions (groups A2, B2, and
C1). There was a significant difference in the scores for the informed group (M = 2.24, SD =
1.17) and the uninformed group (M = 2.47, SD = 1.12), t (519) = -2.20, p = .03 (two-tailed).
The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = -.22, 95% CI: -.42 to -.02)
was very small (eta squared = .009). Although there was a significant difference in the mean
scores for the informed and uniformed groups, the results were not in the expected
direction. The uninformed group reported higher confidence ratings than the informed
group which is contrary to the result expected from previous research (Garrioch &
Brimacombe, 2001).
8.4. The homogeneity of the sample
One of the most important differences between the participants in this experiment is the
distinction between those participants whose line-up Administrators were informed of the
location of the suspect in the line-up, and those whose Administrators were uninformed.
Analysis was conducted to determine whether there are any significant differences between
the participants in the informed condition and the participants in the uninformed condition.
As we have seen above the uninformed group were significantly more confident in their
identifications than the informed group. The variables in the analysis in this section were
gender, age, occupation, and educational attainment. The first analysis conducted examined
whether there was any difference in the number of male and female participants in the
informed and uninformed conditions. Table 8.4.1 shows the number of male and female
participants in the informed and uninformed conditions.
Table 8.4.1: The percentage of male and female participants in the informedand uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Male Female TotalInformed 44.8% (95) 55.2% (117) 100% (212)
Uninformed 48.2% (150) 51.8% (161) 100% (311)
Total 46.85% (245) 53.15% (278) 100% (523)Note: three participants did not indicate their gender
A Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) was conducted. It
indicated no significant difference in the number of males and females in the informed and
uninformed conditions, χ2 (1, n = 523) = .46, p = .50, phi = -.03 indicating a very small effect
size.
In order to determine whether there is an equal spread of ages in both the informed and
the uninformed conditions, the ages of the participants were combined into eight groups.
Table 8.4.2 shows the number of participants in each age group for each condition.
Table 8.4.2: The percentage of participants in each age group for theinformed and  uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Age groups Informed Uninformed16-19 28.3% (60) 12.4% (39)20-29 30.2% (64) 49.4% (155)30-39 7.5% (16) 12.7% (40)40-49 16.5% (35) 10.5% (33)50-59 13.2% (28) 9.2% (29)60-69 3.3% (7) 4.1% (13)70-79 0.9% (2) 1.3% (4)80-89 ~ 0.3% (1)Total 212 314
A Chi-square test for independence was conducted; however the minimum cell frequency
assumption was violated. The normality testing of the age data was conducted, it indicated
that the participant aged 88 years was an outlying variable. Therefore, three age groupings
were constituted, those aged 16-29 were grouped as young, those aged 30-49 were
grouped as middle, and those aged 50-88 were grouped as older. Table 8.4.3 shows the
number of participants in each of the three new age groups for each condition.
Table 8.4.3: The percentage of participants in each of the age groupings for theinformed and  uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Age groups Informed UninformedYoung 58.50% (124) 61.80% (194)Middle 24.10% (51) 23.20% (73)Older 17.50% (37) 15.00% (47)Total 212 314
The Chi-square test for independence was conducted on the three age groups, It indicated
no significant difference between the age groups in the informed and uninformed
conditions, χ2 (2, n = 526) = .75, p = .69, Cramer’s V = .04, indicating a small effect size.
Analysis was then conducted to determine whether there is an equal spread of occupational
categories in both the informed and the uninformed conditions. Table 8.4.4 shows the
percentage of participants in each occupational category for the informed and uninformed
conditions.
Table 8.4.4: Percentage of participants in each occupational category for theinformed and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Occupational Category Informed UninformedManagers/ Directors/ Senior Officials 3.3% (7) 4.1% (13)Professionals 13.2% (28) 16.6% (52)Associate Professionals and Technical 6.1% (13) 11.5% (36)Admin and Secretarial 7.1% (15) 4.8% (15)Skilled Trade 4.7% (10) 6.1% (19)Caring/ Leisure and Other Services 1.9% (4) 5.1% (16)Sales and Customer Service 5.2% (11) 9.6% (30)Process/ Plant and Machine Operatives 0.9% (2) 0.3% (1)Elementary Occupations 14.2% (30) 5.1% (16)Student 31.6% (67) 29.9% (94)Unemployed 3.3% (7) 1.9% (6)Retired 2.4% (5) 4.5% (14)Total 93.9% (199) 99.4% (312)Note: 13 participants in the informed condition and 2 in the uninformedcondition did not indicate their occupation
A Chi-square test for independence was conducted, the minimum cell frequency assumption
was again violated, however according to Field (2005) a violation below 20% is acceptable
for larger tables. In this instance the violation was 8.3%. The Chi-square test indicated a
significant difference in the spread of occupational categories for the informed and
uninformed conditions, χ2 (11, n = 511) = 28.46, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .24, indicating a small
effect size.
Analysis was also conducted to determine whether there is an equal spread of educational
attainment in both the informed and the uninformed conditions. Table 8.4.5 shows the
percentage of participants in each educational attainment category for the informed and
uninformed conditions.
Table 8.4.5: Percentage of participants in each educational category for theinformed and uninformed conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Educational attainment Informed UninformedNo qualifications ~ 1.6% (5)GCSE/O-Level/NVQ 38.2% (81) 29% (91)A-Level / BTEC 17.9% (38) 26.1% (82)Degree / Diploma 22.2% (47) 35% (110)Masters / PhD 13.7% (29) 4.8% (15)Total 92% (212) 96.5% (303)Note: 17 participants in the informed condition and 11 participants in theuninformed condition failed to record their educational attainment
A Chi-square test for independence was conducted; the minimum cell frequency assumption
was again violated, as the violation was 20% Fishers exact test statistic was reported. The
test indicated a significant difference in the spread of educational attainment for the
informed and uninformed conditions, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .24, indicating a small effect
size.
In summary the informed and uninformed conditions do not differ significantly in their
number of male and female participants, or in their spread of participant ages. Therefore, it
cannot be said that differences in identification rates between the two groups are due to
differing numbers of males and females or different age groups. However, the participants
of the two groups did differ significantly in their occupations and educational attainment.
Examination of the occupations and educational attainment of the two groups finds that
most of the differences between the informed and uninformed groups are small. The largest
difference in occupations is for Elementary workers who are more prevalent in the informed
condition. Whilst for educational attainment the most substantial difference between the
two groups is for those who obtained a Degree or Diploma who are more prevalent in the
uninformed condition. Although the difference in occupations and educational attainment
between the two groups is significant it is difficult to determine how these differences
would affect the line-up identifications.
Analysis Section 2 – Examining the Extent of the Administrator Effects
Chapter 9:
This chapter will examine the line-up identification data obtained in order to determine
whether administrators have affected the outcome of the line-ups they conducted. In
condition A1 both the Facilitator and the administrator were informed that the target
occupied position 8 in the line-up, whilst in B1 they were informed that the target occupied
position 4 in the line-up. A1 and B1 therefore constitute the informed condition. If
administrator effects are in evidence then it would be expected to find higher incidences of
identifications of line-up member 8 in condition A1 and line-up member 4 in condition B1. In
conditions A2 and B2 the Facilitators were informed that the target occupied position 8 and
4 respectively, although the administrators in these conditions were not informed.
Conditions A2 and B2 therefore constitute the uninformed condition. If the knowledge of
the location of the target has transferred from the Facilitator to the administrator, higher
incidences of identifications of line-up members 8 and 4 would be expected, although to a
lesser extent than in the informed condition. Finally, condition C1 constitutes the control
group. In this condition both the Facilitator and the administrator were not informed of the
location of the target in the line-up. In this condition then higher incidences of
identifications of line-up member 8 and 4 would not be expected. Indeed in this condition
we would expect to see an equal spread of identifications for all of the members of the line-
up.
9.1. Line-up member selection frequency for the five conditions
From Table 9.1.1 a number of interesting results emerge. Firstly, in condition A1, 20% of the
participants identified target number 8 from the line-up. The next most frequent
identification was of target number 7 at 12%. Therefore, as expected, in the informed
condition the target was identified more often than other members of the line-up. The
second informed condition, B1, provides similar results. Target number 4 was identified by
14.30% of the participants in the condition, which although is lower than the 20% in
condition A1 is still the joint highest frequency of identifications.
Table 9.1.1: Percentage of line-up member selections for the five conditions(frequencies in parentheses)
Experimental condition
Line-upmember A1 A2 B1 B2 C11 4.00% (4) 4.90% (5) 1.80% (2) 5.00% (5) 2.70% (3)2 9.00% (9) 5.80% (6) 8.00% (9) 5.00% (5) 6.40% (7)3 10.00% (10) 9.70% (10) 14.30% (16) 9.90% (10) 8.20% (9)4 11.00% (11) 11.70% (12) 14.30% (16) 11.90% (12) 15.50% (17)5 8.00% (8) 8.70% (9) 5.40% (6) 8.90% (9) 12.70% (14)6 6.00% (6) 4.90% (5) 8.00% (9) 8.90% (9) 10.00% (11)7 12.00% (12) 21.40% (22) 10.70% (12) 9.90% (10) 7.30% (8)8 20.00% (20) 14.60% (15) 5.40% (6) 5.00% (5) 8.20% (9)9 7.00% (7) 4.90% (5) 7.10% (8) 9.90% (10) 9.10% (10)10 3.00% (3) 3.90% (4) 5.40% (6) 5.00% (5) ~11 4.00% (4) 3.90% (4) 3.60% (4) 7.90% (8) 6.40% (7)12 6.00% (6) 5.80% (6) 11.60% (13) 12.90% (13) 12.70% (14)100% (100) 100% (103) 95.60% (107) 100% (101) 99.10% (109)
For the uninformed conditions (A2 and B2) there are again high incidences of identification
for the two targets (8 and 4). In condition A2 14.60% of participants identified target
number 8, whilst in condition B2 11.90% identified target number 4. These percentages
represent the second most frequent identifications in these conditions with slightly more
participants identifying number 7 in condition A2 and number 12 in condition B2. For the
control condition, C1, there is, as expected a good spread of the frequencies of
identifications for all line-up members, apart from line-up member number 10 who was not
identified by any of the participants in this condition. The highest frequency of identification
(15.50%) is for number 4, although frequencies of identification for number 5 and number
12 were also high (12.70%).
Table 9.1.2: The percentage of identification responses (frequencies in parentheses) for the
two targets and the line-up fillers for all conditions
AdministratorCondition
Line-upMember No8 Selected
Line-upMember No4 Selected
Other Line-upMemberSelectedCondition A1 20% (20) 11% (11) 69% (69)Condition A2 14.6% (15) 11.7% (12) 73.7% (76)Condition B1 5.4% (6) 14.3% (16) 80.3% (85)Condition B2 5% (5) 11.9% (12) 83.1% (84)Condition C1 8.2% (9) 15.5% (17) 76.3% (84)Total 10.56% (55) 13.05% (68) 76.39% (398)
To summarise, from a general examination of the above data there does appear to be an
effect of administrator knowledge on the frequency of identifications obtained. The effect
appears most strongly in condition A1, and is more diluted or subtle in condition B1. As we
would expect the effect is less discernible in the uninformed conditions (A2 and B2),
although identifications of the targets are still the second most frequent identifications.
In this novel experiment participants were not the standard eyewitnesses used in the
majority of memory and eyewitness identification research. For these line-ups the
participants had not viewed a mock crime or a staged event, they therefore had no memory
of the target. In the control condition both the Facilitator and the administrator were
unaware of the location of the suspect. In the absence of administrator effects we would
expect that each member of the line-up in the control condition would have an equal
chance of being identified. Table 9.1.3. shows the comparison of observed identifications
against identifications expected by chance for each line-up member in the control condition.
Table 9.1.3: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member identification in
condition C1
Line-up MemberNo. ObservedN ExpectedN Residual1 3 9.17 -6.172 7 9.17 -2.173 9 9.17 -0.174 17 9.17 7.835 14 9.17 4.836 11 9.17 1.837 8 9.17 -1.178 9 9.17 -0.179 10 9.17 0.8310 7 9.17 -2.1711 14 9.17 4.8312 1 9.17 -8.17Total 110χ2 (11, N = 110) = 24.84, p < .05
A series of Chi-square goodness of fit tests were conducted to examine whether the
observed identifications in the two informed conditions (A1 and B1) and the two
uninformed conditions (A2 and B2) differed significantly from the identifications observed in
the control condition (C1). Tables 9.1.4 to 9.1.7 show the comparison of observed
identifications against identifications observed in the control condition (adjusted for the
number of identifications) for each line-up member in the two informed conditions and the
two uniformed conditions, with the chi-square results at the foot of each table.
Table 9.1.4: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member identification incondition A1
Line-up MemberNo. ObservedN ExpectedN Residual1 4 2.17 1.832 9 6.17 2.833 10 8.17 1.834 11 16.17 -5.175 8 13.17 -5.176 6 10.17 -4.177 12 7.17 4.838 20 8.17 11.839 7 9.17 -2.1710 3 6.17 -3.1711 4 13.17 -9.1712 6 0.17 5.83Total 100χ2 (11, N = 100) = 237.58, p < .001
Table 9.1.5: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member identification incondition A2
Line-up MemberNo. ObservedN ExpectedN Residual1 5 2.42 2.582 6 6.42 -0.423 10 8.42 1.584 12 16.42 -4.425 9 13.42 -4.426 5 10.42 -5.427 22 7.42 14.588 15 8.42 6.589 5 9.42 -4.4210 4 6.42 -2.4211 4 13.42 -9.4212 6 0.42 5.58Total 103χ2 (11, N = 103) = 126.11, p < .001
Table 9.1.6: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member identification incondition B1
Line-up MemberNo. ObservedN ExpectedN Residual1 2 2.75 -0.752 9 6.75 2.253 16 8.75 7.254 16 16.75 -0.755 6 13.75 -7.756 9 10.75 -1.757 12 7.75 4.258 6 8.75 -2.759 8 9.75 -1.7510 6 6.75 -0.7511 4 13.75 -9.7512 13 0.75 12.25Total 107Five participants in this condition failed to make anidentificationχ2 (11, N = 107) = 222.24, p < .001
Table 9.1.7: Observed and expected frequencies of line-up member identification incondition B2
Line-up MemberNo. ObservedN ExpectedN Residual1 5 2.25 2.752 5 6.25 -1.253 10 8.25 1.754 12 16.25 -4.255 9 13.25 -4.256 9 10.25 -1.257 10 7.25 2.758 5 8.25 -3.259 10 9.25 0.7510 5 6.25 -1.2511 8 13.25 -5.2512 13 0.25 12.75Total 101χ2 (11, N = 101) = 661.57, p < .001
The chi-square tests show that there is a significant difference in the number of observed
identifications in the two informed conditions and the two uninformed conditions, and the
identifications observed in the control condition. To further explore the significant
differences the observed number of target and non-target identifications in conditions A1,
A2, B1, and B2 are compared to the observed number of target identifications in the control
condition. To reiterate a target identification in conditions A1 and A2 is the identification of
number 8, whilst in B1 and B2 it is the identification of number 4. This comparison can be
seen in Table 9.1.8.
Table 9.1.8: Comparison of observed frequencies of target and non-targetline-up member identification for conditions A1, A2, B1, and B2, withobserved frequencies from the control condition
Observed N Control condition N Residual
A1 Yes 20 8.17 11.83No 80 91.83 -11.83
A2 Yes 15 8.42 6.58No 88 94.58 -6.58
B1 Yes 16 16.75 -0.75No 91 90.25 0.75
B2 Yes 12 16.25 -4.25No 89 84.75 4.25
Four chi-square goodness of fit tests were conducted. In order to control for a Type I error a
Bonferroni correction was applied, resulting in an alpha level of .01. The chi-square
goodness of fit tests indicate that there is a significant difference in the number of
participants identifying target number 8 in condition A1 (χ2 (1, n = 100) = 18.65, p < .001)
than the frequency of identifications of number 8 in the control condition. However there
were no significant differences in the number of participants identifying target number 8 in
condition A2 (χ2 (1, n = 103) = 5.60, p = .02) or the number identifying target number 4 in
conditions B1 (χ2 (1, n = 107) = .04, p > .05) and B2 (χ2 (1, n = 101) = 1.33, p > .05) than the
frequency of identifications of number 8 and number 4 in the control condition.
9.2. Line-up member selection frequency for type of line-up
Table 9.2.1 shows the percentage of identifications of each member of the line-up for both
simultaneous and sequential line-ups. It is clear from this table that marginally more
simultaneous line-ups than sequential line-ups were conducted. Further examination of the
data in this table shows that the percentage of identifications for each of the line-up
members is comparable for both types of line-up. The only difference is for line-up member
12 who was identified more often from a simultaneous line-up. For the two targets of the
line-up, members 4 and 8, the table shows that these two line-up members were identified
from the simultaneous line-up as often they were identified from the sequential line-up.
Table 9.2.1: Percentage of line-up member selections by type of line-up(frequencies in parentheses)
Type of line-up
Line-up member Simultaneous Sequential1 2.9% (8) 4.4% (11)2 6.5% (18) 7.2% (18)3 9.8% (27) 11.2% (28)4 13.4% (37) 12.4% (31)5 8.3% (23) 9.2% (23)6 7.2% (20) 8% (20)7 11.6% (32) 12.8% (32)8 10.9% (30) 10% (25)9 7.6% (21) 7.6% (19)10 2.9% (8) 4% (10)11 5.4% (15) 4.8% (12)12 12.3% (34) 7.2% (18)Total 98.9% (273) 98.8% (247)Note: For 6 participants type of line-up was not indicated
9.3. Analysis of the participants who made target identifications in the informed group
In this study conditions A1 and B1 constitute the informed group, with conditions A2, B2,
forming the uninformed group and condition C1 forming the control group. In condition A1
those who selected number eight were judged as making a target identification, whereas in
condition B1 those who selected number four were judged as making a target identification.
Out of 212 participants in the informed condition, 36 (16.98%) individuals “identified” the
target, below the particulars of those thirty six participants are analysed.
The 36 participants were comprised of 17 (47.22%) male participants and 19 (52.78%)
female participants. Their ages ranged from 17 to 75 years with a mean age of 31.11 years
(SD = 16.82). This group of participants is therefore very homogenous in terms of age and
gender with the whole sample. Table 9.3.1 shows the percentage of male and female
participants who correctly identified the target split between conditions A1 and B1.
Table 9.3.1: Percentage of male and female participants makingtarget identifications in the informed condition (frequencies inparentheses)
Condition Male FemaleA1 27.78% (10) 27.78% (10)
B1 19.44% (7) 25.00% (9)Total 47.22% (17) 52.78% (19)
Table 9.3.2 shows the age group of the participants making a target identification in the
informed condition, split between conditions A1 and B1. We can see from this table that the
majority (two thirds) of the participants who made a target identification were aged
between 16 and 29. The remaining third of the participants were aged 40 to 79.
Table 9.3.2: Percentage of participants making target identifications for each age group inthe informed condition (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89
A1 30.56%(11) 13.89%(5) ~ 5.56%(2) 5.56%(2) ~ ~ ~
B1 2.78%(1) 19.44%(7) ~ 8.33%(3) 8.33%(3) 2.78%(1) 2.78%(1) ~
Total 33.33%(12) 33.33%(12) ~ 13.89%(5) 13.89%(5) 2.78%(1) 2.78%(1) ~
Table 9.3.3 shows the percentage of target identifications in the informed condition for each
type of line-up. There was no difference in the type of line-up on the number of target
identifications in the informed condition. Exactly half of the 36 participants identified the
target from a simultaneous line-up. This indicates that participants were just as likely to be
influenced in a simultaneous line-up as they were in a sequential line-up; therefore, the
superiority of the sequential line-up has not been supported in this instance.
Table 9.3.3: Percentage of target identifications by type of line-upin the informed condition (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition Simultaneous SequentialA1 25.00% (9) 30.56% (11)
B1 25.00% (9) 19.44% (7)Total 50.00% (18) 50.00% (18)
For the informed condition there were four Facilitators; three Facilitators for condition A1
(1A, 2A, and 3A) and one for condition B1 (1B). Facilitator 1A and 1B are female, facilitators
2A and 3A are male. Figure 9.3.a shows the percentage of target identifications in the
informed condition that each facilitator is responsible for. For condition B1 there was only
one facilitator, therefore they were responsible for all of the target identifications in
condition B1. For condition A1 we can see that Facilitator 1A was responsible for 16.67% of
the target identifications, whilst Facilitators 2A and 3A were responsible for slightly more
target identifications, 19.44% each.
Figure 9.3.a: Percentage of correct identifications by Facilitator in the informed condition
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In conditions A1 and B1 there were six administrators; two females and one male in each
condition. Figure 9.3.b shows the percentage of correct identifications for each
administrator in the informed condition. We can see that Administrator 8 was responsible
for a large proportion of the correct identifications, however, Administrators 9 and 10 were
responsible for only a small proportion of the correct identifications. We can also see from
Figure 9.3.c that female administrators were responsible for more correct identifications
than male administrators.
Figure 9.3.b: Percentage of target identifications by Administrator in the informed condition
Figure 9.3.c: Percentage of target identifications by male and female Administrators in theinformed condition
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In line with previous research we have found that the female participants in the informed
condition were more susceptible to influence than the male participants. Surprisingly
though Figure 9.3.d shows that female administrators were more influential with male
participants.
Figure 9.3.d: Number of target identifications made by male and female participants in theinformed condition by the gender of the Administrator
9.4. Analysis of the participants who made target identifications in the uninformed group
Conditions A2 and B2 form the uninformed group, in condition A2 those who selected
number eight were judged as making a target identification, whereas in condition B2 those
who selected number four were judged as making a target identification. Of the 204
participants in the uninformed condition 27 (13.24%) correctly “identified” the target, below
the particulars of those twenty seven participants are analysed.
The 27 participants were comprised of 10 (37.04%) male participants and 16 (59.26%)
female participants. Their ages ranged from 16 to 63 years with a mean age of 29.15 years
(SD = 13.60). This group of participants is fairly homogenous to the whole sample, although
female participants are marginally overrepresented in this group. The range of ages is also
25 years lower than the whole sample, and the mean age is marginally lower. Table 9.4.1
shows the percentage of male and female participants who identified the target split
between conditions A2 and B2.
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Table 9.4.1: Percentage of male and female participants making target identificationsin the uninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition Male FemaleA2 23.08% (6) 34.62% (9)
B2 15.38% (4) 26.92% (7)Total 38.46% (10) 61.54% (16)Note: one participant who made a target identification in B2 did not indicate theirgender
Table 9.4.2 shows the age group of the participants making a target identification in the
uninformed condition, split between conditions A2 and B2. We can see from this table that
the majority (over 90%) of the participants who made a target identification were aged
between 16 and 49. Only two participants were older than this, and were aged between 60
and 69.
Table 9.4.2: Percentage of participants making target identifications for each age group in theuninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89
A2 14.81%(4) 25.93%(7) 11.11%(3) 3.70%(1) ~ ~ ~ ~
B2 7.41%(2) 18.52%(5) 3.70%(1) 7.41%(2) ~ 7.41%(2) ~ ~
Total 22.22%(6) 44.44%(12) 14.81%(4) 11.11%(3) ~ 7.41%(2)
Table 9.4.3 shows the percentage of target identifications in the uninformed condition for
each type of line-up. For the uninformed condition there was a slight difference in the type
of line-up on the number of target identifications. Just over half of the 27 participants
identified the target from a sequential line-up. This indicates that participants were slightly
more likely to be influenced in a sequential line-up than they were in a simultaneous line-
up; therefore, the superiority of the sequential line-up has again not been supported in this
instance.
Table 9.4.3: Percentage of target identifications by type of line-up in theuninformed condition (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition Simultaneous SequentialA2 29.63% (8) 25.93% (7)
B2 14.81% (4) 29.63% (8)Total 44.44% (12) 55.56% (15)
For the uninformed condition there were four Facilitators; two Facilitators for condition A2
(1A, and 2A) and two for condition B2 (1B and 2B). Facilitators 1A, 1B, and 2B are female,
facilitator 2A is male. Figure 9.4.a shows the percentage of target identifications in the
uninformed condition that each facilitator is responsible for. For conditions A2 and B2 we
can see that Facilitators 1A and 1B were responsible for over a third (37.04%) of the target
identifications each. Facilitators 2A was responsible for nearly 20% of the identifications,
however, Facilitator 2B was only responsible for 7.41%.
Figure 9.4.a: Percentage of target identifications by Facilitator in the uninformed condition
In conditions A2 and B2 there were seven administrators; two females and two males in
condition A2, and three females in condition B2. Figure 9.4.b shows the percentage of target
identifications for each administrator in the uninformed condition. We can see that
administrators 4, 5, 7, 11, and 12 were responsible for a relatively equal proportion of the
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target identifications. Administrator 6 was not responsible for any of the target
identifications, whilst administrator 13 was responsible for only a small proportion of the
target identifications. Figure 9.4.c shows that the female administrators were responsible
for the vast majority of target identifications in the uninformed condition.
Figure 9.4.b: Percentage of target identifications by Administrator in the uninformedcondition
Figure 9.4.c: Percentage of target identifications by male and female Administrators in theuninformed condition
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As with the informed condition, female participants were more susceptible to influence by a
male administrator than male participants. However, contrary to the informed condition
and in-line with previous research, female administrators in the uninformed condition were
more influential with female participants.
Figure 9.4.d: Number of target identifications made by male and female participants in theuninformed condition by the gender of the Administrator
9.5. Target absent line-up analysis
As detailed in Chapter 7 there were two conditions in the study. Administrators were asked
to conduct Condition 1 with half of their participants, whereby they conducted one line-up,
either simultaneous or sequential, with their participants. In Condition 2 the same
procedure as Condition 1 was followed, however, after completing the FIRO, participants in
Condition 2 were asked to make a second identification, this time from a target absent line-
up. The sub-sample of Condition 2 consists of 266 participants, 122 (45.9%) males and 141
(53%) females (3 participants failed to record their gender). The participants in Condition 2
range in age from 16 years to 88 years. The mean age of the sample is 31.42 years (Standard
Deviation = 14.61 years), with a median age of 24.50 years.
The aim of Condition 2 was to examine whether the identifications in the first condition
were due to the expectancy effect of the experimenter or were confounded by the presence
of Mr Megrahi’s photo in the line-up. The frequencies of identifications in Condition 2,
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which can be seen in Table 9.5.1, indicate that there is indeed evidence for expectancy
effects in Condition 2. Although the effect is not as strong as in the first condition, 16% of
participants in A1 identify target number 8 as the Lockerbie bomber, whilst 12% of
participants identified number 8 in condition A2, which is the second highest frequency in
that group. The effect is stronger for condition B1 as 21.05% of the participants in this
condition identified target number 4 from the line-up. This effect continues into condition
B2 where the highest proportion of participants (14%) also identified target number 4.
Table 9.5.1: Percentage of line-up member selections in Condition 2 for eachcondition (frequencies in parentheses)
Line-upMemberNo. A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 Total
1 4% (2) 8% (4) 3.51% (2) 8% (4) 3.7% (2) 5.36% (14)2 10% (5) 10% (5) 8.77% (5) 8% (4) 1.9% (1) 7.66% (20)3 12% (6) 8% (4) 10.53% (6) 8% (4) 13% (7) 10.34% (27)4 14% (7) 4% (2) 21.05%(12) 14% (7) 5.6% (3) 11.88% (31)5 10% (5) 18% (9) 7.02% (4) 10% (5) 9.3% (5) 10.73% (28)6 ~ 6% (3) 7.02% (4) 6% (3) 5.6% (3) 4.98% (13)7 8% (4) 6% (3) 1.75% (1) 6% (3) 7.4% (4) 5.75% (15)8 16% (8) 12% (6) ~ 8% (4) 5.6% (3) 8.05% (21)9 8% (4) 8% (4) 5.26% (3) 8% (4) 18.5% (10) 9.58% (25)10 8% (4) 12% (6) 14.04% (8) 8% (4) 13% (7) 11.11% (29)11 8% (4) 8% (4) 15.79% (9) 8% (4) 7.4% (4) 9.58% (25)
12 2% (1) ~ 5.26% (3) 8% (4) 9.3% (5) 4.98% (13)
Total 100% (50) 100% (50) 100% (57) 100% (50) 100% (54) 100% (261)Note: five participants from B1 failed to make a selection
Table 9.5.2 shows the percentage of identifications of the target in each group of the
informed and uninformed conditions. Twenty participants identified 4 or 8 in the informed
condition, whilst thirteen participants identified 4 or 8 in the uninformed condition.
Table 9.5.2: Percentage of target identifications in the informed anduninformed conditions in Condition 2 (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition Informed UninformedA1 40% (8) ~B1 60% (12) ~A2 ~ 46.15% (6)B2 ~ 53.85% (7)Total 100% (20) 100% (13)
It is possible however, that participants in Condition 2 simply chose the same number as in
Condition 1. There were 37 participants from the informed and uninformed groups who
identified either target number 4 or 8 from the line-up, then took part in the target-absent
line-up in Condition 2. Of those 37 participants, 5 (13.51%) made the same identification in
both conditions (one from A1, A2, and B2, and two from B1). Those 5 participants may not
have remembered the number they chose from the first line-up, but even if those
participants are removed, there is still evidence of expectancy effects in Condition 2. A Chi-
square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no significant
association between correct or incorrect identifications in the first line-up and correct or
incorrect identifications in the second line-up, χ2 (1, n = 212) = .02, p > .05, phi = -.03.
9.6. Summary of the main findings of this chapter
When the administrator of the line-up was informed of the location of the target,
participants selected those targets with greater frequencies than participants whose
administrator was not informed of the location of the target. When the Facilitator was
informed of the location of the target, but the administrator was not informed, participant
selections of the targets were the second most frequent selections. These target
identifications were also more frequent than the target identifications when the
administrator was uninformed of the location of the targets. In condition A1, when the
administrator was informed of the location of the target, the frequencies of target selection
were significantly greater than the frequencies of target selection in the control condition.
Condition 2 of the study provides further evidence that the knowledge of the location of the
target affects the frequency of the selection of the target. When the administrator was
informed of the location of the target, the target was the most frequent selection in that
condition. Furthermore, the target was selected more frequently when the administrator
was informed of the location than when the administrator was not informed. Participants
also selected the target more frequently in the uninformed condition of Condition 2, where
the Facilitator but not the administrator was informed of the location of the target, than
participants in the control condition.
Analysis Section 3 – Analysis of the FIRO-B Questionnaire
Chapter 10:
10.1. Analysis of the structure of the FIRO-B questionnaire for this sample
As discussed in Chapter 7, the internal structure of the FIRO-B questionnaire has been
queried. In order to determine the structure of the FIRO-B and how to analyse the data in
this instance, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was conducted. Prior to conducting PCA
the suitability of the data for this procedure was assessed. Firstly inspection of the
correlation matrix revealed many coefficients of .3 and above. Secondly the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin value was .92, which according to Kaiser (1974) is a superb value, and which highly
exceeds the recommended value of .6. Finally, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954)
reached statistical significance (p < .001); therefore, the factorability of the correlation
matrix was supported.
The Principal Components Analysis indicated the presence of nine components with
eigenvalues exceeding 1. Table 10.1.1 shows the variance explained by each component.
Table 10.1.1: The variance explained by each component
Component Variance explained % Cumulative %1 25.47 25.472 9.71 35.183 8.30 43.474 5.49 48.965 4.43 53.406 4.25 57.657 2.52 60.178 2.30 62.479 2.19 64.66
However, an inspection of the screeplot, which can be viewed in Appendix 8, revealed a
clear break after the sixth component. Using Catell’s (1966) scree test, it was therefore
decided to retain six components for further analysis. It has been argued that both Kaiser’s
eigenvalue criterion and Catell’s scree test overestimate the number of components to
extract (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). Therefore, Horn’s (1965) parallel analysis was also
conducted, which compares the eigenvalues of the data with eigenvalues from a data set of
the same size which is randomly generated. The Monte Carlo PCA for parallel analysis
statistical programme (Watkins, 2000) was utilised. The programme will generate a specified
number, in this case 100, random data sets of the same size, the average eigenvalues of the
100 randomly generated samples are then calculated. The average eigenvalues of the
randomly generated data are then compared to the actual data; if the actual eigenvalue is
larger than the eigenvalue from the randomly generated data then the factor is retained, if
it is smaller it is rejected. As Table 10.1.2 shows, only the eigenvalues from the PCA for the
first six factors were larger than the criterion values from the parallel analysis, therefore the
parallel analysis supported the decision to extract six components.
Table 10.1.2: Comparison of eigenvalues from PCA and criterionvalues from parallel analysis
Component Actual eigenvaluefrom PCA Criterion value fromparallel analysis1 13.75 1.692 5.24 1.633 4.48 1.584 2.96 1.545 2.39 1.506 2.30 1.477 1.36 1.438 1.24 1.409 1.19 1.37
The six component solution explained a total of 57.65% of the variance (Table 10.1.1.). In
order to aid the interpretation of the components the data was rotated. As there is a
theoretical reason to assume that interpersonal relationship factors are related, it is also
assumed that the factors of the FIRO-B are related, therefore oblique rotation, specifically
oblimin rotation was conducted. Appendix 9 shows the pattern and structure matrix for the
PCA (with major loadings for each item in bold). As can be seen from this table the rotated
solution does not produce a simple structure, with many variables loading substantially onto
more than one component. Although the structure is not simple there is a discernible
pattern that has emerged. Firstly we can see that 16 items have loaded onto the first
component, these 16 items include all of the received inclusion items and seven of the
expressed inclusion items. The second component is made up exclusively of the expressed
control items, whilst component three is made up of only received control items.
Component four contains only three items, one expressed openness item, and two
expressed inclusion items. The fifth component contains four expressed openness items,
whilst component six contains the remaining four expressed openness items and all of the
received openness items. We can see from the correlation matrix (Table 10.1.3.) that there
is a very weak correlation between all of the factors apart from the relationship between
factor 1 and factor 6 which demonstrates a moderate positive correlation (Cohen, 1988).
Table 10.1.3: Component correlation matrix for the six factor solution
Component 1 2 3 4 5 61 1.000 .183 -.005 -.051 .083 -.4532 .183 1.000 .015 -.019 -.094 -.0473 -.005 .015 1.000 -.034 -.109 .0364 -.051 -.019 -.034 1.000 -.013 .0495 .083 -.094 -.109 -.013 1.000 -.0946 -.453 -.047 .036 .049 -.094 1.000
The above analysis shares some commonality with the work conducted by IRCIP (2010) on
the structure of the FIRO-B questionnaire detailed in Chapter 7. As in that example the
Mode facet (expressed / received) is not distinguishable for Inclusion or Openness. In the
previous analysis expressed and received items for both Inclusion and Openness were
grouped together whilst in this case expressed and received Inclusion items are loaded onto
factor 1 and expressed and received Openness items are loaded onto factor 6. However,
unlike the previous analysis, the PCA revealed two distinct and separate factors of Control,
factor 2; expressed Control and factor 3; received Control. This indicates that the Mode
facet is having an effect; participants are distinguishing between received and expressed
items, but only in relation to Control items. Factors 4 and 5 pose a challenge to the analysis
as they only contain three and four items respectively.
In order to further explore the structure of the FIRO-B, the PCA was repeated, the same
procedure as above was used, however, this time only three factors were extracted. The
pattern and structure matrix for this analysis can be seen in Appendix 10 (with major
loadings for each item in bold).
The results of the repeated analysis confirmed the research conducted by Mahoney and
Stasson (2005) and Macrosson (2000) detailed in Chapter 7. In this analysis factor 1 now
encompasses all of the received Inclusion items, all of the received Openness items, all of
the expressed Inclusion items apart from item 43, and all of the expressed Openness items
apart from items 33, 45, and 27. Therefore, factor 1 correlates with Mahoney and Stasson’s
(2005) Socio-Emotional Affect and Macrosson’s (2000) Nurturance. Factor 2 in this analysis
again contains all of the expressed Control items, plus items 33 and 45 from expressed
Openness. Further analysis of these two items allows some explanation of why they are
included in this factor. The items are “There are some things I would not tell anyone” and
“There is a part of myself I keep private.” These two items could be construed not as a
person’s desire to be open with others, but rather a desire to control what they inform
others about themselves. The third factor contains all of the received Control items plus
item 27 from expressed Openness and item 43 from expressed Inclusion. Item 27 “There are
some things I do not tell anyone” can be explained in the same terms as items 33 and 45, it
represents a desire to control how much personal information other people know.
However, the presence of item 43 “I look for people to be with,” in factor 3 cannot be so
easily explained. In the six factor solution there was a moderate positive correlation
between factor 1 and factor 6. Now, as factor 6 has been subsumed into factor 1, we can
see from the correlation matrix (Table 10.1.4) that there are very small correlations
between all of the factors, indicating that they are indeed measuring distinct aspects of
interpersonal behaviour.
Table 10.1.4: Component correlation matrix for the three factor solution
Component 1 2 31 1.000 .073 -.0632 .073 1.000 .1203 -.063 .120 1.000
The three factor solution therefore corresponds with previous research on the FIRO-B,
whereby Inclusion and Openness both combine to form one facet of interpersonal
relationships, which can be termed Personal and Social Inclusion, with Control (with a
received and expressed mode) constituting the other facet.
In this instance oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin) was used as there are theoretical grounds
to suppose that the factors of interpersonal relations should be related to each other.
Indeed, it has been argued (Field, 2005) that with psychological constructs and human
participants, orthogonal rotation, which assumes the factors to be independent, should not
be used. It has further been argued that for exploratory factor analysis oblique rotation
should be used before orthogonal rotation as the former provides details as to the extent of
the correlation between factors (Pallant, 2007). For the current data-set there was some
correlation between the factors, albeit small. Therefore, in the interests of completeness,
the PCA was repeated with orthogonal rotation (Varimax). As with oblique rotation, without
extracting any factors, nine components reported Eigenvalues above 1. The PCA was
repeated with orthogonal rotation extracting both six and three factors. Analysis of the
rotated component matrix found that the items loaded onto the same six factors and the
same three factors as in the oblique rotation.
In Chapter 7 the facet framework of the FIRO-B was discussed, therefore the FIRO-B data
was subjected to Smallest Space Analysis (SSA). The 2-dimensional SSA solution has a
Guttman – Lingoes coefficient of alienation of .18615 in 8 iterations, showing a reasonable
fit between the Pearson’s coefficients of the FIRO-B items and their corresponding
geometric distances in the configuration. The two-dimensional solution was adopted as it
was found to have a satisfactory coefficient of alienation and was considered to describe the
pattern of relationships better that the three-dimensional solution. Figure 10.1.a shows the
projection of vector 1 by vector 2 of the two dimensional space. The numbers in the visual
representation correspond to the items of the FIRO-B scale which can be seen in Table
10.1.7. Items 6, 10, 22, and 48 belong to the Personal and Social Inclusion facet. They are
not identifiable on the plot because their coordinates place them in the cluster of Personal
and Social Inclusion items to the left of the plot.
Figure 10.1.a: Visual representation of the SSA for the FIRO-B data
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Table 10.1.5: Items of the FIRO-B in each facet
Personal Social Inclusion Expressed Control Received Control
1. I seek out people to be with 25. I include other people in myplans 5. I am the dominant personwhen I am with people 2. People decide what to dowhen we are together3. I am totally honest with myclose friends 28. People include me in theirsocial affairs 11. I get other people to dothings I want done 8. People strongly influence myactions
4. People invite me to do things 30. My closest friends keepsecrets from me 17. I strongly influence otherpeople’s actions 14. People control my actions6. My close friends tell me theirreal feelings 31. I have people around me 23. I take charge when I am withpeople socially 20. I am easily led by people
7. I join social groups 34. People ask me to participatein their discussions 29. I get people to do things theway I want them done 26. People decide things for me
9. I confide in my close friends 36. My friends confide in me 33. There are some things I wouldnot tell anyone 27. There are some things I donot tell anyone10. People invite me to join theiractivities 37. When people are doing thingstogether I join them 35. I take charge when I am withpeople 32. People strongly influence myideas12. My close friends tell meabout private matters 39. I have at least one friend towhom I can tell anything 41. I strongly influence otherpeople`s ideas 38. I am strongly influenced bywhat people say
13. I join social organisations 40. People invite me to parties 45. There is a part of myself Ikeep private 43. I look for people to be with15. I am more comfortable whenpeople do not get too close 42. My close friends keep theirfeelings a secret from me 47. I take charge when I workwith people 44. Other people take chargewhen we work together16. People include me in theiractivities 46. People invite me to join themwhen we have free time 53. I see to it that people dothings the way I want them to 50. People often cause me tochange my mind18. My close friends do not tellme about themselves 48. At least two of my friends tellme their true feelings19. I am included in informalsocial activities 49. I participate in groupactivities21. People should keep theirprivate feelings to themselves 51. I have close relationships witha few people22. People invite me toparticipate in their activities 52. People invite me to do thingswith them24. My close friends let me knowtheir real feelings 54. My friends tell me about theirprivate lives
The SSA plot confirms the results of the factor analysis, and also corroborates the decision
to extract three factors. The large cluster to the left of the SSA plot contains all of the items
from factor 1, the Personal and Social Inclusion items. The cluster at the top of the plot
contains the items from factor 2, the expressed Control items. The cluster to the right of the
plot contains the items from factor 3, the received Control items. A line can therefore be
drawn through the plot separating the sociability factor (Personal and Social Inclusion) from
the Control factors. However, there are three items at the bottom of the plot, in the
sociability section that have been labelled expressed Control and received Control. These
are ambiguous items. Examination of the loadings of item 33 in the factor analysis show that
it loads most highly on to factor 2 (expressed control) but it also loads onto factor 1.
Examination of the loadings of items 27 and 45 indicate that they both have very low
loadings on all three factors.
Figure 10.1.b: Visual representation of the SSA for the FIRO-B data with regionalinterpretation
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As the structure of the FIRO has been questioned, therefore how the FIRO data in this study
is to be analysed is also affected. Due to the widespread use and popularity of the FIRO-B
questionnaire, Schutz’s (1958) original scales will not be discarded; however, the factor
analysis results and the SSA (which are supported by previous research) will also not be
ignored. Furthermore, Schutz (1958) proposed that the FIRO-B questionnaire as a whole
provided a measure of overall social interactivity, whereby higher scores on the
questionnaire indicate a greater inclination towards social interactivity. Therefore, the FIRO-
B will be analysed in terms of the total FIRO-B score, the original scales, and the three new
scales.
The reliability of the FIRO-B scale was then assessed. The first assessment considered the
reliability of the FIRO-B scale as a whole. The Cronbach alpha coefficient for the scale total
was .91, suggesting excellent internal consistency reliability for the scale with this sample.
However, analysis of the Corrected Item-Total Correlation values found that the items of the
received control scale were reporting low values (less than .3), indicating that the received
control scale is measuring a distinct aspect of interpersonal relationships to the rest of the
scale. The reliability of the six original scales and the three new scales of the FIRO-B was
then assessed. Table 10.1.8 provides the Cronbach alpha coefficients for these scales.
Table 10.1.6: Cronbach alpha coefficients for the original andnew scales
Scale Cronbach alphaOriginal scales Expressed Control .90Expressed Openness .70Expressed Inclusion .82Received Control .84Received Openness .88Received Inclusion .93New scales Personal Social Inclusion .94Expressed Control .82Received Control .77
We can see from Table 10.1.7 that all of the Cronbach alpha coefficients reach and indeed in
most cases exceed the ideal figure of .7 (DeVellis, 2003), indicating that the items in each of
the individual scales are measuring the same construct.
10.2. The FIRO-B results for the whole sample
Eleven participants did not complete a FIRO questionnaire; they were therefore removed
from the analysis of the FIRO-B. Furthermore, one participant from C1 only answered the
first eleven questions of the questionnaire; they were also removed, resulting in 514 cases
for analysis. The FIRO data was scrutinised for missing data, the analysis revealed that out of
27,756 items (54 FIRO items multiplied by 514 participants) there were 98 missing items,
which equates to 0.35% of the data set. Analysis of those missing items found that the
majority of them (19.39%) were missing on question 13. Examination of the questionnaire
revealed that the reason for the high rate of answers missing for item 13 is due to the layout
of the questionnaire. When the questionnaire is printed, item 13 is a small box at the top of
page two, which can be easily missed by a participant. Therefore, it is concluded that
participants did not intentionally miss item 13 because of an aversion to the question, but
simply because they did not see the question. In order to calculate the total scores for the
FIRO as a whole and for the individual scales the missing values required attention. If a value
was missing on a particular scale then the mean value of that scale was used to fill in the
missing value, then the total FIRO scores were calculated.
Once the issue of missing values had been addressed, the FIRO-B data was screened to
assess normality. For both the original scales and the new scales the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic was significant, indicating a non-normal distribution of data. Furthermore, as noted
in the previous section a number of outliers in the data-set were identified. Statistical
transformation of the data was attempted in order to improve the distribution. However,
both log transformation and square root transformation failed to improve the distribution
of the data, with numerous outliers still remaining. In order to remedy the outlying scores
the next most extreme scores in the data file were identified; the outlying scores were
changed to one digit above the next extreme score. The above action remedied the outlying
scores; however it was felt that this action, for the number of outlying scores present,
altered the data-set too greatly, therefore it was decided to leave the outlying scores in the
data-set and to employ non-parametric statistics instead to analyse the FIRO-B data.
The total FIRO-B scores were calculated for the whole sample. Schutz (1958) argued that the
total FIRO-B score is a measure of a person’s social interactivity. The FIRO-B total scores can
range from a minimum score of 54 to a maximum score of 324. For the current sample the
range of scores was 230, with a minimum score of 72 and a maximum score of 302. The
mean score for the total FIRO-B scores for the sample was 218.15 (SD = 27.99), which
indicates that the sample veers towards greater levels of social interactivity.
The mean scores for the whole sample for each of the scales were calculated. For each of
the original scales the maximum possible score is 54, and the minimum possible score is 9.
Table 10.2.1 shows the range and mean scores for each of the original scales for the
complete sample.
Table 10.2.1: Range and mean scores for each of the original scales for thecomplete sample
Scale Minimumscore Maximumscore Mean Std.deviationExpressed Control 9 54 30.40 9.30Expressed Openness 10 54 35.37 6.80Expressed Inclusion 9 54 39.27 7.69Received Control 9 53 25.47 7.81Received Openness 12 54 43.79 7.29Received Inclusion 9 54 43.84 7.73
The above table shows a wide range of scores for each of the six scales, with almost all of
the original scales obtaining the minimum and maximum scores. All of the mean scores are
above the median value of the scale (22.5), with participants displaying particularly high
levels of received openness and received inclusion, whereas received control has the lowest
mean scores.
The mean scores for the three new scales were then calculated, Table 10.2.2 contains these
results for the complete sample. For both the expressed control and the received control
scales, which both contain 11 items the maximum possible score is 66, and the minimum
possible score is 11. For the personal and social inclusion scale, which contains 32 items the
maximum possible score is 192 and the minimum possible score is 32.
Table 10.2.2: Range and mean scores for each of the new scales for the completesample
Scale Minimumscore Maximumscore Mean Std.deviationPersonal Social Inclusion 44 192 151.38 22.96Expressed Control 11 66 34.98 9.32Received Control 11 63 31.79 8.33
The above table again shows a wide range of scores for each of the six scales, only
expressed control obtains the minimum and maximum scores possible. The mean scores for
both of the control scales are above the median value of those scales (27.5), whilst the
mean scores for personal and social inclusion are well above the median value for that scale
(80). Participants are displaying particularly high levels of personal and social inclusion,
whereas received control again has the lowest mean scores.
10.2.1. Gender and age differences in the FIRO-B scores for the whole sample
The 514 participants for FIRO-B analysis consist of 235 (45.7%) males and 276 (53.7%)
females (3 participants did not indicate their gender). The participants range in age from 16
to 88, the mean age is 31.87 years (Standard Deviation = 14.50), the median age is 25.50
years. Tables 10.2.1.1 and 10.2.1.2 show the range, mean, and median scores for male and
female participants for the original and the new FIRO-B scales. From these two tables we
can see that the female participants report overall greater levels of social interactivity than
the male participants. In-line with the gender norms reported by Schutz (1992), the female
participants have scored higher on all of the sociability factors (received openness and
inclusion, expressed openness and inclusion, and personal and social inclusion) than the
male participants. For the control factors, again in-line with Schutz’s norms, males and
females report very similar scores; in this case males score slightly higher on expressed
control, but virtually the same on received control.
Table 10.2.1.1: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the original scalesand the total score for male and female participants
Condition Scale Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std.deviationMale Expressed Control 9 53 32.00 31.16 30.07Expressed Openness 10 52 34.00 34.02 6.68Expressed Inclusion 9 54 38.00 38.15 8.20Received Control 9 51 25.00 25.47 7.72Received Openness 12 54 43.00 41.49 7.25Received Inclusion 9 54 44.00 42.66 8.37Total score 72 280 219.00 212.94 30.07Female Expressed Control 9 54 30.50 29.77 9.49Expressed Openness 17 54 36.00 36.56 6.72Expressed Inclusion 11 54 41.00 40.32 7.05Received Control 9 53 24.00 25.43 7.90Received Openness 18 54 46.00 45.75 6.77Received Inclusion 19 54 45.00 44.92 6.97Total score 114 302 224.00 222.75 25.38
Table 10.2.1.2: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the new scales and thetotal score for male and female participants
Condition Scale Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std.deviationMale Personal Social Inclusion 44 192 148.00 145.55 24.36Expressed Control 11 57 36.00 35.64 9.05Received Control 11 63 31.00 31.71 8.38Total score 72 280 219.00 212.90 30.12Female Personal Social Inclusion 70 192 157.50 156.53 20.41Expressed Control 12 66 35.00 34.45 9.55Received Control 13 60 31.00 31.80 8.29Total score 114 302 224.00 222.78 25.37
Due to the non-normal distribution of the data, parametric statistics were deemed
unsuitable, therefore a series of Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted. The first Mann-
Whitney U test was conducted to examine the difference in the median scores for the total
FIRO-B scores between the male and female participants. The test revealed a significant
difference in the total FIRO-B scores of male participants (Median = 219, n = 235) and
female participants (Median = 224, n = 276), U = 25643.50, z = -4.08, p < .001, r = .18.
Mann-Whitney U tests were then conducted for each of the six original scales, and for each
of the three new scales, comparing male and female participants. Table 10.2.1.3 and Table
10.2.1.4 report the results of these tests.
Table 10.2.1.3: Results of the Mann-Whitney U test with z scores and probabilityvalues for the original scales for male and female participants
Male FemaleScale Median N Median N U z pExpressed Control 32.00 235 30.50 276 29081.50 -2.01 .04Expressed Openness 34.00 235 36.00 276 25911.00 -3.93 .000Expressed Inclusion 38.00 235 41.00 276 27313.00 -3.08 .002Received Control 25.00 235 24.00 276 31935.50 -.30 .77Received Openness 43.00 235 46.00 276 20380.50 -7.26 .000Received Inclusion 44.00 235 45.00 276 27323.00 -3.08 .002
Table 10.2.1.4: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probabilityvalues for the new scales for male and female participants
Male FemaleScale Median N Median N U z pPersonal Social Inclusion 148.00 235 157.50 276 22896.50 -5.73 .000Expressed Control 36.00 235 35.00 276 29214.50 -1.93 .05Received Control 31.00 235 31.00 276 32420.00 -.01 .10
For the original scales male and female participants differed significantly in their scores for
all of the scales apart from the received control. For the new scales there was again no
statistically significant difference between male and female participants for the received
control scale. However, the difference between males and females on the expressed control
scale and the personal and social inclusion scale did achieve statistical significance.
Schutz (1992) has reported that scores on the FIRO-B sociability scales and the expressed
control scale decrease with age, whilst scores on the received control scale increase with
age. The association between age and FIRO-B scores has been assessed for the current
sample using Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation (rho). There was a small negative
correlation between the age of the participant and the total FIRO-B scores, rho = -.19, n =
514, p < .001, with higher FIRO-B scores, therefore higher social interactivity, associated
with younger participants. Tables 10.2.1.5 and 10.2.1.6 detail the results of the correlations
for the original scales and the new scales respectively.
Table 10.2.1.5: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation betweenparticipant age and the original FIRO-B scales
Measure AgeExpressed Control .10*Expressed Openness -.21**Expressed Inclusion -.17**Received Control -.06Received Openness -.16**Received Inclusion -.21*** p < .05 (2-tailed)** p < .001 (2-tailed)
Table 10.2.1.6: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation betweenparticipant age and the new FIRO-B scales
Measure AgePersonal Social Inclusion -.23**Expressed Control .06Received Control -.08** p < .001 (2-tailed)
For the sociability scales (expressed and received openness and inclusion) and the received
control scale there is a small negative correlation. As the participants get older their scores
on these scales decrease, although for the received control scale this association is not
significant. For the expressed control scale there is a small significant positive correlation
with the age of the participant, as participants get older they score higher on the expressed
control scale. For the new scales, there is a small significant negative correlation between
the personal and social inclusion scale and the age of the participant. The control scales
show correlations in the same direction as the original scales, although both are very small
correlations and not significant. The correlations for the sociability scales conform to the
results reported by Schutz (1992), younger people report higher scores on these scales.
However, for the control scales, correlations opposite to Schutz’s results have been found,
received control scores decreased as age increased, and expressed control scores increased
as age increased, although both correlations were very small.
10.3. Analysis of the differences between the informed groups (A1 and B1), the uninformedgroups (A2 and B2), and the control group (C1)
Firstly the mean and median scores for the total FIRO-B scores for the informed groups (A1
and B1) were compared to the mean and median scores for the uninformed groups (A2 and
B2), and the control group (C1). The results can be seen in Table 10.3.1.
Table 10.3.1: Range, median, and mean scores for the total FIRO-Bfor the informed, the uninformed, and the control groups
Condition Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std.deviationInformed 72 302 221.00 217.47 33.45
Uninformedand Control 140 280 222.00 218.62 23.46
We can see from Table 10.3.1 that participants in the informed condition report a greater
range of total FIRO-B scores than those in the uninformed and control conditions. The
uninformed and control conditions report a higher mean and median score than the
informed condition.
The mean and median scores were then compared for the informed, uninformed and
control conditions for both the original scales and the new scales. These results can be seen
in Table 10.3.2 and Table 10.3.3.
Table 10.3.2: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the original scales for theinformed, uninformed, and control groups
Condition Scale Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std.deviationInformed Expressed Control 9 54 31.00 31.12 9.64Expressed Openness 10 53 35.00 35.43 6.72Expressed Inclusion 9 54 40.00 39.12 8.90Received Control 10 52 25.00 25.74 8.15Received Openness 12 54 44.00 43.40 8.06Received Inclusion 9 54 44.00 42.67 8.79Uninformedand Control Expressed Control 9 54 32.00 29.89 9.04Expressed Openness 14 54 35.00 35.33 6.86Expressed Inclusion 18 54 39.00 39.38 6.72Received Control 9 53 24.00 25.29 7.57Received Openness 20 54 45.00 44.07 6.69Received Inclusion 16 54 45.00 44.66 6.78
Table 10.3.3: Range, median, and mean scores for each of the new scales for theinformed, uninformed and control groups
Condition Scale Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std.deviationInformed Personal Social Inclusion 44 192 156.00 149.44 26.32Expressed Control 11 62 36.00 35.97 9.88Received Control 15 63 31.50 32.06 8.73Uninformedand Control Personal Social Inclusion 70 192 155.00 152.74 20.20Expressed Control 12 66 35.88 34.28 8.84Received Control 11 60 31.00 31.60 8.04
10.3.1. Mann-Whitney U tests to compare the informed, uninformed, and controlgroups
The first Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to examine the difference in the median
scores for the total FIRO-B scores between the informed and the uninformed and control
groups. The test revealed no significant difference in the total FIRO-B scores of informed
participants (Median = 221, n = 212) and uninformed and control participants (Median =
222, n = 302), U = 31422.00, z = -.36, p = .72, r = .02.
Mann-Whitney U tests were then conducted for each of the six original scales, and for each
of the three new scales, comparing participants in both the informed and uninformed and
control groups. Table 10.3.1.1 and Table 10.3.1.2 report the results of these tests.
Table 10.3.1.1: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests with z scores and probabilityvalues for the original scales for the informed, uninformed, and controlconditions
Informed Uninformedand ControlScale Median N Median N U z pExpressed Control 31.00 212 32.00 302 30095.50 -1.16 0.25Expressed Openness 35.00 212 35.00 302 30846.50 -0.70 0.48Expressed Inclusion 40.00 212 39.00 302 31493.50 -0.31 0.75Received Control 25.00 212 24.00 302 30975.50 -0.63 0.53Received Openness 44.00 212 45.00 302 31282.00 -0.44 0.66Received Inclusion 44.00 212 45.00 302 28281.00 -2.26 0.02
Table 10.3.1.2: Results of the Mann-Whitney U test with z scores and probabilityvalues for the new scales for the informed, uninformed and control conditions
Informed Uninformedand ControlScale Median N Median N U z pPersonal Social Inclusion 156.00 212 155.00 302 31192.50 -0.49 0.62Expressed Control 36.00 212 35.88 302 28750.50 -1.97 0.05Received Control 31.50 212 31.00 302 31143.00 -0.53 0.60
For the original scales there were no statistically significant differences between the
informed and uninformed and control groups for all of the expressed scales and the
received control and received openness scales. The only statistically significant result was
for the received inclusion scale, with the uninformed and control group scoring significantly
higher than the informed group (r = .01). For the new scales there were no statistically
significant differences between the informed and uninformed and control groups for the
personal social inclusion scale and the received control scale. However, the difference
between the two groups on the expressed control scale did achieve statistical significance,
with the informed group scoring significantly higher than the uninformed and control group
(r = .09).
10.4. Analysis of the participants in the informed condition who identified the target and a
matched comparison group
In order to determine whether there is any difference in the FIRO-B scores for those who
identified the target in the informed condition, a matched comparison group was formed.
The 36 participants who identified the target in the informed condition were matched on
age, gender, occupation, and educational achievement to 36 participants also from the
informed condition that had not identified the target. Before further analysis was conducted
to examine the differences between the target group and the matched comparison group
the normality of the distribution of the data was tested. This sub-set of data for both the
original scales and the new scales was considerably more normally distributed than the
whole data-set. Of the six original scales only two (expressed openness and received
inclusion) reported a statistically significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov result, and there were
only seven outlying scores. These extreme scores were changed to the next highest score
for that scale plus one. This action remedied the extreme scores and improved the
normality of the distribution. For the three new scales the Kolmogorov-Smirnov result was
non-significant for the two control scales, the personal social inclusion scale was significant,
and there were two outlying scores, which were dealt with as before. It was therefore
decided to use parametric statistics to compare the scores for both the original scales and
the new scales.
The mean scores for the total FIRO-B, the original scales, and the three new scales were
calculated comparing the group of participants in the informed condition who identified the
target and the matched comparison group. For the original scale total FIRO-B scores the
informed group who identified the target reported higher scores of social interactivity (M =
228.26, SD = 33.87) than the matched comparison group (M = 216.93, SD = 22.91). The total
FIRO-B scores for the new scales, which differ slightly due to the missing values inputted and
the outlying values that were changed, show the same relationship between the groups.
The informed group who identified the target reported higher scores of social interactivity
(M = 227.98, SD = 34.35) than the matched comparison group (M = 217.13, SD = 23.60).
Tables 10.4.1 to 10.4.2 show the mean scores for the original scales and the new scales
respectively.
Table 10.4.1:Mean scores for the original scales for the informed groupwho identified the target and the matched comparison group
Target group Comparison group
Scale Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. DeviationExpressed Control 33.39 11.02 29.93 8.22Expressed Openness 34.94 5.37 36.13 5.78Expressed Inclusion 41.68 9.52 39.47 6.62Received Control 27.97 8.53 23.77 6.49Received Openness 45.41 7.41 44.34 7.21Received Inclusion 44.86 9.15 43.28 8.28
Table 10.4.2:Mean scores for the new scales for the informed groupwho identified the target and the matched comparison group
Target group Comparison group
Scale Mean Std.Deviation Mean Std.DeviationPersonal Social Inclusion 156.04 25.48 152.05 21.81Expressed Control 37.83 11.16 35.10 9.38Received Control 34.11 9.05 29.98 7.31
For the original scales we can see that the informed group who identified the target scored
higher than the matched comparison group on all of the scales apart from the expressed
openness scale. For the new scales similar results are reported. The informed group scored
higher than the matched control group on all of the scales.
10.4.1. T-tests to compare the informed group who identified the target and thematched comparison group
A series of Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the mean scores of the
informed group who identified the target and the matched comparison group. For the
original scale FIRO-B total scores there was no significant difference in scores for the
informed group (M = 228.26, SD = 33.87) and the matched comparison group (M = 216.93,
SD = 22.91); t (61.49) = 1.66, p = .10 (two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the
means (mean difference = 11.33, 95% CI: -2.30 to 24.95) was small to moderate (eta
squared = .04). As the mean scores only differ slightly for the new scale total FIRO-B scores
the t-test result was the same. Table 10.4.1.1 and Table 10.4.1.2 report the results of the
independent-samples t-tests for the original scales and the new scales respectively.
Table 10.4.1.1: Results of the Independent-Samples t-tests comparing the original scalemean scores for the target group and the matched comparison group
Scale t df p Meandifference etasquaredExpressed Control 1.51 64.76 .14 3.45 .03Expressed Openness 0.90 70.00 .37 -1.19 .01Expressed Inclusion 1.14 62.44 .26 2.21 .02Received Control 2.35 70.00 .02 4.20 .08Received Openness 0.62 70.00 .54 1.07 .005Received Inclusion 0.77 70.00 .45 1.58 .008
Table 10.4.1.2: Results of the Independent-Samples t-tests comparing the new scalemean scores for the target group and the matched comparison group
Scale t df p Meandifference etasquaredPersonal Social Inclusion .71 70.00 .48 3.99 .007Expressed Control 1.13 70.00 .26 2.74 .02Received Control 2.13 70.00 .04 4.13 .06
For the original scales only one of the comparisons of the mean scores between the
informed group who identified the target and the matched comparison group achieved
statistical significance, the received control scale (p = .02). For the new scales the received
control scale again was the only scale to achieve statistical significance (p = .04), with the
informed group who identified the target scoring significantly higher than the matched
comparison group.
10.4.2. Logistic regression analysis
For the original scales direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of the
six scales on the likelihood that participants would identify the target. The model contained
the six original scales as independent variables (expressed control, openness, inclusion, and
received control, openness, inclusion). The full model containing all predictors was not
statistically significant, χ2 (6, N = 72) = 9.50, p = .15, however, the Hosmer-Lemeshow
Goodness of Fit Test was non-significant (p = .47), indicating that the model was able to
distinguish between participants who identified the target and those that did not. The
model as a whole explained between 12.4% (Cox and Snell R square) and 16.5% (Nagelkerke
R squared) of the variance in identifications, and correctly classified 61.1% of cases. As
shown in Table 10.4.2.1, only one of the independent variables made a unique statistically
significant contribution to the model (received control, p = .04).
Table 10.4.2.1: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of correctly identifying thetarget for the original scales
95% C.I. for OddsRatio
B S.E. Wald df Sig. OddsRatio Lower UpperExpressed Control .04 .03 1.94 1 .16 1.04 .98 1.10Expressed Openness -.05 .05 .77 1 .38 .96 .87 1.06Expressed Inclusion .003 .06 .003 1 .96 1.00 .90 1.12Received Control .08 .04 4.26 1 .04 1.08 1.00 1.17Received Openness .07 .05 1.68 1 .20 1.07 .97 1.18Received Inclusion -.02 .06 .12 1 .72 .98 .87 1.10Constant -3.89 2.52 2.38 .12 .02
For the new scales direct logistic regression was also performed to assess the impact of the
personal social inclusion, expressed control, and received control scores on the likelihood
that participants would identify the target. The model contained three independent
variables (personal social inclusion, expressed control, and received control). The full model
containing all predictors was not statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 72) = 5.52, p = .14,
however, the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test was non-significant (p = .44),
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between participants who identified the
target and those that did not. The model as a whole explained between 7.4% (Cox and Snell
R square) and 9.8% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in identifications, and correctly
classified 52.8% of cases. As shown in Table 10.4.2.2, only one of the independent variables
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model (received control, p = .05).
Table 10.4.2.2: Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of correctly identifying thesuspect for the new scales
95% C.I. forOdds Ratio
B S.E. Wald df p OddsRatio Lower UpperPersonal Social Inclusion .005 .01 .23 1 .63 1.01 .98 1.03Expressed Control .02 .03 .59 1 .44 1.02 .97 1.07Received Control .06 .03 3.73 1 .05 1.06 .10 1.13Constant -3.39 1.97 2.96 .09 .03
10.4.3. Partial Order Scalogram Analysis
In order to establish the quantitative and qualitative variation in the FIRO-B scores between
the informed group who identified the target and the matched comparison group, Partial
Order Scalogram Analysis was conducted. The 72 individuals in this analysis were given a
profile or structuple according to their score on the three scales of the FIRO-B. To construct
these structuples the maximum and minimum scores for each of the scales was calculated,
three equal groups were then formed encompassing the range of scores. Each individual
was then given a score from 1 to 3 for each of the three scales. Scores of 1 indicates a low
score, scores of 2 are classed as medium scores, whilst scores of 3 are classed as high scores.
Table 10.4.3.1 shows the grouping of scores for the low, medium, and high groups for the
three scales.
Table 10.4.3.1: Range of scale scores to constitute eachstructuple group
Structuple group
Scale scores Low(1) Medium(2) High(3)Personal & Social Inclusion 98 - 128 129 - 159 160 - 191
Expressed Control 15 - 30 31 - 46 47 - 62
Received Control 17 - 28 29 - 40 41 - 51
Therefore a person with a high Personal and Social Inclusion score, a medium Expressed
Control score, and a low Received Control score, would have the structuple 321. Structuples
can range from 111, indicating low scores on each of the three scales, to 333, indicating high
scores on each of the three scales, and can be any combination of the three numbers in
between. The structuples can be quantitatively ordered, a structuple of 333 is greater than a
structuple of 222, which is then greater than a structuple of 111. Structuples can also be
quantitatively the same; structuples of 121 and 211 have the same total score of 4 however
they are qualitatively different. The first example, 121, consists of low Personal and Social
Inclusion, medium Expressed Control, and low Received Control, which is qualitatively
different to 211, medium Personal and Social Inclusion, low Expressed Control, and low
Received Control. The POSA therefore partially orders the structuples according to their
quantitative similarities and qualitative differences.
The structuples are represented in the POSA as points in a geometric space, placed
according to their partial order. Figure 10.4.3.a shows the geometric space of the POSA
which consists of 21 structuples from the 72 individuals from the informed and matched
comparison groups. The analysis uses the structuples not the raw data, and each structuple
is only represented in the space once. Therefore, each structuple may represent more than
one individual; that is how 72 individuals are reduced to 21 structuples. The geometric
space shows the increase in the scores on the three scales running along the joint axis from
low scores on all three scales (111) in the lower left of the space to high scores on all three
scales (333) in the upper right. We can see that structuples with the same total score occupy
the same location on the joint axis, for example structuples 332, 323, and 233 in the upper
right of the space, all total 8. However, they do not occupy the exact same position because
they differ in how that total is constructed.
Figure 10.4.3.a: A partial order scalogram analysis of 21 profiles derived from the 72individuals in the target and matched comparison groups
The two-dimensional solution of the POSA, shown above has a coefficient of correct
representation of 0.86, indicating that there is a correct representation of 86% of structuple
pairs (Borg & Shye, 1995). There is an even distribution of structuples throughout the space,
indicating that the individuals in the informed and matched comparison groups show
quantitative and qualitative variation in their FIRO-B scores.
In order to examine how each of the three scales contributes to the composition of the
structuples in the geometric space, it is necessary to examine the item diagrams of each of
the three scales. Examination of these item diagrams can determine whether the scale
produces a clear partition of the space. If distinct regions of the space can be identified,
then this framework may be used to distinguish FIRO-B scores between participants in the
informed group and participants in the matched comparison group.
We can see from Figure 10.4.3.b that scores of 1, 2, or 3 on the received control scale do not
occupy distinct regions of the space. The space cannot be partitioned due to the scores,
therefore the received control scale cannot be used to distinguish between the two groups.
Figure 10.4.3.b: Item diagram for the received control scale
For the expressed control scale we can see from Figure 10.4.3.c that low, medium, and high
scores on the scale can be distinguished along the X axis. The left-hand section contains only
individuals who scored 1 on the expressed control scale. The majority of individuals in the
middle section scored 2 on the scale, although there is a score of 3 in this section. The right-
hand section consists of individuals who scored 3 on the scale, although there is a score of 2
in this section also.
Figure 10.4.3.c: Partitioned item diagram for the expressed control scale
Note: X partitioning loading coefficient = 0.99
For the personal social inclusion scale we can see from Figure 10.4.3.d that low, medium,
and high scores on the scale can be distinguished along the Y axis. The lower section
contains all of the individuals who scored 1 on the scale. The majority of individuals in the
middle section scored 2 on the scale, although there is a score of 3 in this section. The upper
section consists of individuals who scored 3 on the scale, although there is a score of 2 in
this section also.
Figure 10.4.3.d: Partitioned item diagram for the personal and social inclusion scale
Note: Y partitioning loading coefficient = 1.00
In Figure 10.4.3.e each one of the 72 individuals is placed in the space according to their
score on the three scales. A ‘T’ corresponds to an individual from the informed group who
identified the target; a ‘C’ is an individual from the matched comparison group. Therefore in
the upper right of the space there are two individuals from the informed group who scored
333 on the three scales. The partitioning of the space along the X and Y axis results in nine
sections of the space; comprised of high, medium, and low personal and social inclusion,
and high, medium, and low expressed control.
Figure 10.4.3.e: A partial order scalogram analysis of 25 profiles showing the location of theinformed individuals who identified the target (T) and the matched comparison individuals(C) with the superposition of the two partition lines
With the partitions of the space in place it is clear that individuals in the informed and
matched comparison groups display qualitative and quantitative differences in their FIRO-B
scores, as T’s and C’s are spread throughout the space. However, there are some areas of
the plot that distinguish between individuals in the informed and matched comparison
groups. The high expressed control and high personal and social inclusion sections mainly
contain individuals from the informed condition who identified the target. On the opposite
side of the space though, the section with high personal and social inclusion but low
expressed control, this area is mainly constituted with individuals from the matched
comparison group.
10.5. Analysis of those participants who identified the target in the informed, uninformed,and control conditions
In the informed condition (A1 and B1) 36 participants identified either number eight or
number four, and were therefore deemed to have made a target identification. In the
HighP and SI
MediumP and SI
LowP and SI
Low ExpressedControl Medium ExpressedControl High ExpressedControl
uninformed condition (A2 and B2) 27 participants made a target identification, whilst 25
participants made a target identification (either number four or number eight) in the control
condition (C1). This section will compare the FIRO-B scores (total, original scales and three
new scales) for the participants in each of these groups.
Firstly the normality of the distribution of the data for the three groups was assessed. For
the original FIRO-B scales the data was not particularly normally distributed. Five of the
seven scales reported a significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, only the expressed control
scale and the total FIRO-B score reported a non-significant statistic. Sixteen outlying scores
were changed to less extreme scores, which marginally improved the normality of the
distribution. However, three of the scales (expressed openness, received openness, and
received inclusion) still reported significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, therefore for the
original scales non-parametric statistics were used to further analyse the data.
The FIRO-B data for the three new scales was substantially more normally distributed. Only
the received control scale reported a significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Five outlying
scores were changed to less extreme scores which improved the normality of the data. As
the outlying scores had been sufficiently dealt with parametric statistics were employed to
analyse the new FIRO-B scales.
10.5.1. Comparison of the mean scores of the total FIRO-B scale, the original scalesand the new scales for the informed, uninformed, and control groups
Firstly, the mean scores for the total scores for the three groups were compared. We can
see from Tables 10.5.1.1 and 10.5.1.2 that there is a substantial difference in the total scale
scores between the three groups, with the informed group reporting higher mean scores of
social interactivity than the uninformed group and the control group reporting the lowest
social interactivity scores. For the original scales the informed group scored higher than the
uninformed group and the control group on the expressed control, expressed inclusion,
received openness, and received control scales, but lower on the expressed openness scale.
For the received inclusion scale the informed group scored lower than the control group but
higher than the uninformed group.
Table 10.5.1.1:Mean scores of the original scales for the informed, uninformedand control groups who identified the target
Informed group Uninformed group Control group
Scale Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviationExpressed Control 33.39 11.02 31.22 6.74 23.08 10.75Expressed Openness 35.03 5.58 35.48 5.62 36.72 7.83Expressed Inclusion 41.41 10.23 39.35 6.86 37.56 6.08Received Control 28.44 9.55 24.96 6.40 25.48 8.49Received Openness 45.41 7.41 43.70 7.62 42.28 7.59Received Inclusion 44.86 9.15 44.26 7.61 45.18 5.88Total score 228.54 34.78 218.98 24.05 210.30 26.25
For the new scales the informed group scored higher than the uninformed group and the
control group on all three scales. The uninformed group in turn scored higher than the
control group on all three scales.
Table 10.5.1.2:Mean scores of the new scales for the informed, uninformed and controlgroups who identified the target
Informed group Uninformed group Control group
Scale Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviationPersonal Social Inclusion 156.04 25.48 154.20 17.90 150.02 19.33Expressed Control 37.83 11.16 34.81 7.15 28.80 10.94Received Control 33.97 8.78 31.07 6.71 31.11 9.04Total score 227.84 34.21 220.09 20.71 209.93 26.25
10.5.2. Further analysis comparing the informed, uninformed and control groupswho identified the target
For the original scales of the FIRO-B a series of Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted to
determine if there were any significant differences in the FIRO-B mean scores between the
informed, uninformed, and control groups. The differences in the total FIRO-B score
approached significance (p = .06), however, only the expressed control scale reported
statistically significant differences in their scores between the three groups χ2 (2, n = 88) =
11.29, p < .01. The control group recorded lower median scores (Md = 26) than both the
informed group (Md = 30.50) and the uninformed group (Md = 33). Three post hoc Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted. To control for a Type I error a Bonferroni correction was
applied resulting in a revised alpha level of .017. The Mann-Whitney U tests revealed a
significant difference in the expressed control scores between the informed group and the
control group (U = 240.50, z = -3.08, p = .002, r = .39), and the uninformed group and the
control group (U = 190.00, z = -2.71, p = .007, r = .38). There was no significant difference
between the scores of the informed group and the uninformed group.
A series of one-way between-groups ANOVA’s with post-hoc tests were conducted to
determine if there were any significant differences in the FIRO-B mean scores between the
informed, uninformed, and control groups for the three new scales. Only the total FIRO-B
score and the expressed control scale reported statistically significant differences in their
scores between the three groups at the p < .05 level. For the total FIRO-B score, according to
Levene’s test, the variance in the scores was not homogenous for each of the three groups,
therefore the Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is reported; F (2, 80.76) = 3.20, p = .05. Despite only
just reaching statistical significance the actual difference in mean scores is quite large, which
is evidenced in the medium effect size obtained (eta squared = .06), which may be due to
the small sample in this analysis. Because of the heterogeneity of variance Games-Howell
post-hoc tests were conducted. This test is particularly recommended when there are
unequal sample sizes and heterogeneity of variance (Field, 2005). The Games-Howell post-
hoc tests indicated a difference between the informed group (M = 227.84, SD = 34.21) and
the control group (M = 209.93, SD = 26.25) suggesting a trend towards statistical significance
(p = .06). The uninformed group (M = 220.09, SD = 20.71) did not differ significantly from
either the informed group or control group.
The expressed control scale of the new scales also violated Levene’s test for homogeneity of
variance, therefore the Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is again reported; F (2, 74.48) = 6.23, p =
.003, eta squared = .12. As before Games-Howell post-hoc tests were conducted. The post-
hoc comparisons indicated that the expressed control mean score for the informed group
(M = 37.83, SD = 11.16) was significantly different to the control group (M = 28.80, SD =
10.94, p < .01). The uninformed group (M = 34.81, SD = 7.15) did not differ significantly from
either the informed group or the control group.
10.6. Further analysis of the participants in the informed condition
In this section the participants in the informed condition (groups A1 and B1) are further
analysed. In particular the FIRO-B scores for those who identified the target in the informed
group will be compared to those who did not identify the target in the informed group. 36
participants identified the target, compared to 176 participants who did not identify the
target. This results in a sample for these analyses of 212 participants. Firstly the normality of
the distribution of the data was analysed to determine the suitability of parametric testing.
For the original scales only the expressed control and the received control scales achieved a
non-significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Once the outlying scores had been dealt with
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics did not change, for the expressed openness, expressed
inclusion, received openness, and received inclusion scales the statistic was still significant.
For the three new scales the personal social inclusion scale achieved a significant
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, even when the outlying scores had been changed. Due to the
non-normal distribution of data non-parametric statistics were employed for both the
original scales and the new scales.
10.6.1. Comparison of the FIRO-B mean scores for the participants in the informedcondition who made target and non-target identifications
From Tables 10.6.1.1 and 10.6.1.2 we can see that participants who made a target
identification in the informed condition scored higher on all of the FIRO-B new scales and all
of the original scales apart from expressed openness.
Table 10.6.1.1:Mean scores of the original FIRO-B scales for the targetand non-target identifications in the informed condition
Targetidentification Non-targetidentification
Scale Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviationExpressed Control 33.39 11.02 30.66 9.30Expressed Openness 35.03 5.58 35.51 6.94Expressed Inclusion 41.41 10.23 38.65 8.56Received Control 28.44 9.55 25.18 7.75Received Openness 45.41 7.41 42.99 8.15Received Inclusion 44.86 9.15 42.22 8.67Total score 228.54 34.78 215.21 32.81
Table 10.6.1.2:Mean scores of the new FIRO-B scales for the targetand non-target identifications in the informed condition
Targetidentification Non-targetidentification
Scale Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviationPersonal Social Inclusion 156.04 25.48 148.09 26.36Expressed Control 37.83 11.16 35.59 9.59Received Control 34.66 10.34 31.52 8.29Total score 228.54 34.85 215.20 32.80
10.6.2. Mann-Whitney U tests to compare the participants in the informed conditionwho identified the target to those in the informed condition who did not identify thetarget
A series of Mann Whitney U tests were conducted to compare the original scale FIRO-B
scores of those in the informed condition who identified the target to those who did not
identify the target. There was a significant difference in the total FIRO-B scores for those
who identified the target (Md = 238.00, n = 36) and those who did not identify the target
(Md = 219.38, n = 176), U = 2456, z = -2.12, p < .05, r = .15. Target identifiers were
significantly more socially interactive than non-identifiers. Table 10.6.2.1 shows the results
of the Mann-Whitney U tests for the original scales.
Table 10.6.2.1: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the original scale scores forparticipants making target and non-target identifications in the informed condition
Target Non-Target
Scale Median N Median N U z pExpressed Control 30.50 36 31.00 176 2744.50 -1.26 .21Expressed Openness 34.00 36 35.00 176 2953.00 -0.64 .52Expressed Inclusion 41.25 36 40.00 176 2549.00 -1.85 .07Received Control 28.00 36 25.00 176 2531.50 -1.90 .06Received Openness 46.00 36 44.00 176 2634.50 -1.59 .11Received Inclusion 47.00 36 44.00 176 2515.50 -1.95 .05
The Mann-Whitney U tests conducted on the original scales found that only the scores for
the received inclusion scale were significantly different for the two groups (r = .13), with
target identifiers reporting significantly higher received inclusion scores than non-
identifiers. Target identifiers also reported higher received control scores than non-
identifiers, although this was just above significance.
As expected the Mann-Whitney U test for the total FIRO-B scores for the new scales also
reported a significant difference between those who identified the target (Md = 238.00, n =
36) and those who did not identify the target (Md = 219.30, n = 176) in the informed
condition; U = 2452.50, z = -2.13, p < .05, r = .15. The Mann-Whitney U tests for the new
scales revealed no significant differences in the scores for those who did identify the target
and those who did not identify the target in the informed condition. As Table 10.6.2.2 shows
the personal and social inclusion scale was the only scale close to achieving a statistically
significant difference between the two groups.
Table 10.6.2.2: Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the new scale scores forparticipants making target and non-target identifications in the informed condition
Target Non-TargetScale Median N Median N U z pPersonal Social Inclusion 160.00 36 154.00 176 2574.50 -1.77 .08Expressed Control 35.00 36 36.00 176 2803.50 -1.09 .28Received Control 33.00 36 31.00 176 2653.00 -1.54 .12
10.7. Analysis of the FIRO-B scores of the administrators
Nine of the sixteen administrators returned a completed FIRO-B questionnaire. In the first
stage of the analysis the mean scores for the administrator sample were compared to the
participant sample on the six original scales, the three new scales and the total score.
Table 10.7.1 shows that overall for the total FIRO-B scores the administrators and the
participants barely differ at all in their reported levels of social interactivity. Indeed on many
of the scales the two groups report comparable scores. However, the scores on the received
control scale for both the original scales and the new scales are noticeably different for the
two groups, with the administrator sample reporting lower scores than the participant
sample.
Table 10.7.1: Comparison of the mean scores of the administrators and theparticipants for the total scores, the original scales, and the new scales
Administrator sample Participant sample
Mean Std.deviation Mean Std.deviationExpressed Control 30.67 9.39 30.40 9.30Expressed Openness 36.78 7.48 35.37 6.80Expressed Inclusion 41.89 10.12 39.27 7.69Received Control 16.78 3.96 25.47 7.81Received Openness 43.22 9.65 43.79 7.29Received Inclusion 47.78 5.29 43.84 7.73Personal Social Inclusion 158.33 24.30 151.38 22.96Expressed Control 35.56 9.14 34.98 9.32Received Control 23.22 5.26 31.79 8.33Total 217.11 26.55 218.15 27.99
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to compare the scores of the
administrators and the participants. For the FIRO-B total scores there was no significant
difference between the two groups. For the original scales only the received control scale
reported a significant difference between the administrators (Md = 16, n = 9) and the
participants (Md = 25, n = 514), U = 711.50, z = -3.57, p < .001, r = .16. For the new scales
only the difference in the received control scores was significantly different for the
administrators (Md = 22, n = 9), and the participants (Md = 31, n = 514), U = 892.50, z = -
3.16, p < .01, r = .14.
In the second stage of the analysis the FIRO-B scores of those administrators in the informed
condition are more closely scrutinized. Of the six administrators in the informed condition
who were informed of the location of the target in the line-up, four returned a completed
FIRO-B questionnaire. Table 10.7.2 shows the percentage of target identifications that each
administrator who returned a FIRO-B is responsible for.
Table 10.7.2: Percentage of target identifications for the Administratorsin the informed condition who returned a FIRO-B questionnaire
Administrator Target identifications %
2 19.443 19.448 30.5610 5.56
From the above table it is clear that Administrator 8 is responsible for a large share of the
target responses in the informed condition. Administrator 10 however, is responsible for a
small share of those responses. Is there a difference then in the FIRO-B scores of these two
individuals which can account for the difference in the number of target responses they
achieved? As we can see from Table 10.7.3 the FIRO-B scores for these two individuals
indicate that there is a large difference in the FIRO-B total scores, with Administrator 8
reporting a lower score of social interactivity than Administrator 10. For the original scales
Administrator 8 reported a higher expressed control score, but scored lower on the five
remaining scales. In particular Administrator 8 scored substantially lower on the received
control and the received openness scales than Administrator 10.
Table 10.7.3: Comparison of the scores for the four Administrators in the informedcondition for the total scores, the original scales, and the new scales
Administrator2 Administrator3 Administrator8 Administrator10Expressed Control 39 34 33 18Expressed Openness 42 44 27 34Expressed Inclusion 44 54 30 45Received Control 14 13 11 23Received Openness 45 51 22 51Received Inclusion 48 53 45 54Personal SocialInclusion 162 187 119 176Expressed Control 48 40 35 20Received Control 22 22 14 29Total 232 249 168 225
For the new scales Administrator 8 scored substantially lower on the personal social
inclusion scale and the received control scale, but higher on the expressed control scale
than Administrator 10. In sum the Administrator who achieved the most target
identifications from their line-ups was less socially interactive than the Administrator who
achieved the least target identifications. They reported lower scores on all of the scales
apart from the expressed control scales, indicating that the Administrator who achieved the
most target identifications relates to being the dominant person in social interactions. As
this is only a comparison between two individuals, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn
between higher levels of expressed control and the ability to influence the outcome of a
line-up.
When the analysis of the remaining two Administrators (who were both responsible for
19.44% of target identifications) from the informed condition is considered, see Table
10.7.3, further conclusions can be intimated. As before those Administrators responsible for
the greater number of target identifications reported higher levels of expressed control, but
lower levels of received control. Therefore those Administrators who exert greater levels of
influence on their participants relate more to the dominant role in an interpersonal
relationship, whereby they influence the actions of others and take charge of the social
situation. Analysis of four individuals again does not provide a conclusive link between
tendencies towards dominance in social situations and the ability to influence; however, it
does provide an interesting avenue for further research. Therefore in the next chapter the
transcripts of the line-ups will be analysed for any evidence that dominant interpersonal
tendencies has had an impact on the line-up identification.
10.8. Summary of the main findings of this chapter
There are three findings of particular note from the analysis of the FIRO-B data. Firstly,
when the participants in the informed condition who identified the target were matched on
age, gender, educational attainment, and occupation to a group of participants from the
informed condition that did not identify the target, the target identifiers reported
significantly higher received control scores than the matched comparison group. The
differences between the two groups on the other scales were not significant. Secondly,
when comparing the participants in the informed condition who identified the target to
participants in the informed condition who did not identify the target, the target identifiers
were significantly higher in their overall social interactivity and their received inclusion
scores. Furthermore, although not quite reaching statistical significance, target identifiers
reported higher received control scores than non-identifiers. Finally, the third finding of
note suggests that Administrators who are informed of the location of the target and who
are responsible for more target identifications report higher expressed control scores and
lower received control scores, than informed Administrators who are responsible for more
non-target identifications.
Analysis Section 4 – Analysis of the Transcripts from the Line-ups: Examining
Verbal Cues
Chapter 11:
As part of the line-up procedure, administrators were asked to audio-record their line-ups.
Eleven of the sixteen administrators returned the transcripts of their recordings, resulting in
381 cases for analysis. These transcripts were analysed for the presence of a variety of
verbal cues that may influence the participants in their choice of line-up member.
11.1. Coding of the transcripts
The transcripts were analysed by the author, and a coding dictionary of verbal behaviours
was created. Table 11.1.1 provides a full list of the verbal cues identified and an example of
each from the transcripts.
Table 11.1.1: Verbal behaviours of the Administrators with examples from the transcripts
Verbal behaviours identified ExampleTell witness to look carefully “Examine them all carefully”Tell witness to take time “It's ok take your time”Ask if sure after identification “Ok, number eight, are you certain?”Ask if sure after non-identification “Are you sure number one?”Ask to look again after identification “Do you want to look again?”Ask to look again after non-identification “You can have another look if you like”Repeat choice with questioning tone “Number twelve?”Repeat choice with confirmatory tone “Number five, thank you”Show or offer to show line-up photographsagain “Would you like to see the photosagain”Press for an identification “I need you to give me an answer”Say do not know who suspect is “Well I don't know who he is”
The 381 transcripts were coded by the author for the presence or absence of the above
eleven behaviours. A postgraduate student blind to the hypotheses of the study also coded
the transcripts using the coding dictionary. Kappa Measure of Agreement tests were used to
assess inter-rater agreement. According to Peat (2001) a Kappa Measurement of Agreement
value above .8 represents very good agreement. From Table 11.1.2 we can see that the
coding of the transcripts was very consistent, with ten of the eleven behaviours reporting
Kappa values above .9.
Table 11.1.2: Kappa Measure of Agreement values for the elevenbehaviours identified
Administrator Behaviours KappaMeasure ofAgreementTell witness to look carefully .93Tell witness to take time .98Ask if sure after identification 1.00Ask if sure after non-identification .96Ask to look again after identification 1.00Ask to look again after non-identification 1.00Repeat choice with questioning tone .93Repeat choice with confirmatory tone .96Show or offer to show line-up photographs again 1.00Press for an identification .89Say do not know who suspect is 1.00Note: All values are significant at the p < .001 level
A second postgraduate student, also blind to the hypotheses and conditions of the study
was employed to resolve the disagreements between the two raters. The proportion of the
administrator behaviours were then compared for the informed condition, the uninformed
condition and the control condition. Table 11.1.3 shows the percentage of the administrator
behaviours for the three conditions.
Table 11.1.3: Percentage of each of the Administrator’s behaviours in their line-upsin the informed, uninformed, and control conditions (frequencies in parentheses)
Condition
Verbal behaviours identified Informed Uninformed ControlTell witness to look carefully 4.20% (6) 1.30% (2) 0.00% (0)Tell witness to take time 12.00% (17) 6.90% (11) 3.80% (3)Ask if sure after identification 2.80% (4) 1.30% (2) 0.00% (0)Ask if sure after non-identification 3.50% (5) 5.00% (8) 0.00% (0)Ask to look again after identification 0.00% (0) 0.60% (1) 0.00% (0)Ask to look again after non-identification 1.40% (2) 0.60% (1) 0.00% (0)Repeat choice with questioning tone 12.00% (17) 8.20% (13) 1.30% (1)Repeat choice with confirmatory tone 23.20% (33) 11.90% (19) 1.30% (1)Show or offer to show photographs again 9.90% (14) 5.70% (9) 3.80% (3)Press for an identification 14.80% (21) 8.20% (13) 20.00% (16)Say do not know who suspect is 0.00% (0) 0.00% (0) 3.80% (3)
From the above table we can see that the informed condition has the highest percentage of
administrator behaviours for seven of the eleven identified behaviours. The most prevalent
behaviours identified were the ‘repeat choice with a confirmatory tone’, ‘press for an
identification’, ‘repeat choice with a questioning tone’, and ‘tell the witness to take their
time’. The least frequent administrator behaviours were ‘asking the witness to look at the
photos again after an identification’, and ‘asking the witness to look again after a non-
identification’. The control condition has the lowest percentage of administrator behaviours
for all of the identified behaviours, apart from the ‘press for an identification’ behaviour.
Furthermore, the behaviour of ‘saying they do not know who the suspect is’ is only
perpetrated by administrators in the control condition.
In order to compare the administrator behaviours between the three groups, the
frequencies of each of the administrator behaviours was calculated. A score of one was
given for each incidence of an administrator behaviour, therefore, an administrator who
told the witness to take their time, pressed for an identification, and repeated their choice
with questioning tone would obtain a score of three. The total scores for each of the three
groups were calculated and can be seen in Table 11.1.4.
Table 11.1.4: Number and percentage of administrator behaviours identifiedand average number of line-ups per behaviour in each condition
Condition Number of line-ups Number ofbehaviours identified
Average numberof line-ups perbehaviourInformed 142 119 (52.89%) 1.19Uninformed 159 79 (35.11%) 2.01Control 80 27 (12.00%) 3.96Total 381 225 (100%) 1.69
We can see from this table that the administrators in the informed condition contributed
more of the administrator behaviours than those in the uninformed condition.
Administrators in the uninformed condition in turn contributed more of the administrator
behaviours than those administrators in the control condition. We can also see that overall
administrator behaviours occurred on average in nearly every other line-up. For the
informed condition they occurred in almost four out of every five line-ups, whilst for the
uninformed condition this dropped to every other line-up, and for the control condition
they occurred on average in one in three line-ups.
11.2. The length of the transcripts
The transcripts were then analysed for their length and the number of words spoken
between the administrator and the participant. It would be expected that those
administrators who exhibited the greatest number of the behaviours identified above, and
were the most influential with their participants would have the most discourse with their
participants. In order to determine the length of the interaction, the number of words
spoken by both the administrator and participant were calculated. Some administrators
transcribed the whole of their interaction, whilst others only transcribed the line-up section.
Counting the whole of the interaction would skew the results towards those who
transcribed the whole of the interaction. Therefore, only the words spoken by the
administrator and the participant during the line-up are calculated. Administrators spoke
during the line-up an average of 40.66 (SD = 17.59) words, whilst the participant spoke an
average of 15.43 (SD = 12.31) words.
Table 11.2.1 shows the mean number of words spoken by the administrator and participant
in the informed, uninformed and control groups. We can see from this table that
administrators in the informed group did indeed speak to their participants more than
administrators in the uninformed and control groups. However, surprisingly administrators
in the control condition spoke to their participants more than administrators in the
uninformed condition.
Table 11.2.1:Mean number of words spoken by Administratorsand participants in the three conditions
Administrator ParticipantInformed 48.83 (21.86) 18.95 (12.76)Uninformed 30.20 (9.03) 9.94 (9.11)Control 46.48 (7.99) 20.10 (12.92)
We can also see from this table that administrators were responsible for more discourse
than the participants in all three conditions. Participants in the informed condition spoke on
average double the amount of the participants in the uninformed condition. However, the
participants in the control condition spoke marginally more than the participants in the
informed condition. Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed statistically significant differences in the
number of words spoken by both the administrator; χ2 (2, n = 381) = 94.58, p < .001, and the
participant; χ2 (2, n = 381) = 71.53, p < .001, in the three conditions.
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests with Bonferronni adjustments were conducted (adjusted
alpha level .017). For the number of words spoken by the administrator there was a
significant difference between the informed condition (Md = 58.00, n = 142) and the
uninformed condition (Md = 28.00, n = 159), U = 6199.00, z = -6.76, p < .001, r = .39, and
between the uninformed condition and the control condition (Md = 47.50, n = 80), U =
1231.50, z = -10.18, p < .001, r = .67. However the difference between the informed
condition and the control condition was non-significant, U = 5199.00, z = -1.05, p > .05, r =
.07. For the number of words spoken by the participant there was a significant difference
between the informed condition (Md = 16.50, n = 142) and the uninformed condition (Md =
7.00, n = 159), U = 6037.50, z = -6.98, p < .001, r = .40, and between the uninformed
condition and the control condition (Md = 16.00, n = 80), U = 2737.00, z = -7.21, p < .001, r =
.47. However the difference between the informed condition and the control condition for
the number of words spoken by the participant was non-significant, U = 5237.50, z = -.97, p
> .05, r = .07.
11.3. Comparison of the transcripts obtaining target identifications with those obtainingnon-target identifications
Of the 381 transcripts returned, 301 belonged to the informed and uninformed conditions.
Of those 301 transcripts, 42 were transcripts where the participant had made a target
identification, and 259 were transcripts where the participant had made a non-target
identification. For the 42 target transcripts 39 administrator behaviours were observed,
showing that on average behaviours were occurring in almost every line-up. For the 259
non-target transcripts 159 administrator behaviours were observed, for this group
behaviours occurred on average in every 1.62 line-ups. The target transcripts were
compared to the non-target transcripts to see if any differences in the number of words
spoken by the administrator and the participant existed between them. Table 11.3.1 shows
the mean number of words spoken by the administrator, and mean number of words
spoken by the participant for target and non-target transcripts.
Table 11.3.1: Comparison of the mean number of words spokenby the Administrator and the participant, for target andnon-target transcripts
Words spokenadministrator Words spokenparticipantTarget 43.64 (21.09) 13.95 (9.45)Non-target 38.23 (18.37) 14.23 (12.21)
This table indicates that administrators who obtained target identifications from their
participants spoke to them more during the line-up procedure, than administrators who
obtained non-target identifications. However, for the number of words spoken by the
participant the reverse is found. Participants who made target identifications spoke
marginally less than participants who made non-target identifications. When Mann-Whitney
U tests were conducted, the differences between the target and non-target transcripts for
the number of words spoken by the administrator and participant were non-significant.
11.4. The relationship between the transcripts and the Administrator’s FIRO-B scores
Six of the Administrators who returned transcripts of their line-ups also returned a
completed FIRO-B questionnaire. A series of Spearman’s Rank Order Correlations (rho) were
conducted to explore the relationship between the FIRO-B scale scores of the
Administrators, the mean number of words spoken by the Administrators, and the mean
number of words spoken by the participants.
For the mean number of words spoken by an Administrator there was a strong positive
correlation with expressed control scale scores (rho = .77, n = 6, p =.07), and a strong
negative correlation with received control (rho = -.77, n = 6, p =.07), both of these
correlations were just above the alpha level of significance. These correlations indicate a
trend suggesting that an Administrator who reports higher levels of expressed control and
lower levels of received control speaks more during the line-up
For the mean number of words spoken by the participants there was a strong negative
correlation with the Administrator’s reported expressed control (rho = -.89, n = 6, p < .05),
indicating that participants use fewer words with Administrators who seek to control the
interaction. However, there was a strong positive correlation between the mean number of
words spoken by participants and the Administrators received openness score (rho = .84, n =
6, p < .05), and received inclusion score (rho = .79, n = 6, p = .06), the received inclusion
correlation was just above the alpha level of significance. Participants therefore, use more
words in the line-ups when the Administrators report higher scores of received openness
and inclusion.
11.5. Summary of the main findings of this chapter
When the transcripts of Administrators in the informed, uninformed, and control conditions
were compared, Administrators in the informed condition were found to interact for longer
with their participants, and exhibit more of the identified verbal cues. However, participants
in the control condition were found to speak marginally more than participants in the
informed condition. In the informed condition, when the transcripts of those identifying the
target were compared to those that did not identify the target, the Administrators of the
target identifiers used more words, and exhibited more of the verbal cues.
Finally, from the correlation analysis it appears that Administrators who report higher levels
of expressed control, those who wish to control the social interaction, spoke more words
during the line-up. Whereas, Administrators who report higher levels of received control,
those who do not wish to control the social interaction, spoke fewer words. For the mean
number of words spoken by the participant, participants spoke more words when the
Administrator was more receptive to openness and inclusion from others. However, the
participants used fewer words when the Administrator reported higher levels of expressed
control.
Chapter 12: Discussion
12.1. Discussion
The aim of this research was to examine whether an experimenter’s knowledge could
influence a participant to pick a particular person from a photographic line-up. Facilitators
(A and B) were informed of the location of the target in the line-up. They informed half of
their administrators of the location of the target (administrators A1 and B1), but did not
inform the other half (administrators A2 and B2). There was also a control group where both
the Facilitator (C) and the administrators (C1) were not informed of the location of the
target. In condition 1 administrators recruited participants and asked them to pick the
person that they thought was most likely to be the man convicted of the Lockerbie
bombing. Participants then completed the FIRO-B questionnaire. For participants in
condition 2, once they had completed the FIRO-B, they were again asked to make a choice,
but this time from a target-absent line-up. The line-up procedures were audio-recorded.
12.1.1. Evidence for the experimenter expectancy effect
The research conducted by Greathouse and Kovera (2009) and others (Haw & Fisher, 2004;
Phillips et al., 1999) has found evidence that the administrator of a line-up, when they know
the identity of the suspect, can influence the response of the witness. However the research
to date has proved contradictory, with the effect being found with both simultaneous and
sequential line-ups, and biased and unbiased instructions. Furthermore, the eyewitness’s
memory may limit the influence of the administrator. Therefore, Greathouse and Kovera
(2009) called for research to examine the effect of the quality of the memory on investigator
bias. In response to this, this research has removed the memory component, thereby
leaving a view of the administrator’s influence not confounded by the witness’s memory.
With regard to the presence of experimenter expectancy effects, the research made two
hypotheses. Firstly, it stated that those participants in the informed condition would identify
the target more often than those participants in the uninformed condition and the control
condition. Secondly, those participants in the uninformed condition would identify the
target more often than those in the control condition. The author would therefore
tentatively state that there is evidence of experimenter expectancy effects in this research.
In condition A1 the target suspect was identified the most frequently. In condition B1 the
target was the joint most frequently identified. In conditions A2 and B2 the target was the
second most frequent identification. A chi-square goodness of fit test indicates that the
identifications of the target in condition A1 was significantly greater than the identifications
of the target in the control condition.
Furthermore, similar results were found in the target absent line-up. Identifications of the
target were the most frequent in conditions A1, B1, and B2, and the second most frequent
in condition A2. A non-significant chi-square test indicates that there was no association
between correct or incorrect identifications in the first line-up and correct or incorrect
identifications in the second line-up. This finding suggests that a conclusion that the
administrator’s knowledge of the location of the target impacted the participant’s choice
can be drawn.
The frequencies of the identifications also show a high frequency of identifications of
number 7 in conditions A1 and A2. Indeed in condition A1 identifications of number 7 were
the second most frequent and in A2 were the most frequent identifications. In condition B1
identifications of number 3 are the joint most frequent identifications, whilst in B2
identifications of number 3 are the third most frequent. When the line-up is viewed (see
Appendix 4), it can be seen that line-up members 3 and 7 come immediately before the
targets 4 and 8. Therefore some of the identifications may be explained by some leakage of
an experimenter expectancy effect, but where the participant misinterprets the cues from
the administrator. Indeed an explanation for this may be provided by the processes
highlighted in the original experimenter expectancy research conducted by Rosenthal
(1976). In those original person perception experiments, experimenters were led to expect a
range of scores, either positive or negative, from their participants. Therefore, their
influence of their subjects was on a continuum, and was not for a specific number. The same
process may have been in evidence in this research. The experimenter may have been
exhibiting cues in the general area of numbers 4 and 8, but the participants could not
distinguish the cues and therefore were influenced to pick number 3 or 7.
It should also be considered that in the criminal justice system personnel are particularly
motivated to obtain a particular result. Whether that is a police officer motivated to obtain
an identification of a suspect from a line-up, a finger-print analyst motivated to match a
latent print to a suspects print, or a lawyer motivated to successfully prosecute a case
(Koppl & Sacks, 2013). In this research however, administrators were not particularly
motivated to obtain an identification. They were all misinformed as to the true rationale of
the experiment, and were led to believe that they were examining different types of line-up
procedure. The instructions given to the administrators in the informed and uninformed
conditions provided a very subtle motivating instruction that each participant should make a
selection, and would hopefully make a correct selection. However, the extent to which the
administrators construed that statement as an invitation to influence the participant is
unknown.
Indeed, the participants were most probably oblivious to any influencing behaviours
exhibited by the administrator. Clark et al. (2009) found that even when experimenters
actively tried to influence their participants, the participants rated the influence as very low,
a mean score of 1.66 from a scale of 1 to 9. Clark et al. (2009) suggest that this may be
because they either did not notice or remember the interaction or they did not feel that the
statements made by the experimenter were particularly manipulative. The motivation of the
administrator to obtain a particular selection may explain why the expectancy effect was
not as pronounced in condition B1. For condition A the Facilitator was informed that the
suspect was number 8 in the line-up, and was told to make this known to the administrators
in A1. For condition B though, the Facilitator was told that the administrator in B1 would be
told that the suspect was number 4, even though that was not true. The Facilitator may
have consciously or unconsciously communicated the information that number 4 was not
the actual target. The administrator may not have been as motivated to influence the
participant to make a selection that they may have known was wrong.
Furthermore, if the participants were attending to the demand characteristics of the
experiment (Orne, 1962), it is not completely clear why. There is some evidence for Orne’s
(1962) good subject effect. When asked to pick someone from a line-up without having seen
the person before, the majority of participants did not query the request. Some participants
expressed doubt that they would be correct but they picked someone anyway. Indeed, the
vast majority of the participants selected a person from the line-up, only a very small
minority refused to comply. Analysis of the transcripts found that some participants asked
the Administrator if they “had got it right” or had selected “the right person”. This indicates
that for some participants they were apprehensive of giving the wrong answer, and were
apprehensive of being negatively evaluated by the Administrator (Rosenberg, 1965). It is
difficult to determine whether the participant was obedient to the authority of the
Administrator. As stated before, the vast majority were obedient to the experimental
procedure because they complied with it. Therefore, whilst the Administrator in their role as
the experimenter commands some authority, perhaps participants would have been more
obedient to the procedure if an authority figure such as a police officer had conducted the
line-up.
12.1.2. The impact of interpersonal relations
The FIRO-B questionnaire has provided some interesting insights into the relationship
between experimenter expectancy effects and interpersonal behavioural style. As the FIRO-
B has not been utilised in this type of research before, hypotheses about the direction of the
relationship were not proposed. Therefore, exploratory comparisons of FIRO-B scores were
conducted. Comparisons between those identifying the target in the informed group and a
matched comparison group found significantly higher received control scores for the target
identifiers. This group were also found to have higher received control scores when
compared to the participants in the informed condition who did not make a correct
identification. Although this result just missed statistical significance (p = .06) it does suggest
a trend for this group of target identifiers to have high received control scores and therefore
to be controlled by others in social situations. Furthermore, those correctly identifying in
the informed group were significantly higher in both their total FIRO-B score and their
received inclusion score than those incorrect in the informed group. It can be tentatively
concluded then that individuals who are more socially interactive, but also score higher in
received control, which is characterised as a tendency to let others dominate social
situations, and higher in received inclusion, which is characterised as a need to be included
in social situations, may be more susceptible to cues from the experimenter communicating
their expectancy.
When considering the FIRO-B scores of the administrators, further interesting results
emerged. However, caution must be taken when drawing conclusions from a small sample.
Nevertheless, subtle differences were found when comparing the FIRO-B scores of the
administrators achieving a high number of correct identifications to the administrators
achieving a low number of correct identifications. In particular higher scores of expressed
control and lower scores of received control were reported by administrators achieving a
high number of correct identifications compared to administrators achieving a low number
of correct identifications. It would therefore appear that the communication of expectancies
is particularly conducive if the administrator relates to the dominant controlling role in a
social interaction, and the participant relates to the submissive and compliant role.
12.1.3. The impact of verbal cues
Analysis of the transcripts of the line-up procedures identified the presence of 11 verbal
statements spoken by the administrator that could be construed as cues to the participant.
Overall it was found that administrators in the informed condition exhibited more of these
verbal behaviours than administrators in both the uninformed and control conditions.
Certain behaviours were identified that informed administrators exhibited at greater rates
than uninformed and control administrators, For example, informed administrators were
more likely to repeat the participant’s choice in a confirmatory tone, repeat the choice in a
questioning tone, and tell the participant to take their time. Uninformed administrators
exhibited some verbal behaviours; most notably repeating the choice with both a
confirmatory and questioning tone. However, the control administrators were the most
likely to press for an identification out of all the administrators, and were the only group to
tell the participant that they did not know the identity of the suspect.
Analysis of the length of the interaction between the administrator and the participant
found, perhaps unsurprisingly that the informed administrators, who exhibited the most
verbal behaviours also spoke to their participants the most. One possible explanation for
this is the higher expressed control scores reported by administrators in the informed
condition. Their wish to control the social situation may manifest itself by controlling the
dialogue of the interaction. More surprising perhaps is the finding that control
administrators spoke to their participants more than the uninformed administrators, and
did not differ much from the informed administrators. Furthermore, when the number of
words spoken by the participant is considered, the participants in the control condition
spoke more than in the other two conditions. This may be because the participants in the
control condition were not getting any cues from the administrator as to who the suspect
was, so they felt they had to draw the conversation out to help them make an identification.
Further interesting results were found when Administrator’s FIRO-B scores were compared
to their transcripts. Perhaps not surprisingly, Administrators who spoke more reported
higher scores of expressed control; they dominate the social interaction through their
dialogue. Whereas Administrators who spoke fewer words reported higher received control
scores; they let others dominate the social interaction with their dialogue. Of more interest
though is the effect of the Administrators interpersonal style on the number of words
spoken by the participant. When the Administrator reported higher expressed control
scores, where they dominate the social interaction, the participant spoke fewer words.
However, participants spoke more words when the Administrator scored higher on the
received openness and received inclusion scales; Administrators who exhibit an open and
inclusive style therefore encourage participants to interact with them.
When transcripts for correct identifications were compared to transcripts for incorrect
identifications, it was found that administrators who obtained correct identifications spoke
to their participants more and exhibited more verbal behaviours. However, these
differences were not significant. Nevertheless, this still indicates that whilst some
expectancies are communicated verbally, the kinesic communication highlighted by
Rosenthal (1976) is also an important channel of communication.
12.2. Implications of the research
We have seen in this research that participants are susceptible to the cues exhibited by
administrators who know the location of the suspect in the line-up. Moreover, through the
high incidences of identifications of number 3 and 7 from the line-up, we have seen that
either, administrators are not always successful at correctly communicating their knowledge
to the participant, or participants are not always successful at accurately interpreting the
cues. Furthermore, we have seen that subtle, non-directive verbal statements made by
administrators can influence the choice of the participant. The real-life implications of this
research are clear then; eyewitnesses who are susceptible to the demand characteristics of
the line-up, but have a poor memory of the event may be at greater risk of making a false
identification. This is particularly true if the administrator makes seemingly innocuous
statements to the eyewitness. The risk of a non-identification of a culprit or an identification
of a foil is also increased if the witness misinterprets the cues from the administrator, and
makes their identification on the basis of this.
Moreover, as Clark et al, (2009) argue a line-up administrator can still exert influence even
when blind to the location of the suspect, and unbiased instructions are given. This research
therefore highlights the importance of considering the social interaction between the
experimenter and the participant and by extension the interaction between the real-life
line-up administrator and the eyewitness. If an administrator can provide influence with
their mere presence during a line-up, perhaps research should experiment with line-ups
where the administrator leaves the room after giving their instructions. However,
considering the resistance to double-blind procedures it is unlikely that the criminal justice
system would submit to such a procedure. Therefore, it is imperative that a better
understanding of the factors that moderate the communication of experimenter expectancy
effects is gained.
This research therefore highlights the importance of conducting double-blind line-up
procedures. However, law enforcement agencies have continued to resist this
recommendation, citing procedural hurdles and financial costs as reasons for not adopting
this procedure, regardless of the growing body of research. The results of this research have
further suggested that a Facilitator informed of the location of the suspect may
inadvertently communicate this knowledge to a line-up administrator. The implication then
is that a non-blind investigator asking a blind investigator to conduct a line-up may not
result in a double-blind line-up. It is difficult to see how the procedural hurdles, particularly
in small police stations with limited man power, could be overcome to ensure a true double-
blind line-up, where all those concerned with the line-up were unaware of the identity of
the suspect.
Law enforcement agencies are not alone though in resisting the double-blind
recommendation. In a review of leading journals in experimental science, examining the
extent of the utilisation of blind procedures, Sheldrake (1998) has identified “the
widespread neglect of possible experimenter effects” (p.76). He reports that out of 237
reviewed papers from the physical sciences, none employed a blind methodology. In the
biological sciences, 0.8% employed a blind methodology, this figure rose to 5.9% in the
medical sciences, and 4.9% for psychology and animal behaviour. However, for
parapsychology 85.2% of the papers reviewed used a blind methodology. Furthermore, a
survey of 11 British university science departments found that blind methodologies are
rarely taught or used. However as this body of research continues to expand, to include the
potential for bias in the wider criminal justice system, the laboratories, the crime scenes,
and the court rooms, it must become ever harder for the criminal justice system to ignore
the implications of this body of research.
12.3. Limitations of the research
As this research utilised the photograph of a suspect from a high profile case, there is the
possibility that the participants recognised Mr Megrahi. This would then invalidate the
suggestion that the Administrator’s knowledge of the identity and location of the suspect
influenced the participant to pick that photograph. However, there are a number of results
from the study that suggest that the participants did not have a memory for Mr Megrahi.
Firstly, if participants did indeed recognise Mr Megrahi we would expect participants to
choose his picture in all of the conditions. In conditions B1, B2, and C1, the percentage of
participants choosing Mr Megrahi’s photograph were 5.40%, 5.00%, and 8.20% respectively.
These figures show that in these groups the majority of participants did not recognise Mr
Megrahi from the line-up. The target absent condition also provides evidence that the
participants did not have a memory for Mr Megrahi. Participants in this condition did not
refuse to pick a photograph because the photograph of Mr Megrahi was not present.
Furthermore, in the informed condition (A1) of the target absent line-up participants picked
photograph number 8, even though it was not Mr Megrahi, more often than the other
photographs. Both of these points suggest that the participants were not choosing based on
their memories of Mr Megrahi. Nevertheless, in order to eradicate the possibility that the
participants had a memory of Mr Megrahi, this research should be repeated with a line-up
of foils.
Although administrators were given guidelines as to how to conduct the line-ups, they were
also given flexibility as to the setting and location of the line-ups. As a result there are a
number of factors, which were discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, which may have influenced
the results of the study. For example, the study did not control for the lighting conditions for
the line-ups, or the length of time that participants were allowed to view the photographs.
Whilst the returned transcripts do indicate that administrators did follow the instructions
for conducting the line-ups, as some transcripts were not returned, we cannot be
completely confidant that all of the line-ups followed the instructed procedure.
Furthermore, the instructions given to Facilitators in conditions A and B differed. Group A
facilitators were told that the target was number 8 in the line-up, however group B
facilitators were instructed to tell their administrators that the target was number 4 even
though they knew this not to be true. Therefore, variations in instructions, location, and
how the line-ups were conducted, mean that participants were not all subjected to the
exact same experimental procedure. These factors may then confound the results
suggesting that it was the administrator’s knowledge of the location of the target which led
to the higher rates of identification of that target.
In the real world, identification procedures are conducted in a variety of settings and
locations, by administrators using their own interpretation of the guidelines for how to
conduct those procedures. This study is therefore akin to real-life investigative practices,
and has shown that administrators of line-ups, who know the location of the target, may
transfer this knowledge to the witness and influence them to pick the target. Nevertheless,
to further the understanding of how this knowledge is communicated this research should
be repeated with standardised line-up procedures, where each participant undergoes the
exact same procedure.
There are many factors which were explored in Chapter 1, that were not examined in this
study. This research chose to concentrate on the impact of interpersonal behaviour. Whilst
the FIRO-B has revealed interesting relationships between aspects of interpersonal
behaviour and susceptibility to influence, there are many more potentially important factors
to consider, which may have had a bearing on the results of this study. Indeed, Rosenthal
examined many factors when exploring experimenter expectancy effects, including the
experience and motivation of the experimenter. The complex interplay of biosocial factors,
including gender, age, and ethnicity, and psychosocial attributes between the experimenter
and participant have also been considered. However, no concrete rules concerning the
relationship between these factors and experimenter expectancy effects have been
advanced. Therefore, in order to fully explore the impact of the administrators knowledge of
the location of the target, in this new type of experimental procedure where the memory
component is removed, further research is needed to unpick the tangled web of these
biosocial and psychosocial factors.
The sample for this research was relatively large, however, we cannot generalise that this
sample is representative of the wider population. We only have the responses of the
participants who agreed to take part in the experiment, and therefore do not know if the
current sample is particularly susceptible to or immune from influence. Furthermore, as only
nine of the administrators returned a completed FIRO-B questionnaire it is difficult to draw
definitive conclusions from such a small sample. More research is therefore needed with a
greater number of administrators to obtain a better understanding of the differences
between them, and the impact of these differences on the experimenter expectancy effect.
The FIRO-B is a questionnaire and therefore employs a self-report methodology. As with all
self-report methodologies there is a danger that participants may answer in a socially
desirable manner. In Chapter 2 the research of Orne (1962) and Rosenberg (1965) suggested
that participants may behave or state that they behave in a manner which portrays them as
a ‘good’ person. Although this effect is particularly seen with questionnaires asking about
illicit or illegal behaviours, this effect may also occur with a personality questionnaire such
as the FIRO-B. In particular participants may wish to make themselves appear more popular
by exaggerating on the social inclusion questions. Or participants worried about appearing
too controlling or too submissive may underestimate their levels of expressed and received
control. In order to alleviate some of these concerns this research employed an instrument
that has been in use for many years, and has proved a valid measure of interpersonal
behaviour. Furthermore, it was stressed to the participants that their responses to the FIRO-
B would be completely anonymous.
As the line-up procedures were audio-recorded but not video-recorded, we are limited to
analysing the verbal behaviour of the administrator and the participant. Therefore the
kinesic communication, highlighted by Rosenthal (1976) and Greathouse and Kovera (2009),
including the administrator’s expression, or how long they left the photo in front of the
participant, was not available for analysis. Furthermore, not all of the administrators
returned their transcripts of the line-up procedure. Those that were not returned may have
indicated administrator behaviours not identified in the transcripts that were returned. They
may also have highlighted particularly influencing verbal behaviours that would have
corresponded with or contradicted the results of this research.
12.4. Future directions for research
This research has suggested that experimenters can influence participants to pick a
particular person from a photo-array, in a line-up type procedure, without the confounding
effect of a memory of the person. This therefore supports the research that has suggested
that line-up administrators with knowledge of the location of the suspect can also influence
an identification by an eyewitness.
Research has in recent years started to tackle the problem of bias in the criminal justice
system. This research has moved from examining the effect of the administrator’s
knowledge of the location of the suspect to more recently examining the potential for bias
in forensic laboratories, crime scenes, and court rooms. Whilst experimenter expectancy
effects have been well established, the recommendations to reduce these effects, namely
double-blind procedures are still resisted by the criminal justice system. Therefore, more
research is needed to provide an irrefutable argument for the need for double-blind
procedures. In particular this research needs to concentrate on the interaction between the
experimenter and participant.
Despite the magnitude of the body of research demonstrating experimenter expectancy
effects, there is a paucity of understanding of how these expectancies are communicated,
and what factors moderate their communication. Rosenthal (1976) suggested that both
kinesic and paralinguistic channels were important for the communication of expectancies,
a finding that has been validated by subsequent research (Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001;
Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). However, this research has failed to date to determine why an
innocuous verbal statement such as ‘examine the line-up carefully,’ or a smile, or a body
movement would influence a person to make a particular choice from a line-up.
Furthermore, research to date has largely ignored the moderating factors of the
experimenter and the participant, their gender, age, personality, and the effect these have
on the communication and interpretation of expectancies.
This research therefore attempted to measure just one small aspect of personality,
interpersonal behaviour, using just one instrument of measurement. The results of this
research have indicated that certain interpersonal styles may moderate the communication
of expectancies, whilst other interpersonal styles may aid in the interpretation of those
expectancies. More research then is needed in general to examine the factors that
moderate the communication of expectancies. But specifically there is a need to focus on
the social interaction between the experimenter and the participant and the role of
interpersonal relations in this interaction. In particular, research could pit high expressed
control administrators against low received control participants, or examine the effects of
different combinations of interpersonal style of the administrator and the participant on the
communication and interpretation of expectancies. Interestingly though, research has
suggested that some people are not able to read and interpret other peoples cues and
therefore may be immune to experimenter expectancy effects (Rosnow et al., 1994;
Rosnow, Skleder, & Bind, 1995). Is there then an interpersonal style that renders the
expectancies of the experimenter obsolete?
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Photo line-up containing Mr Megrahi’s picture shown to Mr Gauci on the 15thFebruary 1991
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Appendix 2: SREP approval certificate
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Appendix 3: Consent form
Informed Consent for Participation in ResearchInternational Centre for Investigative PsychologyUniversity of HuddersfieldProject Title: Eyewitness Testimony
Researcher:
As part of my postgraduate studies at the University of Huddersfield I am conducting a study on theeffects of different types of line-ups on eyewitness testimony. I am speaking to a random selectionof people for this. I would therefore be grateful it you could take part in an experiment for me.
You will just be asked to look at different line-ups then complete a personality questionnaire.
As I am also interested in how people choose other people from line-ups I will be recording the line-up.
It is completely anonymous. Neither your name nor any other identifying details will be recorded inconnection with your responses. It should not take any more than 10 minutes.
By taking part in the experiment you have consented to be in the study. Participation is voluntary.You may decide not to participate in this study and if you begin participation you may still decide tostop and withdraw at any time. Your decision will be respected, but please be aware that if youchoose to withdraw or omit information, we cannot use any of your answers for analysis.
Please tick the boxes if you are happy to take part in the study
I agree to take part in the experiment
I consent for my responses to be used in further analysis and research
I agree for the experiment to be recorded
A copy of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference.
If you have been affected by any of the issues raised in the research and would like some freeconfidential advice or someone to listen to, the following organisations and support services areavailable to you:
For confidential advice and support:
Tel: 01484 472227
E-mail: internalcounsel@hud.ac.uk
This project is being carried out under the supervision of Jemma Hollinshead. If you have anycomments or questions about the study please contact her at u0972880@hud.ac.uk
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Appendix 4: Photo-array X1 and X2
1 2
1211109
765
3 4
8
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Appendix 5: Photo-array Y1 and Y2
4321
7 865
1211109
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Appendix 6: Respondent answer sheet
Participant code - _____________________________________
Experimenter name - __________________________________
Administrator name - __________________________________
Respondent condition –
Age – _______________________________________________
Gender – M /F (Please circle)
Occupation – _________________________________________
Highest level of education – ______________________________
Have you ever been asked to identify a suspect from a police line-up?
Yes / No (please circle)
How confident are you that you have identified the correct person? (Please circle)
Very unconfident 1 2 3 4 5 Very confident
First Condition
Identification - ____________________________________
Second Condition
First identification - _______________________________
Second identification - _____________________________
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Appendix 7: The FIRO questionnaire
Below is a list of some different ways of behaving towards others. Read each statement and put an Xin one of the 6 boxes to show how much you agree that the statement is true. The more you agree itis true, the nearer your X should be to the AGREE side.
1. I seek out people to be with. DISAGREE AGREE
2. People decide what to do when weare together. DISAGREE AGREE
3. I am totally honest with my closefriends. DISAGREE AGREE
4. People invite me to do things. DISAGREE AGREE
5. I am the dominant person when I amwith people. DISAGREE AGREE
6. My close friends tell me their realfeelings. DISAGREE AGREE
7. I join social groups. DISAGREE AGREE
8. People strongly influence my actions. DISAGREE AGREE
9. I confide in my close friends. DISAGREE AGREE
10. People invite me to join theiractivities. DISAGREE AGREE
11. I get other people to do things Iwant done. DISAGREE AGREE
12. My close friends tell me aboutprivate matters. DISAGREE AGREE
13. I join social organisations. DISAGREE AGREE
14. People control my actions. DISAGREE AGREE
15. I am more comfortable whenpeople do not get too close. DISAGREE AGREE
16. People include me in their activities. DISAGREE AGREE
17. I strongly influence other people'sactions. DISAGREE AGREE
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18. My close friends do not tell meabout themselves. DISAGREE AGREE
19. I am included in informal socialactivities. DISAGREE AGREE
20. I am easily led by people. DISAGREE AGREE
21. People should keep their privatefeelings to themselves. DISAGREE AGREE
22. People invite me to participate intheir activities. DISAGREE AGREE
23. I take charge when I am with peoplesocially. DISAGREE AGREE
24. My close friends let me know theirreal feelings. DISAGREE AGREE
25. I include other people in my plans. DISAGREE AGREE
26. People decide things for me. DISAGREE AGREE
27. There are some things I do not tellanyone. DISAGREE AGREE
28. People include me in their socialaffairs. DISAGREE AGREE
29. I get people to do things the way Iwant them done. DISAGREE AGREE
30. My closest friends keep secretsfrom me. DISAGREE AGREE
31. I have people around me. DISAGREE AGREE
32. People strongly influence my ideas. DISAGREE AGREE
33. There are some things I would nottell anyone. DISAGREE AGREE
34. People ask me to participate in theirdiscussions. DISAGREE AGREE
35. I take charge when I am withpeople. DISAGREE AGREE
36. My friends confide in me. DISAGREE AGREE
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37. When people are doing thingstogether I join them. DISAGREE AGREE
38. I am strongly influenced by whatpeople say. DISAGREE AGREE
39. I have at least one friend to whom Ican tell anything. DISAGREE AGREE
40. People invite me to parties. DISAGREE AGREE
41. I strongly influence other people`sideas. DISAGREE AGREE
42. My close friends keep their feelingsa secret from me. DISAGREE AGREE
43. I look for people to be with. DISAGREE AGREE
44. Other people take charge when wework together. DISAGREE AGREE
45. There is a part of myself I keepprivate. DISAGREE AGREE
46. People invite me to join them whenwe have free time. DISAGREE AGREE
47. I take charge when I work withpeople. DISAGREE AGREE
48. At least two of my friends tell metheir true feelings. DISAGREE AGREE
49. I participate in group activities. DISAGREE AGREE
50. People often cause me to changemy mind. DISAGREE AGREE
51. I have close relationships with a fewpeople. DISAGREE AGREE52. People invite me to do things withthem. DISAGREE AGREE
53. I see to it that people do things theway I want them to. DISAGREE AGREE
54. My friends tell me about theirprivate lives. DISAGREE AGREE
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Appendix 8: The Screeplot of the Principal Components Analysis for the FIRO-B data
242
Item Pattern Coefficients Structure Coefficients Appendix 9:Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of six factor solution of FIRO items
Component1 Component2 Component3 Component4 Component5 Component6 Component1 Component2 Component3 Component4 Component5 Component649 .819 -.040 .009 -.020 .070 .019 .810 .103 -.002 -.062 .140 -.35822 .756 .013 -.054 -.131 -.023 -.133 .824 .162 -.056 -.174 .059 -.48316 .744 .028 -.099 -.080 -.027 -.090 .793 .171 -.100 -.120 .052 -.43419 .739 -.084 .046 -.242 .010 .063 .708 .052 .050 -.277 .072 -.27910 .735 .069 .000 -.057 -.087 -.177 .824 .221 .002 -.103 -.014 -.5087 .735 .121 .080 .115 .109 .185 .676 .236 .069 .080 .131 -.15613 .707 .058 -.001 .171 .079 .227 .613 .166 -.010 .143 .109 -.09528 .692 .063 -.032 -.054 -.105 -.166 .773 .208 -.028 -.096 -.034 -.47752 .660 -.038 -.043 -.136 -.041 -.236 .763 .099 -.047 -.179 .046 -.53837 .632 .025 .081 .028 .052 -.190 .726 .146 .064 -.017 .111 -.47940 .625 -.037 -.008 -.104 -.079 -.309 .757 .101 -.011 -.149 .008 -.5884 .616 .062 -.062 .135 -.098 -.220 .712 .191 -.066 .094 -.027 -.48825 .613 -.089 .102 .000 .125 -.179 .688 .021 .077 -.044 .190 -.46146 .589 -.063 -.074 .120 -.145 -.362 .723 .072 -.080 .078 -.050 -.60934 .551 .087 -.117 .213 -.076 -.212 .646 .199 -.126 .178 -.008 -.45231 .437 .026 .114 -.074 -.070 -.317 .583 .130 .111 -.115 -.017 -.50935 .019 .842 -.078 -.103 .049 -.010 .188 .842 -.067 -.118 -.017 -.07153 .030 .817 -.040 .153 -.049 .071 .136 .820 -.025 .142 -.127 .03047 .013 .790 -.166 .068 .018 -.061 .184 .790 -.160 .055 -.032 -.10829 .001 .778 -.024 .194 -.079 -.026 .139 .783 -.011 .180 -.150 -.04717 -.035 .756 .007 -.048 .010 -.010 .111 .750 .019 -.061 -.063 -.03211 .060 .700 -.017 .228 -.069 -.015 .177 .714 -.008 .213 -.130 -.05841 -.034 .675 .140 -.242 -.112 -.011 .097 .687 .170 -.257 -.190 -.02323 -.007 .641 .052 -.555 .003 -.021 .149 .652 .079 -.569 -.055 -.0735 .056 .610 -.087 -.480 .122 -.051 .226 .619 -.077 -.495 .090 -.14320 .044 -.120 .797 -.093 .103 .082 -.006 -.111 .790 -.117 .025 .08238 -.071 -.042 .773 .051 -.023 -.082 -.050 -.038 .771 .025 -.103 -.015
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Item Pattern Coefficients Structure Coefficients Appendix 9:Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of six factor solution of FIRO items
Component1 Component2 Component3 Component4 Component5 Component6 Component1 Component2 Component3 Component4 Component5 Component6
50 -.053 .035 .736 -.042 -.092 -.097 -.012 .050 .744 -.068 -.170 -.04226 .015 -.040 .729 -.104 .092 .201 -.074 -.042 .729 -.120 .000 .20814 -.003 -.007 .710 -.114 .063 .149 -.064 -.008 .712 -.132 -.027 .16532 .066 .156 .603 .558 -.041 -.066 .089 .174 .588 .528 -.117 -.05044 .066 -.254 .567 -.041 -.129 .057 -.019 -.224 .581 -.054 -.166 .0708 .114 .226 .550 .524 .079 -.024 .143 .239 .526 .493 .002 -.0472 -.267 -.018 .359 .233 -.151 -.280 -.170 -.039 .359 .223 -.188 -.12051 .114 -.152 .103 -.597 -.023 -.323 .261 -.101 .111 -.619 .028 -.3921 .057 .135 .276 -.555 .091 -.190 .203 .160 .280 -.581 .078 -.24843 .187 .162 .350 -.398 .097 -.096 .287 .204 .351 -.429 .074 -.20445 -.020 -.022 .091 -.162 .814 .070 .020 -.101 .010 -.171 .800 -.00133 -.080 -.092 .046 -.164 .811 -.060 .006 -.176 -.040 -.173 .815 -.10227 -.001 .094 -.020 .456 .721 -.012 .058 .018 -.114 .445 .709 -.06215 .117 -.091 -.044 .071 .455 -.224 .237 -.104 -.107 .051 .498 -.31424 .091 .034 -.013 -.070 -.044 -.769 .446 .091 -.034 -.112 .035 -.81148 .153 .103 -.014 -.105 -.049 -.710 .495 .171 -.031 -.149 .024 -.78512 .191 .092 .045 -.064 -.076 -.705 .524 .169 .030 -.111 -.007 -.79036 .171 .082 -.023 -.066 -.076 -.672 .488 .153 -.036 -.108 -.003 -.7506 .187 .074 .019 -.086 -.090 -.670 .502 .150 .008 -.130 -.019 -.75454 .257 .050 .000 -.087 -.091 -.656 .560 .138 -.012 -.132 -.011 -.77142 -.137 -.100 -.108 -.199 .197 -.646 .165 -.111 -.147 -.221 .270 -.6129 .183 .035 .134 .040 .117 -.589 .464 .086 .097 -.005 .169 -.6783 .109 -.011 .045 .201 .106 -.545 .352 .021 .006 .166 .160 -.59239 .099 .038 .030 -.111 .053 -.527 .355 .078 .009 -.145 .106 -.58430 -.084 -.001 -.194 .062 .253 -.524 .172 -.019 -.243 .043 .316 -.51418 .177 -.090 -.208 .128 .052 -.389 .336 -.050 -.235 .108 .133 -.471
21 .135 -.089 -.138 .302 .279 -.371 .295 -.081 -.194 .279 .344 -.444
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Appendix 10: Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of three factorsolution of FIRO items
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Cont. Appendix 10: Pattern and structure matrix for PCA with oblimin rotation of threefactor solution of FIRO items
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